Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Robert Sylvester Kelly, also known as R. Kelly, was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of racketeering and Mann Act violations. The evidence presented at trial showed that Kelly, with the help of his associates, exploited his fame to lure and abuse young girls and women over a period of twenty-five years. Kelly isolated his victims, controlled their lives, and subjected them to verbal, physical, and sexual abuse.The district court sentenced Kelly to 360 months' imprisonment for racketeering and additional concurrent sentences for the Mann Act violations. Kelly was also fined and ordered to pay restitution to two victims. Kelly appealed his convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the state laws underlying his federal convictions, the empaneling of certain jurors, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed Kelly's appeal. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Kelly's convictions, including the underlying state and federal violations. The court also held that the New York state law was constitutional as applied to Kelly and that Kelly's challenges to the California state law were untimely. The court found no evidence of juror bias or ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. The court also upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings and restitution orders, finding no abuse of discretion.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that Kelly's arguments on appeal were without merit. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

Two Connecticut attorneys, Mario Cerame and Timothy Moynahan, challenged Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(7), which prohibits harassment or discrimination by lawyers based on fifteen protected categories. They argued that the rule violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and being unconstitutionally vague. They claimed that the rule's broad language could potentially sanction their speech on controversial topics, thus chilling their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed their complaint, ruling that Cerame and Moynahan lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court found that they did not demonstrate a "real and imminent fear" of enforcement under Rule 8.4(7) and that their allegations were too general to establish a credible threat of enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Cerame and Moynahan have standing to seek pre-enforcement relief. The court held that they had sufficiently alleged an intention to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by Rule 8.4(7) and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court noted that the rule's broad language and the lack of clear guidelines for enforcement created a substantial risk of disciplinary action, which was sufficient to establish an injury in fact. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiffs' claims. View "Cerame v. Slack" on Justia Law

GEICO, a group of insurance companies, presented evidence that the defendants, collectively known as the Mayzenberg Defendants, paid third parties for referring patients eligible for no-fault insurance benefits to Mingmen Acupuncture, P.C. GEICO argued that this constituted an illegal kickback scheme, violating New York's rules of professional misconduct, and thus, under the Eligibility Regulation (11 N.Y.C.R.R. § 65-3.16(a)(12)), Mingmen was ineligible to receive no-fault payments. The Mayzenberg Defendants contended that paying for patient referrals might be professional misconduct but did not violate a "licensing requirement" under the Eligibility Regulation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO, agreeing that the Mayzenberg Defendants paid for patient referrals and that this conduct rendered Mingmen ineligible for no-fault benefits. The court also granted GEICO summary judgment on its common law fraud and RICO claims, based on the same conclusions about Mingmen’s ineligibility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and found that while the facts established that the Mayzenberg Defendants paid for patient referrals, the legal question of whether this conduct violated a "licensing requirement" under the Eligibility Regulation was unsettled. Given the lack of clear precedent from the New York Court of Appeals and the significant policy implications, the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals to determine if paying for patient referrals in violation of New York Education Law § 6530(18) and 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 29.1(b)(3) disqualifies a provider from receiving no-fault payments under the Eligibility Regulation. View "GEICO v. Mayzenberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Marco Destin, Inc., 1000 Highway 98 East Corp., E&T, Inc., and Panama Surf & Sport, Inc. (collectively, “Marco Destin”) filed a lawsuit against agents of L&L Wings, Inc. (“L&L”), alleging that a 2011 stipulated judgment in a trademark action was obtained through fraud. Marco Destin claimed that L&L had fraudulently procured a trademark registration from the USPTO, which was used to secure the judgment. They sought to vacate the 2011 judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) and requested sanctions and damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court found that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation. Specifically, the court noted that the License Agreement between the parties indicated that other entities might have paramount rights to the "Wings" trademark, suggesting that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud with due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion. The appellate court confirmed that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to vacate the 2011 stipulated judgment. The court emphasized that Marco Destin had a reasonable opportunity to uncover the alleged fraud during the initial litigation and that equitable relief under Rule 60(d)(3) requires a showing of due diligence. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion that Marco Destin could have discovered the fraud through proper diligence.The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the dismissal of Marco Destin’s claims. View "Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of bond investors (plaintiffs) who bought and sold certain types of corporate bonds from and to a group of financial institutions and major dealers in the corporate bond market (defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated antitrust laws by engaging in a pattern of parallel conduct and anticompetitive collusion to restrict forms of competition that would have improved odd-lot pricing for bond investors. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case.Several months after the district court's order, it was discovered that the district court judge had presided over part of the case while his wife owned stock in one of the defendants. Although she had divested that stock before the district court judge issued his decision, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court judge should have disqualified himself due to this prior financial interest of his wife.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with deciding whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, vacatur was warranted because the district court judge was required to disqualify himself before issuing his decision. The court concluded that while there was no outright conflict when the district court judge ruled on the merits of this action, § 455(a) and related precedents required pre-judgment disqualification, thus vacatur was warranted. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Litovich v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

