Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued defendants for various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and parallel provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq., after defendants terminated plaintiff. A jury found that plaintiff's termination was in retaliation for complaints he made about his supervisor and it awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Both parties appealed numerous issues related to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. The court held that it need not determine whether the district court was authorized to grant such relief since the court read the parties' joint submission as effectively stipulating to a new jury trial, the result of which was an award in the reduced amount of $190,000, rendering the district court's judgment final. The court affirmed the decision of the district court that plaintiff's original punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive. The court further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct its clerical mistake without first obtaining leave from this court to do so, but now the court granted that leave nunc pro tunc. The court finally held that because the remaining issues raised in both parties' appeals were without merit, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17, claiming compensatory damages for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. Plaintiff also brought parallel state law claims and sought backpay and reinstatement under Title VII and attorneys' fees. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's rulings on the post-trial motions regarding backpay, her state law claims, and the hourly rate applied to the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that because a backpay award required a separate inquest, a district court could not deny an award of backpay because it believed that an award of compensatory damages was sufficient. Accordingly, on remand, the district court was directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. The court also held that because the district court abused its discretion in its "specific finding" that plaintiff was not entitled to backpay, the district court should consider in the first instance on remand whether plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay. The court further held that plaintiff abandoned her state law claims because she did not pursue the matter diligently. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to remove its "abandonment" reference. The court finally held that the district court's award of attorneys' fees, while perhaps lagging behind the market, was not an abuse of discretion.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against his former employer, seeking monetary and equitable relief for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., and state law. At issue was whether the separation agreement between the parties was unenforceable because its provisions did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. 626(f), and applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, that the separation agreement be written in a manner calculated to be understood. The court held that the separation agreement was written in a manner calculated to be understood by the relevant employees of defendant. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment should have been denied because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried and that the separation agreement was unenforceable because plaintiff was not advised in writing to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Plaintiff sued defendant asserting claims of breach of contract and various business torts in connection with defendant's alleged wrongful termination of plaintiff's employment affiliation with defendant. Plaintiff appealed from summary judgment in favor of defendant on one of its counterclaims against plaintiff for nonrepayment of the outstanding balance of a loan for which he had given a promissory note. The court held that the district court's order of summary judgment was inappropriate and dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction where the determination that the promissory note was independent of the promises made by defendant in the Affiliation Agreements would involve consideration of defendant's promises underlying plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination and of the relationships among those promises. Therefore, the court would be required to consider many of the same issues that would need to be considered in any appeal from a final judgment adjudicating plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, former directors of a retirees association of former unionized transportation workers, alleging, among other things, that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the retirees association and its members by buying and maintaining a health insurance policy with premiums that far outstripped the benefits received by members. When defendants prevailed on all counts, defendants appealed the district court's denial of their fees motion. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying the fees motion in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. The court affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying fees where, although the district court did not have the benefit of Hardt in reaching its decision, nothing in the district court's opinion contradicted Hardt or suggested that the district court would have decided the matter differently in light of Hardt. Accordingly, Hardt did not require the court to reverse or remand. The court also held that, when determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded to defendants, the court focused on whether plaintiffs brought the complaint in good faith.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment entered by the district court granting an oral motion of defendants, plaintiff's former employer, for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 with respect to plaintiff's claims arising under section 4312(a) of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq, where plaintiff was eventually terminated by defendants after returning to work upon completion of his call to active duty by the Army. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the motion where plaintiff claimed that defendants discriminated against him on account of his military service. The court affirmed the judgment and held that there was no reasonable basis to find a violation of section 4312(a) where plaintiff was rehired with the same title, salary, and other conditions of employment after his immediate return from military service.

In June 2009, defendant filed an arbitration demand against plaintiff alleging claims for wrongful termination and breach of contract based on plaintiff's failure to pay a performance bonus. Defendant subsequently filed a new demand for arbitration in October 2010, which included his original claims plus claims of fraud and breach of contract, after the arbitrator denied his motion to amend the original arbitration demand when he discovered evidence suggesting that plaintiff had padded estimated revenues for defendant's companies by $17 million. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by not granting its motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; that defendant's withdrawal from the first arbitration waived his right to a second arbitration; and that the first arbitration's October Order, denying defendant leave to amend, was an enforceable arbitration award. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(4), precluded the court's review of the district court's order refusing to enjoin the arbitration. The court also held that a final decision with respect to an arbitration required an official dismissal of all claims and thus, where the district court stayed proceedings in lieu of dismissal, the decision was not final. The court further concluded that an arbitration award was a final adjudication of a claim on the merits and a procedural ruling that denied leave to amend was not an award since the decision had no effect on the merits of the proposed claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

This dispute arose from the district court's decision to award an attorney $515,179.28 in attorney's fees pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act's fee shifting provision, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for work performed in successfully litigating a case against the City of New York ("city"). The attorney did not keep contemporaneous records and the city appealed the award, arguing that it violated the New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v Carey rule, which explicitly required that such records be kept. The court held that, because a district court's "personal observation" of an attorney's work was not by itself a sufficient basis for permitting a deviation and awarding fees in the absence of contemporaneous records, the most recent order of the district court reinstating its original award of attorney's fees was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a labor organization that represented a bargaining unit of defendant's employees, filed a formal grievance with defendant, challenging defendant's discontinuation of dues "checkoff," or deduction of dues from employees' paychecks, and seeking collection and remittance of all back dues with interest. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the parties' dispute over checkoff of union dues was subject to arbitration pursuant to their expired collective-bargaining agreement. The court held that plaintiff's contractual right to checkoff of union dues survived expiration of the agreement and therefore, subjected the parties' disputes to arbitration.