Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Stony Brook under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging discrimination and retaliation when he was terminated from his employment as an electrician. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether plaintiff was an employee of Stony Brook. The court held, according to precedent, that a trial court did not commit error by submitting the question of whether plaintiff was defendant's employee to the jury, whether by general verdict or by special question. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court erred when it instructed the jury to use the factors in Cmty. for Creative Non‐Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989), to determine whether plaintiff was a Stony Brook employee. The court held that the evidence presented disputed issues of fact regarding several of the Reid factors, and the balancing of those factors and others that pointed both in favor of and against employee status also presented a disputed issue requiring resolution by the fact‐finder. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining arguments. View "Knight v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's third amended complaint against the Department and others. Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to discrimination and retaliation after he filed complaints against the Department with OSHA. The court held that the district court erred in holding that administrative exhaustion must be pleaded in the complaint. Rather, administrative exhaustion under Title VII was an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hardaway v. Hartford Public Works Department" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor reasonably determined that the cited workplace conditions were subject to regulation under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, rather than the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). The court noted that the Secretary's reasonable determination regarding which conditions are to be regulated by MSHA and which by OSHA was entitled to substantial deference. In this case, the ALJ gave no deference whatsoever to the Secretary's decision to issue the citations for the Bag Plant violations under the authority of OSHA, but rather imposed his own interpretation of what the Mine Act covered. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Secretary of Labor v. Cranesville Aggregate Cos." on Justia Law

Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, are subject to arbitration. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that he was denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff's employment contract contained a clause requiring arbitration of any dispute arising out of the contract. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of a claim under the FLSA and dismissing the complaint for violations of the Act. The court held that plaintiff's remaining contentions lacked merit. View "Rodriguez-Depena v. Parts Authority, Inc." on Justia Law

Unpaid interns in this case were not "employees" of Hearst for the purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York Labor Law (NYLL). The Second Circuit applied the "primary beneficiary" test in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. and considered the seven non-exhaustive considerations specific to the context of unpaid internships. The court held that the facts of this case permit inferences that support Hearst with respect to certain Glatt factors, and inferences that support particular interns with respect to other factors. Such mixed inferences did not foreclose a ruling on summary judgment. The court agreed with the district court, which weighed all factors under the totality of the circumstances, and concluded that the interns were not "employees" for the purposes of the FLSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Hearst. View "Wang v. The Hearst Corporation" on Justia Law

LIAAC petitioned for review of the Board's order determining that LIAAC violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by promulgating an unlawful confidentiality agreement and by terminating an employee for his refusal to sign the unlawful confidentiality agreement. The Second Circuit enforced the order and held that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) when it terminates an employee for refusing to sign an unlawful employment document. The court disposed of the remaining issues on appeal in a summary order. View "NLRB v. Long Island Ass'n for AIDS Care, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over subcontracting clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) between the Carpenters' Union and various construction companies and construction managers. The clauses effectively barred subcontracting of construction work with non-Carpenter affiliates. Ironworkers alleged that the Carpenters have used these subcontracting clauses to expand the scope of work assigned to the Carpenters Union to include work traditionally assigned to the Ironworkers. The district court granted summary judgment to the Carpenters. The Second Circuit held that the Carpenters have met the requirements of the construction industry proviso of Section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, but that, on this record, there were factual disputes that precluded a decision on whether the conduct fell within the non‐statutory exemption to antitrust liability. The court explained, to demonstrate that the disputed subcontracting practices were sheltered by the non‐statutory exemption (and thus to defeat the Ironworkers' antitrust claim completely), the Carpenters must show that these practices furthered legitimate aims of collective bargaining, in a way that was not unduly restrictive of market competition. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment as to the Sherman Act claim; affirmed as to the unfair labor practices claim; and remanded. View "Conn. Ironworkers Employers Assoc. v. New England Regional Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

The duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act does not necessarily preempt the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) for claims of discrimination filed by a union member against a labor organization when the labor organization is acting in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative (as distinguished from when it is acting in its capacity as an employer). The Second Circuit held that the Act's duty of representation does not preempt the NYSHRL either on the basis of field preemption or as a general matter on the basis of conflict preemption. Accordingly, the court reversed the declaratory judgment of the district court and denied Local's cross-appeal for injunctive relief. View "Figueroa v. Foster" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's determination that plaintiff asserted claims only under federal law, its dismissal of claims against the individual defendants, and its dismissal of plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. At issue in this appeal was whether a pro se litigant forfeits her claims under New York state and local discrimination law where she has alleged facts supporting such claims, but fails to check a blank on a form complaint indicating that she wishes to bring them. The court held that such a bright-line rule runs counter to the court's policy of liberally construing pro se submissions, and that plaintiff's complaint in this case should have been read by the district court to assert claims under New York state and local discrimination law as well as under federal law. The court addressed the balance of plaintiff's claims on appeal in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "McLeod v. The Jewish Guild for the Blind" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in favor of defendants, agreeing with plaintiff that the district court wrongly instructed the jury that "but for" causation applied to Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) claims. The court held that FMLA retaliation claims of the sort plaintiff brought here were grounded in 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1) and a "motivating factor" causation standard applied to those claims. The court also held that the district court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in admitting and permitting the adverse inferences to be drawn in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Centers" on Justia Law