Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging a claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112-12117, and seeking damages. Plaintiff's claim is based on her employer’s decision to reduce her discretionary bonus after she was absent from work for four months. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The court concluded that the district court erred in ruling that denial or reduction of a bonus could not constitute an adverse employment action solely because the employer had discretion whether to pay a bonus. The court further concluded that, despite this error, the district court correctly determined that, even if plaintiff established an adverse employment action, she failed to present evidence that would support the necessary finding of discriminatory motivation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Davis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Edu." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against defendants under state and federal labor laws, alleging that they were unlawfully denied various forms of compensation and benefits because defendants improperly classified them as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court denied defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained in plaintiffs' subsequent employment agreements. Plaintiffs contend that the prior Sales Agreements and the conduct of the parties reveals positive assurance that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to apply to claims that arose during the time period when defendants affirmatively labeled plaintiffs as non‐employees. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration because it found positive assurance that the parties did not intend for the arbitration agreement to be retroactive. View "Holick v. Cellular Sales of New York, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former employees of the State of Vermont, filed suit against the State, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiffs first filed suit in state court and defendants removed to federal district court. The district court subsequently granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that, while defendants may, by removing the action, have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal forum, defendants have not expressly waived Vermont’s general sovereign immunity from private FLSA suit, and their litigation conduct does not constitute such a waiver. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Beaulieu v. State of Vermont" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., against defendants, alleging that he worked without pay as a volunteer for FanFest, a five‐day “interactive baseball theme park” organized in conjunction with Major League Baseball’s 2013 All‐Star Week. The district court dismissed plaintiff's putative FLSA collective action claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his would‐be New York Labor Law, 190 et seq., & 650 et seq., claims. The court concluded that the term “establishment” for purposes of the amusement or recreational establishment exemption to the FLSA means a distinct, physical place of business, agreed with the district court that the exemption applies to FanFest, and did not reach the question of whether plaintiff was an employee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chen v. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's refusal to enter the parties' stipulation of settlement dismissing, with prejudice, plaintiff's claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(c), and New York Labor Law. The court agreed with the district court's holding that parties cannot enter into private settlements of FLSA claims without either the approval of the district court or the DOL. Therefore, in the absence of such approval, parties cannot settle their FLSA claims through a private stipulated dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City and three supervisors at ACS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on race, and retaliated against because of complaints about such discrimination. Plaintiff also alleged that she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court vacated the district court's judgment granting defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiff's disparate treatment and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII; plaintiff's disparate treatment claim against Defendant Baker under sections 1981 and 1983 where only Baker was involved in the decision to demote plaintiff; and plaintiff's retaliation claim against Baker under section 1981 where she alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The court affirmed as to the other claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Littlejohn v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals employed by the DSNY, filed a putative class action under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and New York State and City human rights laws, alleging that defendants discriminated against them and others similarly situated on the basis of their race and/or national origin in the DSNY's promotional practices. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims. The court concluded that the district court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the Equal Protection and section 1981 claims is affirmed. The court held that, to show discriminatory intent in a section 1981 or Equal Protection case based on statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible non-discriminatory explanations very unlikely. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to allege statistics that meet these standards. Furthermore, the fact that each of the plaintiffs has been promoted at some point undermines their allegations of discrimination in the promotion of sanitation workers to supervisors. The court also concluded that the Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the New York labor Law (NYLL). After plaintiffs prevailed, the district court awarded plaintiffs' counsel $514,284.00 in attorneys’ fees and $68,294.50 in costs. Of that amount, it awarded $10,425 to reimburse plaintiffs' counsel for costs incurred retaining an expert accountant for plaintiffs' affirmative case against defendants. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court’s award of fees and costs constituted an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that because section 216(b) does not explicitly authorize awards reimbursing plaintiffs for expert fees, the district court erred in granting such an award pursuant to this provision. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s award of $10,425 in costs for expert fees and remanded to the district court to consider whether the NYLL authorizes the award of such fees and, if so, whether to award them pursuant to the NYLL. In a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part as to defendants' other challenges. View "Gortat v. Capala Bros." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, appealed the district court's dismissal of his putative collection action seeking damages from defendants for violations of the overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint arose out of his work as a contract attorney in North Carolina. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that: (1) state, not federal, law informs FLSA’s definition of “practice of law;” and (2) North Carolina, as the place where plaintiff worked and lived, has the greatest interest in this litigation, and thus the court looks to North Carolina law to determine if plaintiff was practicing law within the meaning of FLSA. The court, however, disagreed with the district court’s conclusion, on a motion to dismiss, that by undertaking the document review plaintiff allegedly was hired to conduct, he was necessarily “practicing law” within the meaning of North Carolina law. The court found that accepting the allegations as pleaded, plaintiff adequately alleged in his complaint that his document review was devoid of legal judgment such that he was not engaged in the practice of law, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom" on Justia Law