Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated, filed a complaint alleging that defendants violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-19, by requiring waiters to share tips with tip-ineligible employees. Plaintiffs also alleged that Park Avenue also violated various provisions of the New York Labor Law by requiring servers to share tips with tip-ineligible employees and by failing to pay waiters for an extra hour's work when their workdays lasted more than ten hours. Defendants appealed from the district court's order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court held that plaintiffs provided ample and sufficient evidence as to the elements of Rule 23(a)(1)-(4) and Rule 23(b)(3) for it to uphold the district court's findings and conclusions with respect to each of the Rule 23 requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order.

This was an appeal from three orders: (1) denying summary judgment to Wachovia on the ground that appellee had adequately requested reinstatement to his prior employment position following a period of active military duty; (2) awarding liquidated damages, in an amount equal to the award of backpay and granting equitable relief to appellee following a bench trial on damages after a jury found Wachovia liable for violating the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, in failing to reemploy appellee promptly to a position of like seniority, status, and pay following his military services; and (3) denying Wachovia's motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The court held that because it found no error in the district court's thoughtful and well-reasoned opinions, the court affirmed.

Petitioners appealed the decision and order of the Department of Labor Benefits Review Board reversing the ALJ's dismissal of respondent's claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-50, as extended by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651-54, as untimely. The Board determined that the ALJ's principal finding on the issue of timeliness was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that because the ALJ's factual finding with respect to constructive awareness was not supported by substantial evidence, the Board did not overstep the limits of its appellate jurisdiction when it reversed the finding. Accordingly, the order of the Board was affirmed.

The City of New York sued defendants under federal and New York State antitrust laws, seeking to prevent the companies from merging. The city appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing the city's complaint without leave to amend. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged relevant market definition, as the "low-cost municipal health benefits market[,]" was legally deficient and concluded that the district court's denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

Plaintiff, an African-American firefighter for the City of New Haven, alleged that the firefighter promotion exams challenged in Ricci v. DeStefano were arbitrarily weighted, yielding an impermissible disparate impact. The district court dismissed the claim as "necessarily foreclosed" by Ricci. The court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings, but expressed no view as to whether dismissal was warranted based on other defenses raised by the city.

Plaintiff, an employee of The Long Island Rail Road Company (LIRR), appealed from a judgment of the district court granting LIRR's motion to dismiss his complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., against LIRR and two other individuals (defendants), alleging claims of negligent infliction of emotion distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Plaintiff asserted on appeal that his IIED claim against LIRR should not have been dismissed. The court held that the zone of danger test applied to IIED claims brought under FELA. Therefore, because plaintiff failed to allege that he "sustain[ed] a physical impact" as a result of defendants' alleged conduct or was "placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct," the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of his complaint. The court also declined to grant plaintiff leave to amend.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that Citigroup, along with various rating agencies, airlines, and municipalities, conspired to block the use of her finance structure to issue Airline Special Facility bonds. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint and from the district court's order denying her postjudgment motion for reargument and reconsideration of the dismissal and for leave to replead. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by, inter alia, dismissing the complaint without granting leave to replead, denying the postjudgment motion, and exercising supplemental jurisdiction to deny the remaining state law claims. The court held that the district court, in denying the postjudgment motions, applied a standard that overemphasized considerations of finality at the expense of the liberal amendment policy embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court vacated the order denying the postjudgment motion and so much of the judgment as retained supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed plaintiff's state law claims. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Following a jury trial in district court, plaintiff won partial victory on his claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed. Plaintiff argued that, on his unsuccessful retaliation claim, the jury should have adopted the standard set forth for Title VII retaliation in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. Plaintiff also appealed the award of only $204 in attorneys' fees on his one successful claim, that defendant interfered in his exercise of FMLA rights. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim because the district court erred in rejecting the Burlington Northern jury charge and this error prejudiced plaintiff. The court also vacated the award of attorneys' fees and remanded for recalculation in conformity with the lodestar method.

Defendant appealed from an order of the district court insofar as that order denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112 et seq. At issue was whether a New York court's judgment dismissing on timeliness grounds a plaintiff's Article 78 petition seeking review of an adverse administrative determination of her employment discrimination claims precluded the plaintiff from bringing federal discrimination claims in federal court. The court held that this issue warranted certification to the New York Court of Appeals.

Plaintiffs, sergeants in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), brought this lawsuit alleging denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for the period covering April 19, 2001 to the present. Plaintiffs appealed from a July 20, 2009 judgment of the district court in favor of defendant and sought review of, inter alia, the district court's November 6, 2007 Opinion and Order denying their motion for summary judgment and sua sponte granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that the Department of Labor's interpretation of its regulations was not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the pertinent FLSA regulations and thus was entitled to controlling deference. Applying that interpretation to the facts of the case, the court held that the primary duty of sergeants was not "management" and therefore, plaintiffs did not qualify for the "bona fide executive" exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and for further proceedings.