Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, knowing that Plaintiff‐Appellant Natasha Davis was a Type I diabetic, Defendant‐Appellee Bombardier Transportation Holdings (USA) Inc. hired her as a Customer Service Agent (later renaming the position as an Air Train Agent or "ATA"). In 2007, Davis went on disability leave for diabetic retinopathy. Davis underwent at least six eye surgeries during her leave. In August, Davis notified Bombardier that she was prepared to return to work, and submitted to a physical. Bombardier informed Davis that she failed the physical and eye exams, but Davis contended she passed. Bombardier thereafter determined that Davis could no longer operate as an "ATA II." On September 1, 2007, Bombardier “demoted” Davis to the ATA I position, which paid 75 cents less per hour than the ATA II position. Davis filed suit against Bombardier, bringing claims of disability-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted Bombardier's motion for summary judgment, finding (in relevant part) that Davis' demotion-based claim was time barred. On appeal, Davis argued that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 applied to and revived her claims. The Ledbetter Act made it unlawful to apply a discriminatory compensation decision to an employee and starts a new statute of limitations clock with each paycheck that reflected that decision. Davis argued that Bombardier’s demotion decision was made with disability‐based discriminatory intent and, as a result, reduced her compensation. Thus, she contended that her claim was timely when measured from her last paycheck and not the date of her demotion. After review, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor of Bombardier, concluding that the Ledbetter Act did not encompass a claim of a discriminatory demotion decision that results in lower wages where, as here, the plaintiff had not offered any proof that the compensation itself was set in a discriminatory manner. A plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of a pay-discrimination claim to benefit from the Ledbetter Act’s accrual provisions. View "Davis v. Bombardier Transp. Holdings" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hired as unpaid interns on the Fox Searchlight-distributed film "Black Swan," claimed compensation as employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and New York Labor Law. The district court granted plaintiff Glatt and Footman's motion for partial summary judgment, certified plaintiff Antalik's New York class, and conditionally certified Antalik's nationwide collective. The court agreed with defendants that the proper question is whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the relationship, and the court proposed a list of non‐exhaustive factors to aid courts in answering that question. Because the district court limited its review to the six factors in DOL’s Intern Fact Sheet, the court remanded for the district court to permit the parties to submit additional evidence. Even if Antalik established that Fox had a policy of replacing paid employees with unpaid interns, it would not necessarily mean that every Fox intern was likely to prevail on her claim that she was an FLSA employee under the primary beneficiary test, the most important issue in each case. Assuming some questions may be answered with generalized proof, they are not more substantial than the questions requiring individualized proof. Because the most important question in this litigation cannot be answered with generalized proof, the court vacated the district court’s order certifying Antalik’s proposed class and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, for substantially the same reasons as with respect to Antalik’s Rule 23 motion, the court vacated the district court’s order conditionally certifying Antalik’s proposed nationwide collective action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a financial advisor employed by UBS, filed a putative class action and collective action against UBS, asserting wage-and-hour claims under federal and state law. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and from the subsequent order of the district court denying his motion for reconsideration. The court held that enforcement of the UBS Compensation Plan would not be “contrary” to Rule 13204 because the Rule bars neither the enforcement of pre‐dispute waivers of class and collective action procedures nor the arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims. Because plaintiff concedes that his claims under California's Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act, Cal. Lab. Code 2699, are untimely, the court need not decide whether this doctrine of California law is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cohen v. UBS Fin. Svc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Chase, filed a putative class action alleging violations of state and federal overtime laws. The district court denied Chase's motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed, concluding that the arbitration clause in the employment contracts cover only claims or controversies “required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules.” The court agreed with the district court's ruling that it thus incorporated the arbitrability restrictions of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (FINRA Rules) and the district court's application of the current version of FINRA Rule 13204, which prohibits arbitration of claims brought as putative class or collective actions. View "Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law, 26 N.Y. Exec. Law 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as his defamation claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court except with respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary judgment based on plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. Plaintiff submitted evidence that the principal of the school changed the person who conducted plaintiff's year-end evaluation without providing notice to plaintiff, that the principal relied on the 2008-2009 evaluations at issue in isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews were aberrational. These irregularities, when combined with the principal's alleged remarks, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Tolbert v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who self-identifies as male but was born biologically female, filed suit against defendants, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of sex and retaliated against him for filing an earlier action against them. The district court construed plaintiff’s complaint as stating federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and related state‐ and city‐law claims. The district court dismissed the complaint based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in determining that plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction over his Title VII claims; plaintiff has stated a federal claim under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, et seq., for the Local’s breach of its duty of fair representation; and therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Polish man of Jewish descent, filed suit against his employer, Mangia, and other individuals, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, retaliation, conspiracy, wrongful termination, and violation of various New York State and City laws. A jury found Mangia liable and awarded nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages in the amount of $900,000. After the verdict, plaintiff applied for an award of attorneys' fees and costs and Mangia moved for remittitur of the punitive damages award. The district court vacated the jury's liability verdict, conditionally granted Mangia's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and denied plaintiff's application for fees and costs. The court reversed the district court's ruling insofar as it vacates the liability verdict and award of nominal damages in the amount of $1 where, inter alia, the district court's rejection of the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was subject to a hostile work environment was essentially grounded in the type of evidence weighing and credibility determinations that are not permitted by Rule 50(b). The court affirmed the district court's ruling to the extent it vacated the award of punitive damages where no reasonable jury could conclude that Mangia's conduct was driven by an evil motive or intent, or that it involved a reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. The court remanded to the district court to determine what fees and costs, if any, plaintiff may recover given the highly unusual facts of this case. View "Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc." on Justia Law

