Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Trustee sued on behalf of victims in the Ponzi scheme worked by Bernard Madoff under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. 78aaa, alleging that, when defendants were confronted with evidence of Madoff's illegitimate scheme, their banking fees gave incentive to look away, or at least caused a failure to perform due diligence that would have revealed the fraud. The court concluded that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred the Trustee from asserting claims directly against defendants on behalf of the estate for wrongdoing in which Madoff participated; SIPA provided no right to contribution; and the Trustee did not have standing to pursue common law claims on behalf of Madoff's customers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Trustee's claims. View "In Re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to avoid and recover certain payments made by debtor, QWUSA, to appellees, noteholders, in exchange for private placement notes that had been issued by one of debtor's affiliates. On appeal, appellants challenged the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court held that the payments were exempt from avoidance because they were both "settlement payments" and "transfers made... in connection with a securities contract," under 11 U.S.C. 546(e). The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the payments fell within the safe harbor for "transfers made... in connection with a securities contract." View "In re: Quebecor World (USA), Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a post-judgment order barring him from acting as an officer or director of a public company for ten years, pursuant to section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(2). The SEC accused defendant of insider trading and, after the entry of a consent judgment, in which defendant neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the complaint, the SEC moved for an officer and director bar pursuant to section 21(d)(2). The court held that the district court did not err in relying on the six Patel factors in this case. The 2002 Amendment, by lowering the threshold of misconduct required to impose the officer and director bar, did not undermine the usefulness of the Patel factors, which indicated where evidence of unfitness might be found in a defendant's conduct. In light of the circumstances presented, the district court reasonably determined that a ten year ban was warranted and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SEC v. Bankosky" on Justia Law

Several individual investors appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint alleging securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. This litigation arose out of a fraudulent scheme engaged in a now-defunct broker-dealer (Baron). The court concluded that the investors have sufficiently pleaded with particularity that certain Baron investors (Dweck) provided knowing and substantial assistance in financing and facilitating the Baron fraud. While such allegations would easily be sufficient in an SEC civil action, or a federal criminal action because this knowing and substantial assistance constituted, at the least, aiding and abetting, they did not meet the standards for private damage actions under Section 10(b). Nevertheless, with the investors' state law claims - civil conspiracy to defraud and aiding and abetting fraud - the complaint alleged sufficient involvement by Dweck in the scheme to survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded the state law claims for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the federal securities claims. View "Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from the district court's order denying their motion for remand to state courts. This is an interlocutory appeal of a question certified by the district court, calling for interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. 632. Whether the district court's denial of remand was proper turns on whether the dispute falls within section 632. The court concluded that the dispute did not fall within section 632's grant of jurisdiction so that removal from state to federal court was not authorized by the statute. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying remand. View "AIG v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of the United States' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints against the SEC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Plaintiffs also appealed from the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Plaintiffs sought to hold the United States liable for SEC employees' failure to detect Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme and for the financial losses that plaintiffs claimed they suffered as a result. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, finding that the SEC's actions, along with its regrettable inaction, were shielded by the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). View "Molchatsky, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a derivative suit on behalf of Goldman Sachs under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b), seeking to require defendant to disgorge all profits from short-swing transactions in Goldman Sachs shares. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's orders and judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to plead that defendant was a beneficial owner under Section 16(b) and Rule 16a-1, 17, C.F.R. 240, 16a-1. The court also declined to extend the term "beneficial owner" to encompass, perforce, "tippers" who provided insider information, in exchange for payment, to another party who engaged in the short-swing trading of shares. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders and judgment of the district court. View "Mercer v. Gupta" on Justia Law

FHFA, as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued UBS for fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the marketing and sale of mortgage-backed securities. The district court denied UBS's motion to dismiss and certified its decision for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the "extender statute" in section 4617(b)(12) of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, applied to this action, and thus concluded that the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for untimeliness. The court further held that FHFA had standing to bring this action and the district court correctly denied UBS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. View "Federal Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing her claims against her ex-husband and his brother for failure to state a claim and untimeliness. Plaintiff alleged that, in representing a certain investment as worthless and concealing the $5.5 million received on its account, defendants conspired in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), committed common law fraud, and breached fiduciary duties, and that her ex-husband was unjustly enriched. The court held that the district court's reasons for dismissing the fraud-based claims were erroneous and that the district court erred in ruling on the existing record that the RICO, common law fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims were time-barred. The court sustained the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

In these two civil enforcement actions for securities fraud, various entities that were defrauded by defendants appealed from the district court's order approving initial pro rata distributions recovered from defendants and associated entities by the Receiver in accordance with the Plan proposed by the Receiver. Interested parties, 3M Group, contended principally that the district court should have rejected the proposed pro rata distributions because under the Plan, fraud victims who chose allegedly safer investments fare no better than victims whose investments were riskier. Interested party, KCERA, contended that the district court should have rejected the proposed Plan because it did not provide an adjustment for inflation to compensate for longer-term investors. The court considered all of the contentions of the 3M Group and KCERA in support of their respective appeals and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "CFTC v. 3M Employee Welfare Benefit Assoc. Trust I, et al." on Justia Law