Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The County appealed from a judgment of the district court finding that the County was in violation of its duty to promote source-of-income legislation under a Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal (consent decree) entered into by the County with the United States to resolve a qui tam action initially brought by relator, ADC, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging the submission of false claims by the County to HUD in order to obtain federal grant monies for fair housing. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the reviewing magistrate judge under the consent decree. On the merits, the court held that the County violated the terms of the consent decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Westchester County, New York" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the district court's judgment affirming the Commissioner's denial of his application for disability benefits. The court held that the ALJ erred in her treatment of plaintiff's claim that he suffered from fibromyalgia by failing to accord the proper weight to the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician, by misconstruing the record, and by failing to evaluate the claim in light of medically accepted diagnostic criteria. The court also held that the ALJ's determination that plaintiff could perform light work was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ further erred by not determining whether plaintiff's reaching limitation was non-eligible and would therefore require the testimony of a vocational expert. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Selian v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the district court affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits on the basis of her alleged intellectual disability. The court held that evidence of a petitioner's cognitive limitations as an adult established a rebuttable presumption that those limitations arose before petitioner turned 22, as was required by SSA regulations. The court further held that a petitioner must make separate showings of deficits in cognitive and adaptive functioning in order to be considered intellectually disabled under SSA regulations. Because the agency's finding that petitioner did not suffer from qualifying deficits in adaptive functioning was supported by substantial evidence, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Talavera v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through his wife and attorney-in-fact, filed an application for Medicaid benefits with the Connecticut Department of Social Services to cover the cost of his nursing home care. At issue was whether a non-assignable annuity contract that provided the spouse of an institutionalized person with monthly payments counted as an excess resource that must be spent down before the institutionalized person could receive Medicaid benefits under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5. The court held that the payment stream for non-assignable annuity was not a resource for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. View "Lopes v. Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law

Cage, born in 1960, has an extensive medical history. She offered evidence of: bipolar disorder, depression, suicidal ideation, dizziness, blackouts, memory loss and chest pain. She has not worked since November 2003. Before then, she had worked as a retail cashier, hotel maid and home healthcare aide. Cage also has a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. Her ongoing medical care has included treatment for drug addiction and alcoholism and her other conditions. An Administrative Law Judge of the Social Security Administration denied Cage’s application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, finding that although Cage met certain requirements for being “disabled” under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301, she was ineligible for SSI because drug addiction or alcoholism was a contributing factor material to that determination. The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The ALJ properly imposed upon Cage the burden of proving that she would be disabled in the absence of drug addiction and alcoholism and the record supported the ALJ’s finding that she would not be disabled absent drug addiction and alcoholism. View "Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

Applicants for and recipients of Medicaid home health Services claimed that the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Department of Health, violated their statutory right, enforceable under 42 U.S.C.1983, to an opportunity for Medicaid fair hearings. They claimed that this right, as construed by federal regulation, entitles them to “final administrative action” within 90 days of their fair hearing requests. The district court declared that “final administrative action” includes the holding of Medicaid fair hearings, the issuance of fair hearing decisions, and the implementation of any relief ordered in those decisions and permanently enjoined the state agencies to ensure that “final administrative action” implemented within 90 days of fair hearing requests. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the plaintiffs have a right to a Medicaid hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of their fair hearing requests, and that such right is enforceable under section 1983. The permanent injunction was, however, overbroad because “final administrative action” refers not to the implementation of relief ordered in fair hearing decisions, but to the holding of fair hearings and to the issuance of fair hearing decisions. View "Shakhnes v. Eggleston" on Justia Law

Brault applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in 2007, claiming that he became disabled in 2006 because of nerve damage in his left arm and a cervical spine injury he sustained in a motor-vehicle accident. After his application was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested an administrative hearing. Brault’s counsel asserted a Daubert-like objection to the vocational expert’s testimony, contending it was unreliable. The ALJ never directly responded to the objections, but issued a ruling which relied on the VE’s testimony, agreed that positions existed in the eight DOT positions the VE had identified at the numbers the VE had given, and denied Brault’s application for benefits. The district court affirmed the denial. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the denial was supported by substantial evidence. The administrative law judge was not required to state expressly his reasons for accepting a vocational expert’s challenged testimony.View "Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed the district court's order denying his post-judgment motion for an order directing the Social Security Administration (SSA) to re-tender a check for retroactive supplemental social security benefits that he was owed. The court held that the No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act, Pub. L. No. 111-114, 123 Stat. 3029, barred the SSA from making any payment to an incarcerated individual covered by the Act, regardless of when the underlying obligation to pay the individual arose. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the district court that reduced by two-thirds the attorney's fees award she requested for successfully appealing from the administrative denial of her application for disability benefits. The district court, attributing gaps in the administrative record to plaintiff's counsel, concluded that the alleged deficiency constituted "special circumstances" justifying a reduction in the attorney's fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The court held that the failure of a claimant's attorney to develop the administrative record on issues collateral to the disability determination did not constitute a "special circumstance" warranting a reduction in attorney's fees. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the fee award based on its sua sponte critique of counsel's billing records and its conclusion that the time billed was excessive because no novel issues were raised. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.