Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her employer, Defendant Montefiore Medical Center, and two of its employees, asserting claims of sexual harassment during and retaliatory discharge from her employment. Following the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in their favor, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims and sought sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel, Appellant Daniel Altaras and his firm, Appellant Derek Smith Law Group, PLLC (“DSLG”), contending that Plaintiff’s text message evidence was a forgery. The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiff had fabricated the text messages, falsely testified about their production, and spoliated evidence in an attempt to conceal her wrongdoing. The district court also found that Altaras had facilitated Plaintiff’s misconduct. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice and imposed a monetary sanction of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred by Defendants. On appeal, Appellants challenged various aspects of the district court’s conduct.   The court vacated the portion of the district court’s judgment imposing a sanction on Altaras and DSLG and remanded for further proceedings consistent. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects. The court held that the district court erred by failing to expressly make the finding of bad faith required to support the sanction it imposed against Altaras and DSLG.  The court directed that on remand, the district court may assess in its discretion whether Altaras’s misconduct—including his insistence on defending a complaint founded on obviously fabricated evidence or other actions—amounted to bad faith. View "Rossbach et al. v. Montefiore Medical Center et al." on Justia Law

An attorney appealed from orders of the Committee on Grievances of the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (the “Committee”) finding her liable for violating various provisions of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and imposing sanctions for these violations, including a six-month suspension from practicing law in the Eastern District. On appeal, the attorney argued that the Committee (1) deprived her of due process by failing to afford her with reasonable notice of the charges and an adequate opportunity to defend against the charges, (2) failed to substantiate each element of the charges by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) imposed a punishment that was excessive in light of the putative lack of harm to the public. She has also requested that we maintain her appeal under seal, arguing that public disclosure of her identity would cause her reputational harm.   The Second Circuit affirmed the orders of the Committee and ordered that the docket in this appeal, and all its contents, be unsealed. The court explained that the attorney violated her most basic duty to the vulnerable clients who depended on her: to provide them with diligent, competent representation. Along the way, her neglectful and discourteous conduct harmed the administration of justice itself. The Committee’s evidence establishing as much was unassailable. Further, the court wrote that to the extent that the attorney’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge relies on her contention that it was improper for the Committee to consider filings and transcripts from her non-disciplinary matters in the Eastern District, it fails. View "In re Demetriades" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial in part of the law firm's motion for attorney's fees in a Social Security disability case. The court held that for a court to find an attorney's agreed-upon contingency fee unreasonable under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) on the sole ground that it constitutes a windfall, it must be truly clear that the high fee represents a sum unearned by counsel. In this case, the requested fee was not such a windfall and there is no other reason to think that the fee requested is unreasonable. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions to order the Social Security Administration to release the requested fee to the law firm. View "Fields v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants GDB, Stavis, and Kartagener, remanding for further proceedings. This appeal arose from breach of contract and quasi-contract claims brought by plaintiff stemming from defendants' legal representation of plaintiff.The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim because, under New York law, plaintiff can maintain a breach-of-contract claim without any showing that the $100,000 belonged to him. Although plaintiff's quasi-contract claims against Defendant Stavis and GDB do require a showing that he owned the money, the court further concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to those defendants on those claims because there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that the money indeed belonged to defendant. Finally, the court held that summary judgment for Stavis in his individual capacity was also inappropriate. View "Moreno-Godoy v. Kartagener" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his firm appeal from the district court's opinion and order sanctioning them for their conduct during their representation of a client in his copyright case against Bandshell Artist Management. The district court found that plaintiff repeatedly violated court orders, lied under oath to the district court, and brought and maintained this case in bad faith. The district court cited its authority under 28 U.S.C. 1927, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, and its inherent power, and imposed monetary sanctions in attorney's fees, additional monetary sanctions, and nonmonetary sanctions that, inter alia, imposed nationwide requirements on cases filed by plaintiff and his firm.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's sanctions on plaintiff and his law firm, while strict, were not an abuse of discretion. In this case, the district court's factual findings – including the findings of bad faith – were adequately supported by the evidence in the record and by the district court's judgments of witness credibility. The court explained that, given plaintiff's serious and repeated misconduct, he and his firm merited sanctions reserved for attorneys and litigants who demonstrate via their actions that unusual measures are required to deter future misbehavior, protect other litigants, and maintain the integrity of the judicial system. View "Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Management" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in defendant's appeal from the district court's final order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Because a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel on a compassionate release motion or an appeal from the denial of such a motion, the court held that an attorney seeking to be relieved before it in that context need not file a motion and brief that comply with the requirements of Anders. Instead, counsel's motion to be relieved must adhere to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27.1 by stating with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief requested, and the legal argument supporting that request, as well as attaching an affidavit indicating that counsel has advised the defendant of the process for obtaining court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Counsel in this case complied with the requirements of Rule 27. The court also denied the government's motion for summary affirmance of the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's orders affirming the bankruptcy court's award of monetary sanctions pursuant to its inherent power. Appellant filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy court for his client but ultimately failed to prosecute the case. The bankruptcy court then issued multiple orders to show cause, which appellant failed to comply with, and then the bankruptcy court ultimately sanctioned him.The court held, as a matter of first impression, that bankruptcy courts possess inherent power to sanction attorneys in appropriate circumstances. In this case, appellant's challenges to the bankruptcy court's exercise of that power failed for the reasons set forth in a separately-filed summary order. View "In re: Alba Sanchez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the City and individual police officers for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights, defendants presented plaintiff with an offer judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. Plaintiff accepted the officer but the parties disputed the sum of attorney's fees, expenses, and costs to be paid.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to reduce plaintiff's attorney's reasonable hourly rate in light of the simple nature of the case; affirmed the district court's decision to reduce the hours claimed through an across-the-board reduction to reflect the clerical work performed; but reversed and vacated the district court's decision to award plaintiff attorney's fees for the work incurred preparing the fee application where the express terms of the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment limited the fees recoverable to those incurred to the date of the offer. View "Lilly v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The parties dispute the district court's award of attorney's fees to plaintiff in an action successfully claiming a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The Second Circuit affirmed and held that plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees as a prevailing party; plaintiff may not obtain fees for the administrative proceedings for failure to identify "the discrete portion of the work product from the administrative proceedings" for which fees might have been awarded, North Carolina Dep't of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 15 (1986); and the 50 percent reduction was appropriate. View "Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield County, Inc. v. Litchfield Historic District Commission" on Justia Law

After appellant successfully litigated her claim to supplemental social security income, she challenged the district court's denial of her application for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 406(b).The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of appellant's attorney's fee application as untimely, because she filed well beyond the 14 days prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B). Assuming the court would entertain appellant's argument, it failed on the merits because she provided no factual basis to support a claim that it was reasonable to delay the filing of her section 406(b) application for more than six months after she received notice of the benefits calculation on remand. View "Sinkler v. Berryhill" on Justia Law