Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who suffers from a fear of needles (trypanophobia), filed suit against Rite Aid, alleging violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., after he was terminated from his position as a pharmacist because he could not comply with the company's policy that required pharmacists to administer immunization injections to customers. On appeal, Rite Aid challenged the district court's award of substantial damages to plaintiff after a jury trial. Both parties appealed the district court's post-trial order that dismissed plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim, granted a new trial unless plaintiff agreed to a remittitur (later accepted), substantially granted plaintiff's claims for interest, and denied defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on plaintiff's wrongful discharge and retaliation claims. The court explained that because performing immunization injections was an essential job requirement and plaintiff presented no evidence of a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed him to perform immunizations at the time of his dismissal, no juror could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was "qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation." Therefore, the court reversed the post-trial denial of the JMOL on plaintiff's federal and state wrongful termination and retaliation claims, affirmed the dismissal of the failure-to-accommodate claim; and remanded for entry of a revised judgment in favor of Rite Aid. View "Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., against his employer, MCU, after he was denied leave to take care of his seriously ill grandfather who, in loco parentis, had raised him as a child. The district court granted MCU's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The district court reasoned that, although the FMLA provides that an eligible employee may be entitled to take leave in order to care for a person with whom he had an in loco parentis relationship as a child, plaintiff had informed MCU merely that he needed to take care of his grandfather without informing MCU of the in loco parentis relationship. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to MCU on the basis that plaintiff had failed to provide the necessary information, given MCU's denial of plaintiff's request without requesting additional information; vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings; rejected MCU's contention that the district court's dismissal of the complaint can be upheld on other grounds; and rejected plaintiff's request that the court order the grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in his favor. View "Coutard v. Municipal Credit Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MTBank, alleging violations of various state and federal statues by not allowing her to work remotely when she became pregnant. The magistrate judge ruled as a matter of law against plaintiff on a number of claims and the jury found for MTBank on the remaining claims. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the reinstatement offer because the offer was, as a matter of law, not unconditional; the district court erred in sua sponte disqualifying the attorneys for both parties, because the disqualification depended on the erroneous admission of evidence relating to the reinstatement offer; the jury instructions were not erroneous; and the court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to the district court's New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., ruling. Accordingly, the court vacated in part in regard to the jury's verdict and the disqualification order, dismissed in part in regard to claims under the NYSHRL, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jia Sheng v. MTBank Corp." on Justia Law

The Union filed a petition seeking to represent Constellation’s outside cellar employees as a bargaining unit. Constellation subsequently refused to bargain with the Union and the Union filed an unfair-labor-practice charge. The Board granted summary judgment for the Union, concluding that Constellation had violated labor laws. Constellation petitioned for review and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. At issue is whether the framework for evaluating proposed bargaining units set forth in Specialty Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, is unlawful. The court held that the Specialty Healthcare framework was valid, as its sister circuits have, and was consistent with this court’s precedent. However, the court concluded that the Board did not properly apply the Specialty Healthcare framework in its decision and order against Constellation. In approving the petitioned‐for collective bargaining unit, the court concluded that the Board did not analyze at step one of the Specialty Healthcare framework whether the excluded employees had meaningfully distinct interests from members of the petitioned‐for unit in the context of collective bargaining that outweigh similarities with unit members. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Constellation Brands, U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a union employee, filed suit alleging that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race and/or national origin, and retaliated against him. At issue on appeal is whether the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which requires arbitration of disputes over discrimination, requires arbitration of statutory claims. The court concluded that the CBA’s arbitration requirement does not encompass statutory discrimination or retaliation claims with wording that is “clear and unmistakable.” Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the complaint, remanding for further proceedings. View "Lawrence v. Sol G. Atlas Realty Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked at the concessions at Oriole Park, the home field of the Baltimore Orioles. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. DNC Sportservice, the owner of the concessions, chose not to pay on the basis of an exemption under section 213(a)(3) of the FLSA, which exempts any amusement or recreational establishment. The court concluded that a concessions operator at a place of amusement or recreation qualifies in its own right as “amusement or recreational,” even though it does not directly provide the amusement or the recreation. The court concluded that, although the FLSA does not define “amusement or recreational,” the legislative history and an interpretative rule from the Department of Labor indicate that “concessionaires” at amusement or recreational establishments are themselves typical examples of such establishments. Using the common understanding and definition of “concessionaire,” the court held that an establishment at an amusement or recreational host that sells goods or services to the host’s customer’s for their consumption or use during the host’s amusement or recreational activities is a concessionaire that qualifies as an “amusement or recreational establishment” under FLSA. In this case, the court concluded that DNC Sportservice satisfied the receipts test to qualify for the exemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to DNC Sportservice. View "Hill v. Delaware North Co. Sportservice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two former employees of Astro, filed suit against Astro, Allied, and Sirva, alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. 296(15). The court noted that this case presents the following three questions that the New York Court of Appeals has not had the opportunity to address and thus the court certified to the New York State Court of Appeals: First, does Section 296(15) limit liability for unlawful denial of employment only to the aggrieved party’s “employer”? Second, if Section 296(15) is limited in that way, how should courts determine whether an entity is the aggrieved party’s “employer” for the purposes of a claim under Section 296(15)? Third, does the “aiding and abetting” liability provision of the NYSHRL, Section 296(6), apply to Section 296(15) such that a non‐employer may be liable under Section 296(15) as an aider and abettor of an employer’s unlawful denial of employment? View "Griffin v. Sirva Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the New Your State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. The district court dismissed the claims, holding that plaintiff's employer could not have engaged in retaliation because it could not be held responsible for the retaliatory animus of plaintiff's co-worker, a low-level employee with no decisionmaking authority. The court held, however, that an employee’s retaliatory intent may be imputed to an employer where, as alleged here, the employer’s own negligence gives effect to the employee’s retaliatory animus and causes the victim to suffer an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that she was terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech when she spoke to local leaders about what she saw as a "scam" occurring in the police department. The district court held that the officials had not shown entitlement to summary judgment of qualified immunity because, accepting plaintiff's facts as true and drawing all permissible factual inferences in her favor, she had shown that they had violated her clearly established constitutional rights. The court concluded that, under plaintiff's version of the facts, there was no doubt that under the prevailing decisions, plaintiff's speech was not made "pursuant to" her official duties as a patrol officer. Therefore, defendants failed to show entitlement to fire plaintiff or entitlement to qualified immunity under her version of the facts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ricciuti v. Gyzenis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's partial grant of summary judgment to his former employer, Rockbestos, on his claims of hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review so much of the district court's judgment as involves plaintiff's claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a‐60. In regard to plaintiff's discriminatory-discharge claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., the court concluded that, although the district court's explanation of why plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that he was qualified for his position was erroneous, the decision was nevertheless correct because plaintiff failed to proffer a sufficient explanation in light of the record why his assertion that he was qualified for his position was consistent with his earlier sworn statement to the SSA that he was “unable to work.” Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge on summary judgment under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA. Finally, the court held that to the extent plaintiff pleaded hostile-work-environment claims in his amended complaint, he has subsequently abandoned these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction in regard to the CFEPA claim. View "Kovaco v. Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp." on Justia Law