Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City appealed from a district court order requiring it to pay plaintiff damages, attorneys' fees, and costs for retaliation against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and state law, for making complaints of gender discrimination. Plaintiff cross-appealed, principally challenging the dismissal of her retaliation claims against individual defendants and denying her additional damages and attorneys' fees. The court concluded that the City's appeal provided no basis for overturning the judgment against the City. The court also concluded that plaintiff's cross-appeal merited only in its challenges to (A) the dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of her New York State Human Rights Law (HRL), N.Y.Exec. Law 296 et seq., claim against defendant Rick Guy, and (B) the grant of summary judgment dismissing her main discrimination claims under the HRL against the City and defendant Roy Bernardi, and that plaintiff was entitled to trial of those discrimination claims. The court held, however, that a trial of the erroneously dismissed HRL discrimination claims alone could lead to an award of damages that would be duplicative, in whole or in part, or the compensation plaintiff was awarded in the present judgment. Accordingly, the court concluded that if there was to be a trial of the HRL discrimination claims, that trial must be combined with a retrial of plaintiff's Title VII and HRL retaliation claims against the City and her HRL retaliation claim against Guy.

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing as time-barred their putative class action complaint against their former employer and the employer's pension plan for benefits alleged to be due under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred when it looked past the six-year New York limitations period for contract actions; applied part of the New York regime known as the "borrowing statute," which directed it to Pennsylvania law; and ruled that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period barred plaintiffs' claims. The court held that in an action for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132, the court applied the forums state's statute of limitations, including its borrowing statute. Therefore, the district court was correct in applying New York's borrowing statute and plaintiffs' claims were untimely under Pennsylvania law.

The Board petitioned to enforce its August 2010 decision and order, concluding that County Waste violated section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2), by allowing Local 124 to distribute a bonus to employees when an election was pending. County Waste cross-petitioned for review of the August 2010 decision, contending that the decision could not be enforced since two of the Board members who entered it also sat on the panel that issued an earlier decision in this case, which was vacated by the court pursuant to New Process Steel. The court held that because the court found nothing in New Process Steel that precluded Board members who entered a subsequently vacated decision from participating on the panel that reviewed the case on remand, the court granted the Board and Local 108's petition to enforce the August 2010 decision and denied County Waste's cross-petition for review.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court denying her petition to vacate an arbitration decision that rejected her claims, which asserted principally that defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal plaintiff principally contended that the arbitrators' decision should be vacated in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Fair Pay Act), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The court reviewed the district court's conclusions of law de novo and found plaintiff's contentions to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)-(3), seeking to recover funds that were erroneously removed from his pension fund account and credited to that of his former wife. The district court entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $1,571,723.73, which included the principal amount, accumulated earnings and pre-judgment interest. On appeal, defendant argued that enforcement of the judgment was prohibited by the terms of the pension agreement, ERISA's anti-alienation provision, and other provisions of federal and state law. Defendant also argued that the district court's award of accumulated earnings was inconsistent with the court's decision in Dobson v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court found defendant's arguments were without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal and cross-appeal concerned the pension benefits owed to plaintiff, a retired carpenter, and members of a class he purported to represent. Plaintiff asserted that the pension fund was guilty of seven violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court agreed with the district court that defendants' interpretations of certain plan language was arbitrary and capricious and therefore affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment to plaintiff on his individual claims for miscalculation of pension benefits. The court concluded, however, contrary to the district court, that the six-year statute of limitations applicable to plaintiff's and each other putative class member's ERISA claims began to run when each pensioner knew or should have known that defendants had miscalculated the amount of his pension benefits, and that he was being underpaid as a result. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgments certifying the plaintiff class, granting summary judgment to the class, and granting prejudgment interest to the class members. The court remanded for further factfinding with regard to when each putative class member became, or should have become, aware of his alleged injury so as to begin the running of the statute of limitations as applied to him.

Plaintiff, employed as a security officer by defendant, contended that he was sexually harassed by a co-worker and brought an action against defendant, asserting claims for constructive discharge, hostile environment sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the district court properly granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the retaliation claim because a reasonable employee in plaintiff's situation would not have been deterred from engaging in protected activities. The district court also correctly held that, even assuming the jury could have reasonably found plaintiff on his retaliation claim, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the award of punitive damages because a reasonable jury could find that defendant sought to, and did, address defendant's claims in good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on her claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. The district court granted summary judgment after determining that plaintiff had offered "sham evidence" in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that, in light of plaintiff's inconsistent and contradictory testimony, there was no genuine issue of fact to be decided by a jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, filed a complaint alleging that defendants violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-19, by requiring waiters to share tips with tip-ineligible employees. Plaintiffs also alleged that Park Avenue also violated various provisions of the New York Labor Law by requiring servers to share tips with tip-ineligible employees and by failing to pay waiters for an extra hour's work when their workdays lasted more than ten hours. Defendants appealed from the district court's order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court held that plaintiffs provided ample and sufficient evidence as to the elements of Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule 23(b)(3) for it to uphold the district court's findings and conclusions with respect to each of the Rule 23 requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order.

This was an appeal from three orders: (1) denying summary judgment to Wachovia on the ground that appellee had adequately requested reinstatement to his prior employment position following a period of active military duty; (2) awarding liquidated damages, in an amount equal to the award of backpay and granting equitable relief to appellee following a bench trial on damages after a jury found Wachovia liable for violating the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, in failing to reemploy appellee promptly to a position of like seniority, status, and pay following his military services; and (3) denying Wachovia's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The court held that because it found no error in the district court's thoughtful and well-reasoned opinions, the court affirmed.