Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants are title insurance companies, members of TIRSA, a rate service organization. Plaintiffs purchased title insurance from defendants. Rates are established and regulated by the New York Insurance Department, N.Y. Ins. Law 2305, 2306, which reviews loss experience and financial data submitted by individual insurers and rate service organizations, licensed by the Insurance Department. TIRSA annually submits data from its members and prepares the New York Title Insurance Rate manual, which is submitted to the Insurance Department for approval and sets forth collectively-fixed rates, which are based on: value of property insured; cost of insuring risk associated with issuing the policy; costs associated with examination of records; and agency commissions. While title agents do provide actual services, commissions exceed the value of the services. Plaintiffs alleged that title insurers get business by encouraging those making purchasing decisions to direct business to that insurer. The complaint alleged claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2607(a); the Sherman Act; New York General Business Law; and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The complaint did not allege facts that would allow a plausible inference that defendants paid kickbacks for business referrals in violation of RESPA. View "Galiano v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant, a loan officer, recruited buyers to obtain mortgage loans for which they were not qualified by using false information. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The Second Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err by allowing jurors, after the beginning of jury deliberations and after receiving various cautionary instructions, to take the indictment home to read on their own time. View "United States v. Esso" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who dealt with Chicago Title sued both Chicago Title and Ticor, on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging that they qualified for a reduced refinance rate, but paid more, and that the practice of overcharging on title insurance for refinanced properties violates the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110b(a). She also claimed unjust enrichment, breach of implied contract, and money had and received. The complaint alleged that the companies are “juridically linked,” coordinated drafting their premium rate schedules, and operate in the same manner with respect to overcharging. The district court dismissed the Ticor defendants, holding that plaintiff lacked standing. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s argument concerning standing. View "Mahon v. Chicago Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged defendant's denial of coverage under the terms of an insurance policy provided under the National Flood Insurance Program, a program created by Congress that subsidized flood insurance for individuals and businesses in areas of high flood risk. Plaintiff argued that defendant's denial of coverage excused compliance with the terms of the policy. Because the court must strictly interpret the terms of governmental insurance policies backed by federal funds, and because the policy required compliance with a proof of loss requirement that plaintiff admitted he did not follow, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant.

Appellants appealed from an order of the district court denying hotel owners' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Chapter 225 of the Laws of New York State of 2010, which prohibited rental of hotel rooms in certain types of buildings for less than 30 days. Appellants alleged that Chapter 225 would destroy their budget friendly hotel businesses, under which they rent out a large number of the units in their buildings on a temporary basis to tourists. The court affirmed the district court's order and held that appellants failed to make a sufficient showing of irreparable injury.

These consolidated appeals, which have been returned to the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court, once again called upon the court to consider whether - and, if so, on what grounds - the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN) was entitled to restrain the Counties from foreclosing upon certain fee-title properties, acquired on the open market by the OIN in the 1990's, for which the OIN had refused to pay property tax. The court held that the OIN had abandoned its claims premised on tribal sovereign immunity from suit as well as its claims based upon the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177. The court also held that the district court erred in ruling that the Counties' redemption-notice procedures failed to comport with due process. The court further held that the district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the OIN's state-law claims. The court finally affirmed as to several ancillary matters.

Plaintiff brought this action against the Village Defendants alleging a violation of his constitutional rights as a result of the Zoning Board of Appeals' denial of his application for a certificate of occupancy (CO) for his newly-built home. Specifically, plaintiff asserted that the Village Zoning law, Chapter IX, Section E was void for vagueness and that the Village Defendants violated his substantive due process rights by denying him a CO. The court held that Section E was unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff's property because it provided inadequate notice of the elevation point on River Road from which plaintiff should measure the height of his house to determine compliance, and because it authorized arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The court also held that the ordinance's constitutionality was not otherwise saved by its core meaning because a reasonable enforcement officer could find that the height of plaintiff's house was in compliance with Section E's restrictions. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Village Defendants on plaintiff's void-for-vagueness claim and directed that court to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on this claim. The court also vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Village Defendants on plaintiff's substantive due process claim and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal concerned tax deductions that Altria claimed in 1996 and 1997, and which the IRS disallowed. The claimed deductions resulted from Altria's participation in nine leveraged lease transactions with tax-indifferent entities. The jury found that Altria was not entitled to the claimed tax deductions. Applying the substance over form doctrine, the jury rejected Altria's contention that it retained a genuine ownership or leasehold interest in the assets and therefore was entitled to the tax deductions. The district court denied Altria's motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial and entered judgment for the government. The court affirmed and held that Altria had not shown that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the substance over form doctrine.

This was a consolidated appeal from, inter alia, an order of the district court lifting an asset freeze for the purpose of authorizing the interlocutory sale of a vacation home owned by relief-defendant Lynn A. Smith. The magistrate judge held in relevant part that the sale was necessary to preserve the value of the asset pending resolution of the merits of the action. The court held that there was no error in this finding and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to lift the asset freeze in order to authorize the sale. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed convictions for conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, causing death by use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, murder in the course of drug conspiracy, and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. Defendant contended that he was entitled to acquittal on some counts by reason of double jeopardy and the sufficiency of the evidence, to resentencing on other counts, and to a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant where a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant had inferentially instructed another individual to kill the victim; that Judge Jones' decision to exclude certain portions of the tapes of jailhouse telephone conversations was not an abuse of discretion and, if the Judge had committed an error, it was harmless; that any residual prejudice from a witness's statement was negligible because the information regarding defendant's arrest was already before the jury; that the record was insufficient to allow adjudication of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and that the Double Jeopardy clause did not bar the government from getting "one complete opportunity" to achieve a conviction on the greater offense by retrial of that count where the jury in the first trial convicted defendant on the lesser offense and failed to reach a verdict on the greater offense. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.