Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several active and former Assistant Urban Park Rangers (AUPRs) employed by the City's Parks Department alleged that they, and others similarly situated, were not paid in accordance with the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The district court granted partial summary judgment for defendants and closed the case without further proceedings. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On the current record, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that plaintiffsʹ donning and doffing of uniforms were not integral and indispensable to their principal activities as AUPRs - the sole ground on which the district court granted partial summary judgment. Therefore, the court remanded to allow the district court to decide, in the first instance, whether plaintiffsʹ donning and doffing are nevertheless non‐compensable as a matter of law under the de minimis doctrine or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court should also resolve the issues that defendants raise as to their entitlement to partial summary judgment on other aspects of plaintiffsʹ claims, which the district court's decision erroneously failed to reach.  Absent another appeal or additional motions by the parties that dispose of the action in its entirety, the case should then proceed to trial. View "Perez v. The City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NYCHA, alleging that its decision not to hire her as a bricklayer was sex-based and thus violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL); and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). The district court granted summary judgment to NYCHA as to the Title VII and NYSHRL claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim and dismissed it without prejudice. The court concluded that the district court erred when it failed to view plaintiff’s evidence as a whole and instead set aside each piece of evidence after deeming it insufficient to create a triable issue of fact that NYCHA’s refusal to hire her was based in part on the fact that she is female. In this case, plaintiff has proffered evidence that - when viewed as a whole - is sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that NYCHA’s decision not to hire her was more likely than not motivated in part by sex-based discrimination. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Walsh v. NYCHA" on Justia Law

WCC, an employers' association, challenged the district court's order vacating an award issued in an arbitration between WCC and the District Council. The district court vacated the award, holding that the award did not draw its essence from the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and conflicted with the district court's earlier order approving the CBA. The court concluded, however, that the arbitrator properly exercised his authority to interpret the CBA, and that his award did not violate the judicial order of approval. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to revisit its decision to approve the CBA with the benefit of the arbitrator’s interpretation of its two‐man job provision. View "NYC & Vicinity Dist. v. Ass'n of Wall-Ceiling and Carpentry Indus." on Justia Law

In 2004, an AG investigation focused on an alleged bid‐rigging scheme involving Marsh and several insurance carriers. Marsh's counsel asked two employees, William Gilman and Edward McNenney, Jr., to sit for interviews, but neither employee complied with the request. The employees subsequently filed suit against Marsh after the company fired them "for cause," and denied them unvested, deferred compensation as well as severance. The district court granted summary judgment for Marsh. The court concluded that the interview demands were reasonable as a matter of law because at the time they were made, the employees were Marsh employees who had been implicated in an alleged criminal conspiracy for acts that were within the scope of employment and that imperiled the company. The court also concluded that there are no triable issues of facts as to whether Marsh fired the employees for cause. The court rejected the employees' argument that they were let go routinely as part of a reduction in force and the argument that Gilman could not be fired because he had preemptively resigned. Finally, the court rejected the employees' contention that, in light of Marsh’s cooperation with the AG, Marsh’s requirement that they answer potentially incriminating questions amounted to state action, and was thus unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because Marsh had cause to fire the employees and they were not entitled to the employment benefits at issue. View "Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, or alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59, or relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) on plaintiff's New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) claim. Plaintiff, diagnosed with cancer, cross-appealed the dismissal of her New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) claim. Plaintiff and her husband cross-appealed the dismissal of their Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 116(a), claims. The court held that, because plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation prior to her termination, the district court erred in denying defendants’ Rule 50 motion. Therefore, the court reversed that decision and vacated the jury award on the NYSHRL claim. However, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's NYCHRL claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denial of the COBRA claims on the merits. View "Vangas v. Montefiore Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that American Airlines violated its obligation under the McCaskill‐Bond amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. 42112 note, to provide for the integration of the American Airlines and U.S. Airways seniority lists “in a fair and equitable manner.” Plaintiffs also claimed principally that the Association of Professional Flight Attendants (“APFA”), the labor union representing American Airlines flight attendants, violated its duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151‐165, by failing to represent the former TWA flight attendants adequately during the creation of the integrated seniority list. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The court concluded that McCaskill‐Bond did not require American Airlines to reorder its own seniority list upon entering into a new merger in order to redress plaintiffs’ endtailing in 2001. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim against American Airlines under McCaskill‐Bond. The court also concluded that the union’s refusal to reorder the list, in accordance with its policy and the condition imposed by American Airlines, was not irrational or arbitrary; nor was the union’s decision to use the “length of service” rule to integrate the seniority lists unlawfully discriminatory in violation of the Railway Labor Act; and the amended complaint’s allegations do not raise an inference of “bad faith” on the part of APFA. The court considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Flight Attendants in Reunion v. Am. Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, OAG, alleging discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. OAG moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter, arguing that plaintiff was employed at a policymaking level and thus was subject to the Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 (GERA), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16a, 2000e-16b, and 2000e-16c. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that GERA was inapplicable in this case. The court concluded that the district court's denial of OAG's motion to dismiss under GERA does not qualify as an immediately appealable order under that doctrine. Therefore, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Fischer v. New York State Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, members of an electrical union, appealed the dismissal of their claims against their union. Plaintiff alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.621 et seq., violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411 et seq., the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq., and the union’s duty of fair representation (DFR), as well as unlawful retaliation for complaints. The court concluded that the district court erroneously ruled that a union official’s expressions of resentment of plaintiffs’ claims of age discrimination could not evince retaliatory animus existing prior to the time the resentful statements were made. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with respect to the ADEA claims to which the magistrate judge’s recommendation of dismissal was based solely on the fact that the referral occurred prior to the February 2009 union meeting. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Kazolias v. IBEW" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging violation of his due process rights and that defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously by terminating his employment. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff does not have a private right of action under the Due Process Clause of the sort recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that this claim was properly dismissed. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Atterbury v. U.S. Marshals Service" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the disputed assignment of certain construction work on the Tappan Zee Hudson River Crossing Project. UBC appealed the district court's conclusion that a May 4th arbitration award was not final and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by issuing a May 12th arbitration award. Under a heightened standard of deference, the court concluded that it must defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation of Article 10, Section 3(D) of the Project Labor Agreement (PLA) as allowing him to alter the short‐form award when rendering his written opinion. The PLA does not define the term “short‐form,” nor does it specifically require that the second decision echo the result of the first.  The court concluded that, absent any such definitions or provisions, the arbitrator had the authority to interpret Article 10, Section 3(D) as allowing him to change or alter the first award in order to ensure full consideration of the three criteria required under Article 5, Section 8 of the National Plan for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry. Accordingly, the court confirmed the May 13th Award and vacated the May 4th Award. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC" on Justia Law