Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over fees related to contracts between independent solar generators (the plaintiffs) and National Grid USA Services Co., Inc. and its affiliate Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the defendants). The plaintiffs are required to pay costs for interconnecting their solar energy projects to the defendants' electric distribution grid, which includes a "tax gross-up adder" to offset the defendants' federal income tax liability. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that these interconnection payments are not taxable income and also sought to recover the allegedly unlawful tax-related fees through state-law claims for damages.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the case, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment was barred by the Declaratory Judgment Act because the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense to a state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the plaintiffs' state-law claims did not raise a substantial federal question, as the federal tax issue was not significant to the federal system as a whole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief did not meet the threshold requirement for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, as the federal tax issue would only arise as a defense in a hypothetical state-law breach of contract claim. The court also found that the federal issue in the plaintiffs' state-law claims was not substantial, as it was fact-bound and situation-specific, and did not have broader significance for the federal government. Therefore, the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was upheld. View "Sunvestment Energy Group NY 64 LLC v. National Grid USA Services Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The case pertains to Ariel Jimenez, who owned and operated a tax preparation business in Bronx, New York. Between 2009 and 2015, Jimenez led a large-scale tax fraud and identity theft scheme, purchasing stolen identities of children to falsely claim them as dependents on clients' tax returns. Through this scheme, Jimenez obtained millions of dollars, which he laundered by structuring bank deposits, investing in real estate properties, and transferring the properties to his parents and limited liability companies. Following a jury trial, Jimenez was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to tax-return claims, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering.On appeal, Jimenez raised two issues. First, he claimed that the district court’s jury instruction regarding withdrawal from a conspiracy was erroneous. Second, he alleged that the evidence supporting his conspiracy convictions was insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court’s jury instruction on withdrawal from a conspiracy was a correct statement of the law and that the evidence supporting Jimenez's conspiracy convictions was sufficient. The court found that Jimenez had failed to effectively withdraw from the conspiracy as he continued to benefit from it. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

The case in question involves an appeal by Joseph William Foley against the United States Tax Court's dismissal of his deficiency protest due to untimeliness. Foley filed a protest against a notice of deficiency issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the 2014 and 2015 tax years, but his filing came 1,393 days after the 90-day deadline.Foley's petition was filed under small tax case procedures, which is a less formal process meant for cases where the deficiency amount is under $50,000. The IRS moved to dismiss Foley’s petition for redetermination due to its untimeliness. Foley then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the Tax Court's decision was made on jurisdictional grounds, not on merit, and therefore should not be impeded by the non-reviewability provision of the small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Foley's argument. It held that the Tax Court's dismissal of his petition did constitute a "decision", as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. The Court of Appeals explained that a "decision" includes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, which was the case for Foley’s petition. Therefore, according to the language of the Internal Revenue Code, jurisdictional dismissals like Foley's are indeed unreviewable under small tax case procedures.The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Foley's alternative argument that his case never became a "small case" due to the Tax Court's jurisdictional dismissal, and thus falls outside of the non-reviewability provision. The court noted that Foley had initially requested small-case procedures, and despite the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss his petition as untimely, Foley never moved to rescind his small-case election. Hence, the Tax Court dismissed a case that was subject to small tax case procedures, and the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review Foley's appeal. Consequently, the court granted the Commissioner's motion and dismissed Foley’s appeal. View "Foley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed from a judgment of the district court awarding the United States $112,324.18, plus statutory additions and interest, in connection with an unpaid tax assessment from 2007. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, notwithstanding the fact that the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) referred the assessment to the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) before formally rejecting Defendants’ proposed installment agreement. Defendants contended that this referral violated the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the implementing Treasury Regulations that curb the IRS’s collection activities while a proposed installment agreement remains on the table.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as their plain terms indicate, the suspension provisions of Section 6331(i) and (k) prohibit the commencement of a collection action in court during specified periods, not the IRS’s antecedent request that the DOJ file such an action. The court wrote that the Internal Revenue Code is silent on when the IRS may refer an action to the DOJ, and a Treasury Regulation that limits the IRS’s referral power cannot read into the statute something that is not there. Further, this conclusion is not altered because authorization from the Treasury Secretary is a prerequisite to commencing an in-court proceeding.   Further, the court explained that Defendants have not claimed a violation of their constitutional rights and the regulatory limits on IRS referrals of collection actions are not statutorily derived. As a result, Defendants must demonstrate prejudice for the government’s regulatory violation to invalidate the instant collection action. The court found that Defendants have failed to do so. View "United States v. Schiller" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged he post-trial rulings of the United States Tax Court regarding their tax obligations for the 2004 tax year. Petitioners argued that the Tax Court erroneously concluded that (1) they filed a valid joint return, (2) the Internal Revenue Service issued a statutory notice of deficiency before the limitations period for a tax assessment under I.R.C. Sections 6501(a) and (c)(4) expired, (3) they owed a $28,836 penalty pursuant to I.R.C. Section 6651(a)(1) for filing a late tax return, and (4) they owed a $128,526 penalty pursuant to I.R.C. Section 6662 for filing an inaccurate tax return.