Greathouse filed a retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3), 216, alleging that when he orally complained to his supervisor (Wilcox) that he had not received the pay he was due as a security guard, Wilcox responded, “I’ll pay you when I feel like it,” and, without warning, drew a gun and pointed it at Greathouse. Greathous understood that response as ending his employment. Greathouse obtained a default judgment, but the district court declined to award damages, based on precedent holding that making an informal oral complaint to a supervisor did not amount to “fil[ing a] complaint” and was not protected by the statute. The Second Circuit vacated, based on the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Kasten v. Saint‐Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., that an oral complaint can serve as a predicate to an FLSA retaliation claim. View "Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc." on Justia Law

Hicks was a deckhand on a tugboat when, while handling heavy gear, he injured his shoulder. A company doctor determined that Hicks was not fit for duty. His employer acknowledged its obligation to pay maintenance and cure and medical expenses until full recovery, maximum improvement, or until his condition was declared permanent, 46 U.S.C. 30104 (Jones Act). Hicks had surgery and physical therapy. His employer hired an investigator to videotape Hicks surreptitiously. The video showed Hicks planting a small tree and playing with his grandson. When Hicks’s doctor requested funding for an MRI scan, he was shown this footage and told that Hicks’s job required only light lifting. The doctor determined that Hicks was fit for duty. The employer terminated payments. Hicks consulted a second doctor, who diagnosed a recurrent rotator cuff tear and recommended another surgery plus rehabilitation. Under financial pressure, Hicks returned to work and missed physical therapy. His house went into foreclosure, and he was unable to pay for health insurance. Hicks sued, claiming negligence under the Jones Act and the maritime doctrines of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. The jury awarded $190,000 for past and future maintenance and cure and $132,000 for pain and suffering. Based on a finding that the failure to pay was unreasonable and willful, Hicks was awarded $123,000 in punitive damages and $112,083.77 in attorney’s fees. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Hicks v. Vane Line Bunkering, Inc." on Justia Law

Home health care plaintiffs sought to prevent the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, from enforcing the Wage Parity Law, which sets the minimum amount of total compensation that employers must pay home care aides in order to receive Medicaid reimbursements for reimbursable care provided in New York City and Westchester, Suffolk, and Nassau Counties, N.Y. Pub. Health Law 3614‐c. Plaintiffs claim the Law was either preempted by the National Labor Relations 8 Act, 29 U.S.C. 151, or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, or was unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court conclusion that the state law, except for one severable provision subdivision that singles out Taft‐Hartley plans for special treatment, is neither preempted nor unconstitutional. View "Concerned Home Care Providers, Inc. v. Cuomo" on Justia Law