Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, employed as "Audit Associates," filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, against KMPG, alleging that they were entitled to overtime compensation. The court concluded that Audit Associates are learned professionals who perform work requiring advanced knowledge requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, and who have customarily received this advanced knowledge through a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction. Therefore, they are learned professionals and are exempt from the FLSA overtime requirements. The court concluded that plaintiffs' remaining arguments were without merit and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to KPMG.View "Pippins v. KPMG LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DPS under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against DPS. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim regarding plaintiff's Casino Unit transfer and the jury's verdict in favor of DPS as to the Title VII retaliation claim; vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment of the Title VII race discrimination claims where, balancing the McDonnell Douglas factors, the court concluded that it was simply too close to call and should be a question for a jury; vacated the corresponding race discrimination claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. 1983; and remanded for further proceedings.View "Abrams v. Dept. of Pub. Safety" on Justia Law

The EEOC filed suit against the Port Authority under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), alleging that the Port Authority paid its female nonsupervisory attorneys at a lesser rate than their male counterparts for "equal work." The district court granted the Port Authority's motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The court affirmed, concluding that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief where the EEOC failed to allege any facts concerning the attorneys' actual job duties and, therefore, the court had no basis from which to draw a reasonable inference that the attorneys performed "equal work." View "EEOC v. Port Authority of N.Y. and N.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employers, BoA, on his claim of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and breach of contract. Under the McDonald Douglas Corp v. Green framework, assuming arguendo that plaintiff met his burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of age discrimination, the court agreed with the district court that BoA has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination. BoA has explained that plaintiff's employment was terminated as part of a company-wide reduction in force; two months prior to his termination, plaintiff received a negative mid-year performance review; and as of September 2010, plaintiff was ranked 136th across all BoA sales personnel for the year and his performance was the worse of all employees in his group. In regards to the breach of contract claim, the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was an at-will employee and that although annual bonuses were discretionary, there is no record evidence, or even an allegation, indicating that plaintiff was promised a mid-year bonus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Delaney v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his original complaint against DIL and his amended complaint against DIL's wholly-owned subsidiary, Daikin America. Plaintiff, a white male of United States origin, alleged that DIL and Daikin discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin. Plaintiff claimed that, for discriminatory reasons, Daikin America did not consider terminating any of the Japanese rotational employees or any employees of Japanese national origin who had been hired directly by Daikin America. The court concluded that, under the standards articulated in Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., plaintiff sufficiently alleged that DIL was part of a "single integrated enterprise" with Daikin America to be properly named as a codefendant; plaintiff plausibly alleged a claim of race and national origin discrimination against both defendants; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim because he failed to allege that either defendant maintained a written policy of terminating employees only for cause. View "Brown v. Daikin America Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants after she was temporarily removed from the office of the Clinton County Election Commissioner during her candidacy for Beekmantown Town Justice. Plaintiff alleged that her removal from office under Clinton County Local Law No. 1 was an unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights in running for elective office. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's evidence failed to show a genuine issue of material fact supporting her claim of unconstitutional retaliation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed her federal claim. The court vacated, however, the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claim seeking a declaratory judgment that Local Law No. 1 is void under New York state law. The timing of the claim raises a substantial question whether the claim was moot. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider the question of mootness in the first instance. View "Castine v. Zurlo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's federal claim for relief under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The court declined to review plaintiff's lack of notice claim. The court concluded that the totality of the circumstances, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, compelled the legal conclusion that he rendered services at a high school as a public agency volunteer, thereby exempting the DOE from the minimum and overtime wage requirements of the FLSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, and the court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's New York Labor Law claim without prejudice to refiling in state court. View "Brown v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, formerly employed as mortgage underwriters by the Bank, filed suit in state court asserting state law claims for unjust enrichment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Bank removed to federal court and the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., preempted plaintiffs' common law claims. In Gunn v. Minton, the Supreme Court explained that federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. In this case, the court concluded that the federal issue arising in these state law claims was not substantial, and the district court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the court were to assume that plaintiffs' state common law claims raised a federal issue as pled, the federal issue was at best insubstantial. Accordingly, the court concluded that the federal courts were without subject matter jurisdiction in this case and vacated and remanded with instructions. View "Fracasse v. People's United Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed discrimination and retaliation claims against the Bank under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., as well as state and local laws. At issue was whether an employee's inability to sit for a prolonged time may constitute a disability under the ADA. The court held that impairments that limit the ability to sit for long periods of time do not categorically fail to qualify as disabilities under the ADA. The court vacated the district court's judgment relating to plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA and leave for the district court to determine in the first instance on remand if the record reflected a genuine dispute of fact as to whether plaintiff's inability to sit for a prolonged period of time constituted a substantial limitation of a major life activity, and to address remaining arguments advanced by the Bank in its summary judgment motion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., as well as her claim of retaliation under the ADA. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim of discrimination under the ADA and her claims under state law, remanding for further proceedings. View "Parada v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, C.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her state-law tort claims as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations applicable to her tort claims was tolled by her filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The court joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding as a matter of federal law that filing an EEOC charge did not toll the limitations period of state-law tort claims, even if those claims arose out of the same factual circumstances as the discrimination alleged in the EEOC charge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's tort claims. View "Castagna v. Luceno" on Justia Law