Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taylor, an attorney who allegedly suffers from clinical depression, lived in a private community managed by HPHA. Graser was president of HPHA’s board. For years, Taylor’s glass-enclosed patio, visible from the main thoroughfare, was described as a “pigsty.” Taylor generally declined offers to help with cleanup. While she was away, Cramp, noticed that Taylor’s garage door was open. Taylor gave him permission to retrieve her opener and close the door. Cramp, Graser, and another closed her garage door and cleaned up Taylor’s patio, consolidating items in Taylor’s garage. Taylor filed a police report complaining of trespass and burglary and filed a complaint against HPHA with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR). DHR issued a Determination that there was no evidence of disability or that the accumulation of or clearing of clutter is related to a disability. HUD affirmed. Taylor filed suit against the HPHA and Graser, claiming failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. 3601, trespass, and conversion. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit dismissed her appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules. Calling Taylor’s FHA claim “frivolous,” the court held that HPHA and Graser were entitled to attorneys’ fees. View "Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented commercial property to AGC under a lease to expire February 28, 2007. In 2006, AGC stopped paying rent and plaintiff obtained a warrant of eviction in state court. On February 2, 2007, before plaintiff could execute the warrant, AGC filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; the automatic stay halted eviction efforts. Plaintiff successfully moved to lift the stay and executed the warrant on April 24, 2007. Plaintiff sought, under Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, post-petition rent, attorneys’ fees, and interest for the period between the Chapter 7 filing date and the date the warrant of eviction was executed. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that the pre-petition issuance of the warrant of eviction terminated the relationship such that there was no “unexpired” lease, the presence of which is necessary to obtain administrative expenses under Section 365(d)(3). The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated. A lease is “unexpired” for purposes of the Code where the tenant has the power to revive the lease under applicable state law. In New York it is the execution, and not the issuance, of the warrant of eviction that extinguishes the tenant’s interest in a lease, so, until the warrant is executed, the lease is “unexpired.” View "In re: Assoc. of Graphic Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005 Truman and partners purchased a vacant commercial building for $175,000, insured for $4,250,000 in fire-related losses. The property, without the building, was worth more than with the building. After a minor accidental fire, Truman told an employee that if it ever caught fire again, just get out. Considering leasing, Truman stated that it would make more money if it burnt. By late 2006, Truman had less than $5,000 in personal bank accounts. Premiums were paid through November 17. The building burned down November 12. Truman, Jr. confessed that he had burned the building at his father’s direction. State charges were dismissed because of inability to corroborate junior’s testimony, as required under New York law. Truman was charged with aiding and abetting arson, 18 U.S.C. 844(i); mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; use of fire in commission of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h); and loan fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Following a guilty verdict the district court granted acquittal and conditionally granted a new trial. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for sentencing. Junior’s refusal to answer certain questions did not render his testimony incredible as a matter of law, and his prior state testimony was nonhearsay. Truman was not prejudiced by improper cross-examination or summation argument references to the cooperation agreement. View "United States v. Truman" on Justia Law

Defendants are title insurance companies, members of TIRSA, a rate service organization. Plaintiffs purchased title insurance from defendants. Rates are established and regulated by the New York Insurance Department, N.Y. Ins. Law 2305, 2306, which reviews loss experience and financial data submitted by individual insurers and rate service organizations, licensed by the Insurance Department. TIRSA annually submits data from its members and prepares the New York Title Insurance Rate manual, which is submitted to the Insurance Department for approval and sets forth collectively-fixed rates, which are based on: value of property insured; cost of insuring risk associated with issuing the policy; costs associated with examination of records; and agency commissions. While title agents do provide actual services, commissions exceed the value of the services. Plaintiffs alleged that title insurers get business by encouraging those making purchasing decisions to direct business to that insurer. The complaint alleged claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a); the Sherman Act; New York General Business Law; and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege facts that would allow a plausible inference that defendants paid kickbacks for business referrals in violation of RESPA. View "Galiano v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant, a loan officer, recruited buyers to obtain mortgage loans for which they were not qualified by using false information. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The Second Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by allowing jurors, after the beginning of jury deliberations and after receiving various cautionary instructions, to take the indictment home to read on their own time. View "United States v. Esso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who dealt with Chicago Title sued both Chicago Title and Ticor, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging that they qualified for a reduced refinance rate, but paid more, and that the practice of overcharging on title insurance for refinanced properties violates the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b(a). She also claimed unjust enrichment, breach of implied contract, and money had and received. The complaint alleged that the companies are “juridically linked,” coordinated drafting their premium rate schedules, and operate in the same manner with respect to overcharging. The district court dismissed the Ticor defendants, holding that plaintiff lacked standing. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument concerning standing. View "Mahon v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged defendant's denial of coverage under the terms of an insurance policy provided under the National Flood Insurance Program, a program created by Congress that subsidized flood insurance for individuals and businesses in areas of high flood risk. Plaintiff argued that defendant's denial of coverage excused compliance with the terms of the policy. Because the court must strictly interpret the terms of governmental insurance policies backed by federal funds, and because the policy required compliance with a proof of loss requirement that plaintiff admitted he did not follow, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant.

Appellants appealed from an order of the district court denying hotel owners' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Chapter 225 of the Laws of New York State of 2010, which prohibited rental of hotel rooms in certain types of buildings for less than 30 days. Appellants alleged that Chapter 225 would destroy their budget friendly hotel businesses, under which they rent out a large number of the units in their buildings on a temporary basis to tourists. The court affirmed the district court's order and held that appellants failed to make a sufficient showing of irreparable injury.

These consolidated appeals, which have been returned to the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court, once again called upon the court to consider whether - and, if so, on what grounds - the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) was entitled to restrain the Counties from foreclosing upon certain fee-title properties, acquired on the open market by the OIN in the 1990's, for which the OIN had refused to pay property tax. The court held that the OIN had abandoned its claims premised on tribal sovereign immunity from suit as well as its claims based upon the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177. The court also held that the district court erred in ruling that the Counties' redemption-notice procedures failed to comport with due process. The court further held that the district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the OIN's state-law claims. The court finally affirmed as to several ancillary matters.

Plaintiff brought this action against the Village Defendants alleging a violation of his constitutional rights as a result of the Zoning Board of Appeals' denial of his application for a certificate of occupancy (CO) for his newly-built home. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that the Village Zoning law, Chapter IX, Section E was void for vagueness and that the Village Defendants violated his substantive due process rights by denying him a CO. The court held that Section E was unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff's property because it provided inadequate notice of the elevation point on River Road from which plaintiff should measure the height of his house to determine compliance, and because it authorized arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The court also held that the ordinance's constitutionality was not otherwise saved by its core meaning because a reasonable enforcement officer could find that the height of plaintiff's house was in compliance with Section E's restrictions. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Village Defendants on plaintiff's void-for-vagueness claim and directed that court to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on this claim. The court also vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Village Defendants on plaintiff's substantive due process claim and remanded for further proceedings.