Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CitiMortgage's responses to requests for information about her mortgage violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601-2617; the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p; and N.Y. General Business Law (GBL) section 349. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to allege that CitiMortgage did not properly designate a qualified written address (QWR) or that any or her lawyer's letters were sent to the designated address. Because plaintiff's lawyer's letters are not QWRs, CitiMortgage's RESPA duties were not triggered, and therefore the district court properly dismissed the RESPA claims. The district court did not err in dismissing the FDCPA claims where the amended complaint failed to alleged that CitiMortgage qualified as a debt collector under the FDCPA. The district court did not err in dismissing the section 349 claim where CitiMortgage's QWR address notice was not inadequate. Finally, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court and denied her request for leave to amend. View "Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc." on Justia Law

Stockbridge, a recognized Indian tribe, appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claims asserting title of a tract of land in upstate New York. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that it was well-settled that claims by an Indian tribe alleging that it was unlawfully dispossessed of land early in America's history were barred by the equitable principles of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility. View "Stockbridge-Munsee v. State of New York, et al." on Justia Law

Claimants appealed from the district court's forfeiture orders of 23 of the defendant funds and properties to the United States. The judgments were entered by default after the district court granted the motion of the United States under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466, to strike Claimants' claims to the properties on the ground that Claimants Padma and Reddy (the "Allens") remained outside the United States in order to avoid prosecution in a related criminal case. The court rejected the government's contention that the burden of proof as to intent under the fugitive disentitlement statute was on Claimants. However, the court also rejected Claimants' contentions that summary judgment standards were applicable, and that the court was required to find that avoidance of criminal prosecution was the Allens' sole, dominant, or principal reason for remaining outside of the United States. The court concluded that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that its application of the fugitive disentitlement statute was well within the bounds of its discretion. The court considered all of Claimants' challenges and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Technodyne LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Town after a decade of dealing with the Town in plaintiff's efforts to apply for subdivision approval. The court reversed the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's federal takings claims, concluding that his claim became ripe because of the way the Town handled his application under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City where the Town employed a decade of unfair and repetitive procedures, which made seeking a final decision futile. The Town also unfairly manipulated the litigation of the case in a way that might have prevented plaintiff from ever bringing his takings claim. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's non-takings claims based on ripeness grounds and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1981 claim, to deny plaintiff leave to amend to add a 42 U.S.C. 1982 claim, and to dismiss plaintiff's procedural due process claim based on the consultants' fee law. View "Sherman v. Town of Chester" on Justia Law

Debtor, a New York City tenant, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the value of her apartment lease on Schedule B as personal property exempt from the bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit." At issue was whether the value inherent in debtor's rent-stabilized lease as a consequence of the protections afforded by New York's Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp. Code R. & Regs. tit. 9, 2520.1 et seq., made the lease, or some portion of its value, exempt from debtor's bankruptcy estate as a "local public assistance benefit" within the meaning of New York Debtor and Creditor Law 282(2). The court certified this unsettled issue to the New York Court of Appeals. View "Santiago-Monteverde v. Pereira" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a forfeiture order in connection with a conviction for, inter alia, three counts of mortgage fraud (Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine). At issue was whether the district court erred by ordering forfeiture on Count Seven under a statute which, while applicable to Count Seven, was onlly charged in the indictment in connection with Counts Eight and Nine - an oversight that was not corrected by the Government or the district court before or during sentencing. The court concluded that forfeiture was limited to that authorized by the statute listed in the indictment, even if greater forfeiture would have been authorized by a different statute, where the government fails to invoke the harsher forfeiture provision prior to or during sentencing; 28 U.S.C. 982(a) authorizes forfeiture of the full amount of the loans fraudulently obtained in Counts Eight and Nine, without an offset for any portion of the loan that has been repaid; and 28 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(c), the only forfeiture provision charged in Count Seven, permitted an offset for that portion of the loan that was repaid with no loss to the victim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the forfeiture order on Counts Eight and Nine, and remanded with instructions to vacate the forfeiture order on Count Seven. View "United States v. Annabi" on Justia Law

Liquidators challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brazil, concluding that a forfeiture judgment entered by a Brazilian court pursuant to Brazil's successful criminal prosecution of Kesten's former principals and owners took precedence over the Liquidators' Cayman Islands civil default judgment against Kesten. The court concluded that the penal law rule awarding summary judgment in favor of Brazil based on a forfeiture judgment of that sovereign grounded in a violation of Brazil's penal laws; however, the court recognized that 28 U.S.C. 2467 is a statutory exception to the penal rule; while no section 2467 request from Brazil is presently before the Attorney General, that nation's counsel advised the court at oral argument that if the challenged summary judgment decision were vacated based on the penal law rule, Brazil would promptly file a section 2467 petition pursuant to the nations' mutual legal assistance treaty; and therefore, the court remanded with instructions to the district court that it afford Brazil and the Attorney General a reasonable period of time to satisfy the section 2467's exception to that rule before reaching a final decision in this interpleader action. View "Federative Republic of Brazil v. Fu" on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Although several claims of error asserted by claimant were without merit, the court acted nostra sponte in holding that the district court's application of legal standards antedating adoption of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. 983, constituted plain error and affected claimant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Pellegrino" on Justia Law

These appeals arose out of LJL's exercise of its contractual option to purchase Pitcairn's ownership stake in a jointly owned high-rise luxury residential building in New York City, after which the parties pursued an arbitration to determine the value of the property. Both parties subsequently appealed from the district court's judgment. In LJL's appeal, the court agreed with its contention that the arbitrator's exclusion of Pitcairn's hearsay exhibits was within the arbitrator's authorized discretion and, therefore, vacated the district court's order overturning the arbitrator's determination of the Stated Value. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the arbitrator acted in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement in refusing to determine the Purchase Price and, therefore, remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award in its entirety. In Pitcairn's appeal, the court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Pitcairn's claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LJL 33rd Street Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Federal, denying plaintiffs indemnification under their insurance policy for the destruction of their barn by fire. The court concluded that the permissive adverse inference instruction with respect to a photograph that plaintiffs had not produced in discovery was appropriate; Federal was not entitled to attorney fees; Federal was not entitled to equitable relief to recover payments made to plaintiffs; and, therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mali v. Federal Ins. Co," on Justia Law