Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner was able to demonstrate this continuous presence except for two encounters with U.S. Border Patrol in 2007, each of which resulted in what the parties termed petitioner's "voluntary return" to Mexico. The court held that the immigration judge reasonably found that during each of those well-documented encounters, petitioner knowingly and voluntarily conceded his removability, waived his right to appear before an immigration judge, and chose to leave the United States in lieu of more formal proceedings. The court further held that petitioner's return to Mexico under those circumstances severed his continuous physical presence in the United States, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal. Finally, the court denied petitioner's appeal of the denial of his motion to reopen proceedings. View "Rosario-Mijangos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence as substantively unreasonable. The district court imposed defendant's 57-month sentence to run consecutively to his existing sentence after considering his history, characteristics, and the goals of sentencing, most notably, deterrence. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing the sentence. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from appellant's attempt to intervene in a wrongful death law suit. After an appeal from a judgment of the district court, this court affirmed the district court's judgment denying appellant's motion to intervene, and ordered appellant and her attorney to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for their conduct on appeal. The court concluded that appellant and her counsel's conduct in prosecuting the appeal was frivolous and offensive, warranting the imposition of sanctions. After review of their submissions and the totality of the circumstances, the court invoked the inherent power of the court and imposed sanctions in the form of double costs jointly and severally on appellant and her counsel. View "Ransmeier v. UAL Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 3 of the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10, implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 42 U.S.C. 11601 et seq., and sought return of his children to Canada from New York in order to allow the Canadian courts to determine which parent was to be awarded custody of the children. The court concluded that the district court properly determined under the Convention that the parties' last shared intention regarding the children's residence was that they live in Canada and for that reason the habitual residence of the children remained in Canada; there was no basis to conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that the children have not become so acclimatized to life in New York that returning them to Canada would be harmful to them; and respondent failed to prove any affirmative defense. The court considered respondent's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hofmann v. Sender" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a post-judgment order barring him from acting as an officer or director of a public company for ten years, pursuant to section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(2). The SEC accused defendant of insider trading and, after the entry of a consent judgment, in which defendant neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the complaint, the SEC moved for an officer and director bar pursuant to section 21(d)(2). The court held that the district court did not err in relying on the six Patel factors in this case. The 2002 Amendment, by lowering the threshold of misconduct required to impose the officer and director bar, did not undermine the usefulness of the Patel factors, which indicated where evidence of unfitness might be found in a defendant's conduct. In light of the circumstances presented, the district court reasonably determined that a ten year ban was warranted and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SEC v. Bankosky" on Justia Law

The United States brought suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination in the hiring of New York City firefighters. On appeal, the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta challenged the district court's order issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters. Intervenors cross-appealed a partial final judgment dismissing their federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta. The City, inter alia, sought review of an order granting Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim. The court concluded that (1) summary judgment was improperly entered on Intervenors' disparate treatment claims; (2) the federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg were properly dismissed, as were the state law claims against Commissioner Scopetta, but the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta should be reinstated; (3) most portions of the injunction based on the unchallenged disparate impact finding were within the district court's remedial discretion, but other portions, particularly those portions based on the improper discriminatory treatment ruling, exceeded that discretion; and (4) on remand, the bench trial on the liability phase of the disparate treatment claim against the City should be reassigned to a different district judge. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. City of New York" on Justia Law

JDJ Marine moved to reinstate an appeal dismissed after its failure to comply with the court's second scheduling order for filing a brief. The court concluded that JDJ Marine had demonstrated a persistent indifference to the court's scheduling orders and local rules. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to reinstate the appeal. View "RLI Ins. Co. v. JDJ Marine, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of drug offenses and subsequently appealed his resentence. After defendant's resentencing, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 750, which retroactively lowered the base offense levels for crack-cocaine offenses pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat. 2372. At issue on appeal was whether the sentencing court, exercising its authority under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), could give defendant the additional benefit of a downward departure previously awarded in the original sentencing. The court held that the provisions of U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 of the Guidelines, as incorporated by section 3582(c)(2), required a resentencing court to apply the amended Guidelines range that would have been applicable to the defendant under the retroactive amendment, without applying any previously-granted departure, except for a departure granted upon an appropriate motion by the government based on the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities. Applying that rule to this case, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that defendant was not entitled to a downward departure. View "United States v. Steele" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for resentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) and U.S.S.G. 1B1.10. Although the district court concluded that defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction, it declined to reduce his sentence, finding that he posed a danger to the community based on his conduct while in detention. Defendant had incurred eight disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated, five of which (and the most violent) occurred after he was sentenced. The court concluded that the district court acted well within its discretion in considering this conduct and denying a sentence reduction on that basis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Figueroa" on Justia Law

SEFCU, a lender, appealed from the district court's reversal of an order of the bankruptcy court and remanding the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. The district court concluded that SEFCU violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 362, when, after lawfully repossessing a vehicle belonging to debtor, it failed to deliver the vehicle to him notwithstanding its knowledge of debtor's pending petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that SEFCU "exercised control" over "property" of debtor's bankruptcy estate in contravention of section 362 when it failed to relinquish the vehicle promptly after it learned that a Chapter 13 petition was filed. Consequently, under section 362(k), SEFCU was liable for debtor's actual damages resulting from the wrongful retention, costs, and attorneys' fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Weber v. SEFCU" on Justia Law