Link Motion Inc., a Chinese company incorporated in the Cayman Islands, filed a legal malpractice action against the law firm DLA Piper LLP (US) and one of its attorneys in the New York State Supreme Court. The case was related to a previous lawsuit filed by a shareholder of Link Motion, Wayne Baliga, in which DLA Piper represented Link Motion. The law firm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which dismissed Link Motion's complaint as time-barred and denied its motion to remand the case back to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court lacked federal jurisdiction. The court found that the federal law standing question identified by the district court as embedded in Link Motion's malpractice claim did not fall within the narrow category of "disputed and substantial" questions of federal law permitting the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a state law claim. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case back to the state court. View "Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP" on Justia Law

The defendant, Dwayne Barrett, was convicted on multiple counts of conspiratorial and substantive Hobbs Act robbery, the use of firearms during such robberies, and in one robbery, the murder of a robbery victim. On appeal, Barrett argued that his initial appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of his convictions. He also argued that his 50-year prison sentence was procedurally unreasonable based on the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 in calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected all of Barrett’s arguments except for his consecutive sentence challenge, where it identified error by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lora v. United States. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing consistent with Lora and its opinion. View "United States v. Barrett" on Justia Law

In this case handled by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the plaintiff, Alexis Marquez, an attorney who represented herself, claimed that an Acting New York State Supreme Court Justice harassed her and subjected her to inappropriate behavior during her service as his court attorney. Marquez challenged two interlocutory rulings that dismissed the complaint as to one defendant and denied reconsideration. However, the district court dismissed the case as a penalty for Marquez's failure to comply with discovery orders, which Marquez did not challenge in this appeal.The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Marquez's challenge to the interlocutory orders as it was not an appeal from a final decision of the district court. The Court explained that the merger rule, which allows an interlocutory order to merge into the final judgment, does not apply when a district court enters a dismissal as a sanction. If Marquez successfully challenges the sanction dismissal, she would then have the opportunity to challenge the interlocutory orders as part of any appeal from a final judgment on the merits. In this situation, however, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Marquez v. Silver" on Justia Law

Ivan Reyes-Arzate, the defendant-appellant, appealed his conviction and sentence after pleading guilty to a drug offense before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and was also subjected to a special assessment and forfeiture. His defense counsel filed an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from the appeal on the basis that any appeal would be frivolous due to the defendant's plea agreement, which included a valid waiver of the right to appeal any sentence of 293 months or less. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, deferred a decision on the motion to withdraw and ordered the defense counsel to submit a supplemental brief. The court found that the defense counsel's brief only addressed the validity of Reyes-Arzate's appeal waiver and did not discuss the scope of the waiver, particularly as it related to non-imprisonment components of the sentence such as the term and conditions of supervised release. The court clarified that when filing Anders briefs, defense counsels should address all aspects of a defendant’s conviction and sentence that are not unambiguously waived. The court deferred decision on the motions and ordered the defendant-appellant's counsel to file a supplemental brief addressing whether the non-imprisonment components of the sentence, which are not unambiguously covered by the appeal waiver, present any non-frivolous issues for appeal. View "United States v. Reyes-Arzate" on Justia Law