Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

TAG filed suit against the City, arguing that the City's zoning policies perpetuated racial segregation and had a disparate impact, thus violating the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604. In 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim, but the district court granted the City's motion for a new trial. In 2012, a second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both TAG's perpetuation of segregation and disparate impact claims. The court held that TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. The court also held that the City waived its argument regarding the inconsistency of the jury verdict; the district court should not have reached the merits of that argument, and it therefore erred when it ordered a new trial on that ground. Further, having concluded that the district court erred in ordering a new trial, and that the City has waived its remaining claims of error relating to the 2010 trial, the court reinstated the 2010 judgment in favor of TAG on its disparate impact claim; remanded with instructions that the district court grant a new trial limited only to the issue of damages unless TAG agrees to a remittitur reducing its award to $100,000; and denied reassignment on remand. View "The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Imico alleging that it failed to comply with disclosure provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., in connection with plaintiffs' attempt to purchase a condominium apartment. The court concluded that: (1) Imico complied with section 1703(a)(1)(B) by providing the property report to plaintiffs’ designated attorney; (2) Imico’s description of the lot was sufficient to meet the requirements of section 1703(d)(1); and (3) Imico is entitled to any interest that accrued on plaintiffs’ fifteen‐percent down payment while the deposit was in escrow.  Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court insofar as it held that Imico did not violate section 1703(d)(1), but reversed the judgment insofar as it held that plaintiffs were entitled to rescind their contract due to Imico’s alleged failure to comply with section 1703(a)(1)(B). View "Rai v. WB Imico Lexington Fee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against a group of airlines and security contractors seeking to recover losses after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Plaintiffs alleged that, because defendants were negligent in overseeing airport security systems, the terrorists were able to hijack American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 and to fly those planes into the Twin Towers. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation only for the amount of value that their leasehold interests lost due to the terrorist attacks, that they cannot recover their claimed consequential damages, and that, pursuant to CPLR 4545, their insurance recoveries correspond to, and offset, their potential tort award. The court also agreed that United had no duty to supervise the security checkpoints or detect the hijackers who boarded American Airlines Flight 11. However, the court concluded that the district court erred by using an incorrect methodology when calculating the value by which plaintiffs’ leasehold interests declined, and the district court wrongly decided that prejudgment interest accrues at the federal funds rate on the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ leasehold estates. The district court should have calculated prejudgment interest using New York’s statutory prejudgment interest rate, and assessed that interest based on the final damages award. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Trade Center Properties LLC v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of minor child A.R., filed suit against a real estate agency and its agent for disability discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made housing unavailable on the basis of disability; provided different terms, conditions, and privileges of rental housing on the basis of disability; expressed a preference on the basis of disability; and misrepresented the availability of rental housing on the basis of disability. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court held, however, that the district court erred because there was sufficient evidence presented that A.R. qualifies as disabled under the FHA; the FHA’s prohibition against statements that “indicate[ ] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . handicap,” pursuant to section 3604(c), may be violated even if the subject of those statements does not qualify as disabled under the FHA; and the “ordinary listener” standard is not applicable to claims under section 3604(d) for misrepresenting the availability of housing. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant and his counsel, D&B, (collectively, "petitioners") appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss their petition asserting an interest found in property found subject to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(2) after defendant's co-defendant was convicted. The district court determined that both parties had standing but that petitioners failed to state any claims for relief. The court concluded that because the government’s forfeiture claim qualifies it as a creditor under New York law, the government has standing to challenge D&B's assignment as a fraudulent conveyance; because the record fails to establish whether the transferor of the contested funds was insolvent at the time of the transfer so as to render D&B’s assignment a fraudulent conveyance, the petitioners have, at this stage in the proceedings, alleged a plausible interest in the property sufficient to create standing to seek an ancillary hearing; because the contested funds are subject to forfeiture as “proceeds” of the co-defendant's criminal activity and therefore only came into existence following the commission of his criminal act, petitioners cannot claim that D&B had a superior interest in those funds at the time of the offense as required by 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A); and because the criminal forfeiture statute limits a third party’s right to challenge a post‐indictment forfeiture order to the two grounds identified in 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), petitioners may not challenge the inclusion of the contested funds in the forfeiture order under § 982(a)(2). The court concluded, however, that because D&B accepted the assignment of the contested funds shortly after a Monsanto hearing in which the district court determined that the government failed to establish probable cause to restrain the contested property, and because the petition alleges no additional facts suggesting that D&B had reason to know that the property was forfeitable as a matter of law, petitioners have plausibly alleged that D&B was a bona fide purchaser reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "United States v. Watts" on Justia Law

Amtrak appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing its federal Supremacy Clause claims filed against the Commissioner, claiming that the Supremacy Clause deprived the NYSDOT of authority to condemn Amtrak's property by eminent domain. The district court held that Amtrak's claims were barred under the Eleventh Amendment and, in the alternative, the claims were time-barred. The court concluded that, because one of the parcels of land is not subject to sovereign immunity, the statute of limitations issue must be resolved. Amtrak argued that it suffered two separate injuries: first, when it learned that NYSDOT planned to take its land, and second, when the Commissioner actually executed the takings. Under the circumstances of this case, the court concluded that Amtrak brought its federal claims more than six years afters its claims accrued. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court based on its alternative conclusion that the claims were time-barred. View "National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Petitioner, as assignee of his brother's interest in the forfeited property ($50,000 in bail money), appealed the district court's denial of his motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983(e)(1). The district court dismissed the petition, holding that the assignment was invalid because the forfeiture had been completed and all interest in the property had vested in the United States at the time of the assignment. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that the Act permits any person with an interest in forfeited property to file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture after the forfeiture has occurred on grounds of lack of notice. The court also concluded that the assignment of petitioner's brother's interest to him was valid under New York law. View "Lucas v. United States" on Justia Law

The New York State Legislature amended N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5206 in 2005, increasing the state's homestead exemption from $10,000 to $50,000. At issue was whether the 2005 Amendment's increased homestead exemption applied to judgment liens perfected prior to the amendment's effective date and, if so, whether application of the law to pre-enactment judgment liens violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court held that the 2005 Amendment applies to all creditors and all obligations, including pre-existing obligations, regardless of whether the debt was reduced to a judgment lien prior to the statute's enactment; and (2) that retroactive application of the exemption does not constitute an uncompensated taking of pre-enactment judgment liens in violation of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's conclusion that there was been no taking of claimant's property.View "1256 Hertel Avenue Associates v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed from the district court's order of forfeiture seizing roughly $750,000 in cash, arguing that the district court erred in granting the government's motion for a default judgment against the res without first considering his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's judgment of forfeiture because claimant failed to establishing standing to challenge the forfeiture. View "United States v. Vazquez-Alvarez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that Verizon installed multi-unit terminal boxes on their property without just compensation and violated their due process rights. The court concluded that Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City applied to physical takings, with the recognition that the finality requirement was satisfied by a physical taking; in regards to plaintiffs' due process claims, Williamson County applies to such claims arising from the same circumstances as a takings claim; and plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their state remedies through an inverse condemnation proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc." on Justia Law