Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

FBK moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction SHW's appeal from the district court's ruling on motions by SHW relating to its entitlement to attorneys' fees as former counsel to certain plaintiffs in the underlying action. FBK contends that because SHW did not consent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c), for all proceedings to be conducted before a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge's orders must be treated merely as recommendations to be reviewed by the district court, and that appeal directly to this court from the orders of the magistrate judge is unauthorized. The court denied the motion, concluding that the consent of SHW as counsel or former counsel was not required because section 636(c)'s consent requirement applies to parties (and to persons who move to become parties, see New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 996 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1993)), and the parties in this case had given the requisite consent. View "In re McCray, Richardson, Santana, Wise, and Salaam Litigation" on Justia Law

Binder, a law firm representing claimants before the SSA, appealed from summary judgment in two related cases where Binder seeks past attorney's fees. When Binder sought to hold the SSA liable for the fees, the district courts granted summary judgment to the SSA on the basis of sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgments and held that, regardless of the SSA’s statutory duties to withhold attorney’s fees from payments to successful claimants, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in 42 U.S.C. 406(a) that would permit Binder’s lawsuits for money damages. View "Binder & Binder v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Flanagan appealed the district court's denial of the law firm's request for attorneys' fees drawn from a settlement fund in a consolidated securities class action. The court held that the standard set forth in In re Cendant Corp. Litig. (Cendant II) applies to fee applications from non‐lead counsel for work completed after the appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel where the fee to non‐lead counsel is one part of a capped percentage of a common fund. In this case, the district court should have afforded a rebuttable presumption of correctness to Lead Plaintiffs’ proposed allocation of fees to Flanagan. Because the district court analyzed Flanagan's request under an incorrect standard, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former law firm and five of its partners, alleging that he had been forced to resign after blowing the whistle on what he considered to be the firm’s unethical litigation conduct. The parties eventually settled the suit and then sought an order directing the clerk of the court to close the file while leaving it permanently sealed. The district court denied the parties' request. The court held that pleadings, even in settled cases, are judicial records subject to a presumption of public access. The court concluded that the district court engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the competing interests at stake and the district court's conclusions were amply supported. Finally, the court concluded that sealing of the complaint is not justified in order to protect “confidential client information.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the New York labor Law (NYLL). After plaintiffs prevailed, the district court awarded plaintiffs' counsel $514,284.00 in attorneys’ fees and $68,294.50 in costs. Of that amount, it awarded $10,425 to reimburse plaintiffs' counsel for costs incurred retaining an expert accountant for plaintiffs' affirmative case against defendants. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court’s award of fees and costs constituted an abuse of discretion. The court concluded that because section 216(b) does not explicitly authorize awards reimbursing plaintiffs for expert fees, the district court erred in granting such an award pursuant to this provision. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s award of $10,425 in costs for expert fees and remanded to the district court to consider whether the NYLL authorizes the award of such fees and, if so, whether to award them pursuant to the NYLL. In a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part as to defendants' other challenges. View "Gortat v. Capala Bros." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, appealed the district court's dismissal of his putative collection action seeking damages from defendants for violations of the overtime provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint arose out of his work as a contract attorney in North Carolina. The court agreed with the district court’s conclusion that: (1) state, not federal, law informs FLSA’s definition of “practice of law;” and (2) North Carolina, as the place where plaintiff worked and lived, has the greatest interest in this litigation, and thus the court looks to North Carolina law to determine if plaintiff was practicing law within the meaning of FLSA. The court, however, disagreed with the district court’s conclusion, on a motion to dismiss, that by undertaking the document review plaintiff allegedly was hired to conduct, he was necessarily “practicing law” within the meaning of North Carolina law. The court found that accepting the allegations as pleaded, plaintiff adequately alleged in his complaint that his document review was devoid of legal judgment such that he was not engaged in the practice of law, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom" on Justia Law

Nursing Personnel appealed the district court's partial judgment awarding plaintiff $185,962.12 in attorneys' fees under the attorneys' fees provision of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1). Nursing Personnel filed the appeal to challenge time entries in plaintiff's fee petition. The court held that Nursing Personnel waived its challenge to the time entries by failing to raise this objection before the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for the limited purpose of awarding plaintiff appellate attorneys' fees. View "United States ex rel. Keshner v. Nursing Personnel Home Care" on Justia Law

Gordon was admitted to the New York State bar in 1989. Following referral by the Second Circuit, the Committee on Admissions and Grievances found clear and convincing evidence that Gordon had engaged in misconduct in that Gordon had: filed several nearly identical “summary judgment” motions in at least nine cases that were not authorized by any rule of appellate procedure; failed to comply with an order directing him to either withdraw those motions or explain their legal basis; failed in 17 cases to file scheduling notification letters, in violation of court rules; failed in 11 cases to comply with court-imposed deadlines, resulting in dismissal of two cases; and failed to oppose the government’s motion for summary affirmance in at least one case. The Committee found that Gordon’s explanations for his failure to comply were “inconsistent, disingenuous, and lacking in credibility,” and that his lack of candor during its hearing violated New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(1). After considering mitigating and aggravating factors, the Committee recommended that Gordon be publicly reprimanded and required to attend continuing legal education classes in appellate immigration law. The Second Circuit adopted the Committee’s report, reprimanded Gordon, and suspended him from practice for two months. View "In re Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, law firms that seek to collect debts, obtained a judgment from the district court declaring that New York City's Local Law 15, which regulates debt collection agencies, was void as applied to plaintiffs. Because this case raises unresolved and significant issues concerning the scope of New York State's regulatory authority over attorneys, the court certified the following two questions: (1) Does Local Law 15, insofar as it regulates attorney conduct, constitute an unlawful encroachment on the State’s authority to regulate attorneys, and is there a conflict between Local Law 15 and Sections 53 and 90 of the New York Judiciary Law? and (2) If Local Law 15’s regulation of attorney conduct is not preempted, does Local Law 15, as applied to attorneys, violate Section 2203(c) of the New York City Charter? View "Eric M. Berman, P.C., et al. v. City of New York, et al." on Justia Law