Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners appealed the decision and order of the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board reversing the ALJ's dismissal of respondent's claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-50, as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, as untimely. The Board determined that the ALJ's principal finding on the issue of timeliness was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that because the ALJ's factual finding with respect to constructive awareness was not supported by substantial evidence, the Board did not overstep the limits of its appellate jurisdiction when it reversed the finding. Accordingly, the order of the Board was affirmed.

The City of New York sued defendants under federal and New York State antitrust laws, seeking to prevent the companies from merging. The city appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing the city's complaint without leave to amend. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged relevant market definition, as the "low-cost municipal health benefits market[,]" was legally deficient and concluded that the district court's denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Plaintiff, an African-American firefighter for the City of New Haven, alleged that the firefighter promotion exams challenged in Ricci v. DeStefano were arbitrarily weighted, yielding an impermissible disparate impact. The district court dismissed the claim as "necessarily foreclosed" by Ricci. The court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings, but expressed no view as to whether dismissal was warranted based on other defenses raised by the city.

Plaintiff, an employee of The Long Island Rail Road Company (LIRR), appealed from a judgment of the district court granting LIRR's motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., against LIRR and two other individuals (defendants), alleging claims of negligent infliction of emotion distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Plaintiff asserted on appeal that his IIED claim against LIRR should not have been dismissed. The court held that the zone of danger test applied to IIED claims brought under FELA. Therefore, because plaintiff failed to allege that he "sustain[ed] a physical impact" as a result of defendants' alleged conduct or was "placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct," the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. The court also declined to grant plaintiff leave to amend.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that Citigroup, along with various rating agencies, airlines, and municipalities, conspired to block the use of her finance structure to issue Airline Special Facility bonds. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint and from the district court's order denying her postjudgment motion for reargument and reconsideration of the dismissal and for leave to replead. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by, inter alia, dismissing the complaint without granting leave to replead, denying the postjudgment motion, and exercising supplemental jurisdiction to deny the remaining state law claims. The court held that the district court, in denying the postjudgment motions, applied a standard that overemphasized considerations of finality at the expense of the liberal amendment policy embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying the postjudgment motion and so much of the judgment as retained supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial in district court, plaintiff won partial victory on his claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed. Plaintiff argued that, on his unsuccessful retaliation claim, the jury should have adopted the standard set forth for Title VII retaliation in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. Plaintiff also appealed the award of only $204 in attorneys' fees on his one successful claim, that defendant interfered in his exercise of FMLA rights. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim because the district court erred in rejecting the Burlington Northern jury charge and this error prejudiced plaintiff. The court also vacated the award of attorneys' fees and remanded for recalculation in conformity with the lodestar method.

Defendant appealed from an order of the district court insofar as that order denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112 et seq. At issue was whether a New York court's judgment dismissing on timeliness grounds a plaintiff's Article 78 petition seeking review of an adverse administrative determination of her employment discrimination claims precluded the plaintiff from bringing federal discrimination claims in federal court. The court held that this issue warranted certification to the New York Court of Appeals.

Plaintiffs, sergeants in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), brought this lawsuit alleging denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for the period covering April 19, 2001 to the present. Plaintiffs appealed from a July 20, 2009 judgment of the district court in favor of defendant and sought review of, inter alia, the district court's November 6, 2007 Opinion and Order denying their motion for summary judgment and sua sponte granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that the Department of Labor's interpretation of its regulations was not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the pertinent FLSA regulations and thus was entitled to controlling deference. Applying that interpretation to the facts of the case, the court held that the primary duty of sergeants was not "management" and therefore, plaintiffs did not qualify for the "bona fide executive" exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and for further proceedings.

Petitioner sought review of three decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirming in part and reversing in part the ALJ's findings with respect to allegations that AM Property Holding Corporation (AM) participated in a scheme with two successive cleaning contractors to avoid a bargaining obligation with petitioner after AM purchased a certain building. At issue was whether the NLRB erred by finding that: (1) AM was not a joint employer with either contractors; (2) the NLRB was precluded from determining whether one contractor was individually a successor employer to Clean-Right, the in-house cleaning division of the former owner of the building because the General Counsel had not litigated a violation based on that theory; and (3) petitioner was not entitled to additional remedies. The court rejected the first and third claims of error, but concluded that as to the second, the NLRB misunderstood its authority to determine whether one of the contractors was individually a successor employer to Clean-Right. Therefore, the court remanded so that the NLRB could reconsider this issue.

Plaintiff, a former probationary police officer, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging principally that defendants, Chief of the Middletown Police Department (MPD) and other members of the MPD, violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by causing the termination of his employment in retaliation for his refusals to make false statements in connection with an investigation into a civilian complaint alleging use of excessive force by a MPD officer. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Garcetti v. Ceballos and Weintraub v. Board of Education did not preclude First Amendment protection for his refusals to make false statements. The court considered all of defendants' arguments in support of affirmance and found them to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was vacated to the extent that it dismissed plaintiff's claims for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the matter was remanded.