Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These appeals arose out of LJL's exercise of its contractual option to purchase Pitcairn's ownership stake in a jointly owned high-rise luxury residential building in New York City, after which the parties pursued an arbitration to determine the value of the property. Both parties subsequently appealed from the district court's judgment. In LJL's appeal, the court agreed with its contention that the arbitrator's exclusion of Pitcairn's hearsay exhibits was within the arbitrator's authorized discretion and, therefore, vacated the district court's order overturning the arbitrator's determination of the Stated Value. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the arbitrator acted in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement in refusing to determine the Purchase Price and, therefore, remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award in its entirety. In Pitcairn's appeal, the court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Pitcairn's claims for breach of fiduciary duties and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LJL 33rd Street Associates, LLC v. Pitcairn Properties Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's judgment in favor of Federal, denying plaintiffs indemnification under their insurance policy for the destruction of their barn by fire. The court concluded that the permissive adverse inference instruction with respect to a photograph that plaintiffs had not produced in discovery was appropriate; Federal was not entitled to attorney fees; Federal was not entitled to equitable relief to recover payments made to plaintiffs; and, therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Mali v. Federal Ins. Co," on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal with prejudice plaintiff's complaint seeking indemnification for property loss caused by fire under an insurance policy. At issue were two provisions in the policy: one requiring the insured to file suit on the policy within two years and the second requiring the insured, seeking replacement costs, to replace the damaged property before bringing suit, and to complete the replacement work as soon as reasonably possible. Because New York law did not clearly resolve the question of what happens to insured property that could not reasonably be replaced within two years, the court certified the question to the New York State Court of Appeals. View "Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After defendant, a developer, had not furnished a "printed property report," as required by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ISLA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., plaintiff claimed that their contract to purchase a condominium unit from defendant was voidable. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff. At issue was whether a single-floor condominium unit in a multi-story building was a "lot," thus triggering the disclosure and reporting requirements of the ISLA. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the Department of Urban Development (HUD) promulgated a rule defining the term "lot" to require the "exclusive use of... land," and, in turn, interpreted the term "land" to mean "realty," thus applying ILSA's requirements to condominium units in multi-story buildings. Because "land" could be used as a term of art meaning "realty," the court held that CFPB and HUD have reasonably interpreted their own definition of the term "lot." Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Further, the district court did not err or abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees. View "Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for remand to state courts. This is an interlocutory appeal of a question certified by the district court, calling for interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632. Whether the district court's denial of remand was proper turns on whether the dispute falls within section 632. The court concluded that the dispute did not fall within section 632's grant of jurisdiction so that removal from state to federal court was not authorized by the statute. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying remand. View "AIG v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

The County appealed from a judgment of the district court finding that the County was in violation of its duty to promote source-of-income legislation under a Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal (consent decree) entered into by the County with the United States to resolve a qui tam action initially brought by relator, ADC, under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging the submission of false claims by the County to HUD in order to obtain federal grant monies for fair housing. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to review the decision of the reviewing magistrate judge under the consent decree. On the merits, the court held that the County violated the terms of the consent decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Westchester County, New York" on Justia Law

FHFA, as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued UBS for fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgage-backed securities. The district court denied UBS's motion to dismiss and certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the "extender statute" in section 4617(b)(12) of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, applied to this action, and thus concluded that the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for untimeliness. The court further held that FHFA had standing to bring this action and the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Federal Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc." on Justia Law

Livecchi appealed from an amended judgment of the district court following partial summary judgment in favor of the government's equity-skimming claim (Livecchi I), and a subsequent bench trial rejecting Levecchi's counterclaim for recoupment and granting the government's application for double damages and prejudgment interest (Levecchi II). The court concluded that Livecchi's interpretation of the equity-skimming statute was inconsistent with the statute's clear purpose; the government's authority to foreclose on a HUD-insured mortgage could not preclude the government from subsequently recovering assets or rental income retained in violation of a related regulatory agreement; as for the limitations period, Levecchi failed to establish that HUD had any knowledge of his equity skimming prior to August 21, 2000, the date HUD first acquired Levecchi's financial records; and therefore, the court affirmed the amended judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Livecchi" on Justia Law

In this criminal fraud case, defendant appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to release $3.7 million in assets that were frozen in a parallel civil enforcement action. Defendant and his wife had purchased a house in her name using funds unrelated to the alleged fraud. Pursuant to the divorce settlement, defendant received title to the house and gave his wife a $12.5 million distribution award, at least $6 million of which was directly traceable to defendant's alleged fraud. The court held that the district court properly applied the tracing analysis from United States v. Banco-Cafetero. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court made two related erroneous evidentiary rulings at the Monsanto hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a tenant-stockholder of a cooperative housing corporation, appealed from the tax court's denial of her petition for a redetermination of a deficiency determination by the Commissioner. The tax court granted the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, ruling that petitioner held no property interest in the cooperative's grounds sufficient to entitle her to the claimed deduction. The court concluded that petitioner had a sufficient interest in "property" within the meaning of 165(c)(3), and the Commissioner's arguments in support of the tax court's ruling were without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alphonso v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law