Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her employer, alleging violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that her job as a librarian at the Library was terminated because of behavior symptomatic of her chronic mental illness. Because the court concluded that Title II did, in some circumstances, require reasonable departures from standards established by state laws, the court vacated the district court's judgment of dismissal in that respect. Because the court concluded, based principally on the structure of the ADA, that Title II did not apply to employment discrimination, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal of that claim. View "Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former sergeant with the Hartford Police Department, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendants wrongfully failed to promote him and defendants instigated several internal affairs investigations into his conduct on the basis of his race or national origin. With respect to plaintiff's discrimination claims, the court held that he failed to introduce factual evidence that defendants' nondiscriminatory reasons for the investigation and failure to promote him were pretextual or that plaintiff's race or national origin was a motivating favor. With respect to Chief Croughwell, although the court agreed with plaintiff that his statement to the press implicated a matter of public concern, the court affirmed the judgment on the district court's alternative ground that Chief Croughwell was protected from liability by qualified immunity. View "Garcia v. Hartford Police Dept." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Enio Rivera and Michael Talton, employees of Lift Line, a subsidiary of RGRTA, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of RGRTA and a supervisor and dismissing plaintiffs' claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1981, and New York state law. Considering the evidence, together with the evidence of a racially hostile work environment for Talton, his co-worker, in the light most favorable to Rivera, and resolving all ambiguities in his favor, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Rivera's hostile work environment claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Talton and accepting his version of the events as true, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Talton's hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII and section 1981. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Rivera's retaliation claims but vacated the grant of summary judgment on Talton's retaliation claim against RGRTA and vacated its grant of summary judgment dismissing Talton's retaliation claim against the supervisor under section 1981. The court also vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Talton's state law claims. View "Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Building Official for the Town of Marlborough from 1994-2010, sued the Town, as well as its Board of Selectmen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his procedural due process and free speech rights when his position was reduced from full to part time after he made certain statements regarding the use of wood-burning stoves. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Selectmen Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that the Selectmen defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, as plaintiff did not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Looney v. Marlborough et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the DEP, claimed that he failed to prevail in a prior employment-related suit because of false statements and deliberate omissions in an investigative report issued by defendant. The court held that "backward-looking" access-to-court claims were not cognizable when plaintiff had knowledge of the crucial facts and an opportunity to rebut opposing evidence, because such a plaintiff necessarily had adequate access to a judicial remedy. The court also held that the district court's opinion in the prior suit demonstrated that it did not rely on statements or omissions in defendant's report, and therefore no reasonable factfinder could find that defendant's actions denied him a right of access to the courts in violation of his federal constitutional rights. View "Sousa v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants unlawfully retaliated against him after he spoke out about issues involving his employer, the Long Beach Fire Department. The district court dismissed some of the claims against some of the defendants and the remaining individual defendants sought to appeal the denial of their dismissal motion, raising a defense of qualified immunity. The court held, however, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their appeal because they did not file a timely notice of appeal that specified that they intended to appeal. View "Gusler v. The City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Superintendent of the Connecticut Technical High School System, renewed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to qualified immunity in this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which defendant was alleged to have deprived plaintiff of her right to procedural due process. The district court denied the motion after concluding that there existed a dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff received sufficient notice before the elimination of her position as a guidance counselor at a Connecticut high school. The court held that defendant's conduct in this case, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, did not violate plaintiff's clearly established rights. Therefore, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed and remanded. View "Coollick v. Hughes" on Justia Law

These appeals, heard in tandem, challenged awards of summary judgment entered in the district court in favor of Starbucks on plaintiffs' complaints that Starbucks violated New York Labor Law 196-d in the distribution of tip pools maintained at stores in New York State. These appeals presented unresolved questions of New York law. Because these unresolved questions implicated significant New York state interests, and are determinative of these appeals, the court deferred decision and certified them to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Barenboim, et al. v. Starbucks Corp." on Justia Law

The EEOC appealed from a post-judgment order by the district court denying its request for injunctive relief against defendant following a jury verdict finding defendant liable for sexual harassment and fostering a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and New York State law. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying any injunctive relief to the EEOC. At minimum, the district court was obliged to craft injunctive relief sufficient to prevent further violations of Title VII by the individual who directly perpetrated the egregious sexual harassment at issue in this case. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Equal Employment Opportunity v. KarenKim, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, the school district superintendent, appealed from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim that she was fired in retaliation for her reports of financial malfeasance. The court concluded that plaintiff, a payroll clerk typist for the school district, was speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee and her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. View "Ross v. Lichtenfeld" on Justia Law