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in its finding that Petitioners intended to jointly file the Return. Further, the court wrote that the IRS issued the Deficiency Notice within the limitations period for the tax assessment. Moreover, the court held that Petitioners are subject to a $28,836 late-filing penalty under I.R.C. Section 6651(a)(1). Finally, the court held that Petitioners are subject to a $128,526 accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. Section 6662. View "Soni v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the post-trial rulings of the United States Tax Court regarding their tax obligations for the 2004 tax year. Petitioners argued that the Tax Court erroneously concluded that (1) they filed a valid joint return, (2) the Internal Revenue Service issued a statutory notice of deficiency before the limitations period for a tax assessment under I.R.C. Sections 6501(a) and (c)(4) expired, (3) they owed a $28,836 penalty pursuant to I.R.C. Section 6651(a)(1) for filing a late tax return, and (4) they owed a $128,526 penalty pursuant to I.R.C. Section 6662 for filing an inaccurate tax return.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tax Court did not clearly err in its finding that Petitioners intended to jointly file the Return. Further, the court concluded that the IRS issued the Deficiency Notice within the limitations period for the tax assessment. The court held that Petitioners are subject to a $28,836 late-filing penalty under I.R.C. Section 6651(a)(1). Finally, the court held that Petitioners are subject to a $128,526 accuracy-related penalty under I.R.C. Section 6662. The court explained that Petitioner’s inaccuracy was not the product of reasonable reliance upon the advice of a tax professional. As the Tax Court also found, Petitioners failed to provide their accountants “necessary and accurate information.” Moreover, the record includes evidence that Petitioner disregarded the advice of accountants who warned him that he would need proof to substantiate the claimed loss. View "Soni v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a franchisor of tax preparation services, appeals from the district court’s denying its motion for preliminary injunctive relief to enforce, among other things, covenants not to compete or solicit former clients against Defendants, its former franchisees. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erroneously applied a heightened standard for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, failed to credit an undisputed fact that Plaintiff had grounds to terminate the franchise agreements because Defendants were violating federal tax laws, and was compelled as a matter of law to find that it would suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and client relationships in the absence of an injunction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the order denying preliminary relief. The court concluded that the district court applied the appropriate standard, permissibly credited Defendants’ denials that they violated federal tax laws, and acted well within its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm. The court reasoned that nothing in the court’s precedents compels a district court to find irreparable harm to goodwill and client relationships in covenant-not-to-compete or -solicit cases simply because irreparable harm is often found in such cases. Instead, a plaintiff must present the district court with actual evidence. On that record, the court wrote it cannot conclude that the district court’s finding that Plaintiff had failed to make a strong showing of irreparable injury represented a clear error or exceeded the court’s discretion. View "JTH Tax d/b/a Liberty Tax Service v. Agnant" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned the United States Tax Court to redetermine her income tax deficiency after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that she was subject to a 10-percent exaction under 26 U.S.C. Section 72(t) of the Internal Revenue Code for early distributions she made from her pension plan. Petitioner argued that she is not liable for the 10-percent exaction under Section 72(t) because it is a penalty, an additional amount, or an addition to tax within the meaning of Section 6751(c) of the Internal Revenue Code and that the Commissioner failed to obtain written supervisory approval for the initial determination to impose the exaction, as required by Section 6751(b). The United States Tax Court ruled that the 10-percent exaction under Section 72(t) is not subject to the written supervisory requirement because it is a tax, not a penalty, an additional amount, or an addition to tax, and Petitioner is liable for the 10-percent exaction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment. The court explained that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 72(t) establishes that the Exaction is a tax, not a penalty, an additional amount, or an addition to tax within the meaning of Section 6751(c) that requires written supervisory approval. Thus, Petitioner is liable for the Exaction. View "Grajales v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Under 26 U.S.C. 7345, if a court determines that a "seriously delinquent" certification was erroneous, it may order the Secretary of the Treasury to notify the Secretary of State of that fact. No other relief is authorized. The Second Circuit affirmed the tax court's dismissal in part insofar as it dismissed certain of petitioner's claims as moot, and vacated and remanded in part with instructions to the tax court court to dismiss all the remaining claims as moot insofar as it dismissed those claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction.In 2019, petitioner filed a petition with the tax court challenging the Commissioner's certification that she had a "seriously delinquent tax debt" under 26 U.S.C. 7345. While her challenge was pending, the Commissioner reversed the certification as erroneous and so notified the Secretary of State. In 2020, the tax court dismissed the petition, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to assess the validity of her underlying liability for the penalties the IRS had assessed against her, which formed the basis for her debt, and that her challenge to her certification was moot in light of the IRS's reversal. In this case, petitioner has received all the relief to which she is entitled by statute and, to the extent that the voluntary cessation doctrine exists primarily to keep parties from acting strategically to avoid judicial review, that is not a concern here. Finally, petitioner's challenge, under section 7345, to the underlying penalties assessed against her was moot at the time the tax court issued its order. View "Ruesch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The Plaintiff States filed suit alleging that the $10,000 cap on the federal income tax deduction for money paid in state and local taxes (SALT), enacted as part of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, violates the United States Constitution.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denial of the States' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the States had standing and that their claims were not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). However, the court rejected the States' contention that the SALT deduction is constitutionally required by the text of Article I, Section 8 and the Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and thus the SALT deduction cap effectively eliminates a constitutionally mandated deduction for taxpayers. Rather, the court concluded that the Constitution itself does not limit Congress's authority to impose a cap. In this case, the States' arguments mimic those that the Supreme Court rejected in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515–27 9 (1988). In Baker, the Court held that Congress had the power to tax interest earned on state-issued bonds even though it had not previously done so. The court also concluded that the SALT deduction cap is not coercive in violation of the Tenth Amendment or the principle of equal sovereignty. View "New York v. Yellen" on Justia Law