Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The NRC granted Entergy an exemption from compliance with certain fire safety regulations at its Indian Point nuclear plant operating unit No. 3. Plaintiffs alleged that the NRC's award of the exemption to Entergy violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Entergy on all of these claims except in one respect. Insofar as plaintiffs contended that the NRC granted the challenged exemption in violation of NEPA's regulations, which allowed for public involvement where appropriate and practicable, the court concluded that the agency record did not permit a reviewing court to determine whether a reasoned basis existed for the NRC's decision not to afford any such public involvement in the exemption decision. View "Brodsky v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, two officers. The suit sought damages for the seizure of plaintiffs who were ordered to return to their automobile, a disorderly conduct arrest, and an alleged malicious prosecution, all claimed to have been precipitated by plaintiff's "giving the finger" to a police officer. The court held that there was a question of whether a motor vehicle stop occurred; there was a question of whether there was probable cause for the arrest for disorderly conduct; and it was error for the district court to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim based on dictum in Burg v. Gosselin. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment dismissing all three of plaintiffs' claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Swartz, et al v. Insogna, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss the government's interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court suppressing certain evidence in connection with a criminal trial. The court concluded that the U.S. Attorney's certification that "the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding" was conclusive of that issue for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3731 and therefore was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction under section 3731 of timely appeals from orders suppressing evidence. Because the requirements of section 3731 were satisfied in this case, the court had jurisdiction over the appeal. View "United States v. Metter" on Justia Law

Langrock appealed, inter alia, from the district court's order requiring it to pay certain fees and costs incurred by Citigroup in connection with this action. Langrock was ordered to pay Citigroup as a sanction for filing opposition papers to Citigroup's motion to dismiss four days late, despite the fact that Langrock submitted a timely request for an extension of the filing deadline that the court later determined was supported by good cause. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sanction of attorneys' fees without explicitly finding that Langrock acted in bad faith, and by sanctioning Langrock without affording the attorneys prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's orders. View "Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP v. Citigroup" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. At issue was whether a court in Connecticut could properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant who, while domiciled and working in Canada, was alleged to have accessed a computer server located in Connecticut to misappropriate confidential information belonging to her employer. The court held that Connecticut district court had long-arm jurisdiction over defendant; defendant had sufficient minimum contacts in Connecticut; and the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Enio Rivera and Michael Talton, employees of Lift Line, a subsidiary of RGRTA, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of RGRTA and a supervisor and dismissing plaintiffs' claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. 1981, and New York state law. Considering the evidence, together with the evidence of a racially hostile work environment for Talton, his co-worker, in the light most favorable to Rivera, and resolving all ambiguities in his favor, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Rivera's hostile work environment claim. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Talton and accepting his version of the events as true, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing Talton's hostile work environment claims pursuant to Title VII and section 1981. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Rivera's retaliation claims but vacated the grant of summary judgment on Talton's retaliation claim against RGRTA and vacated its grant of summary judgment dismissing Talton's retaliation claim against the supervisor under section 1981. The court also vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Talton's state law claims. View "Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transp. Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Building Official for the Town of Marlborough from 1994-2010, sued the Town, as well as its Board of Selectmen, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was deprived of his procedural due process and free speech rights when his position was reduced from full to part time after he made certain statements regarding the use of wood-burning stoves. The court held that the district court erred in determining that Selectmen Black was not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, as plaintiff had not adequately alleged that he had a constitutionally protected property right in full-time employment. The court also held that the district court erred in determining that the Selectmen defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, as plaintiff did not adequately allege that he spoke in his capacity as a private citizen. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Looney v. Marlborough et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. The primary issue one appeal was whether an act performed on adjacent property that caused damage to plaintiff's property could constitute "vandalism" under plaintiff's property insurance. The subsidiary question was whether "malicious damage" could be found to result from an act not directed specifically at the insured property. The court held that certification of the malice issue to the New York Court of Appeals was warranted and certified the question. View "Georgitsi Realty, LLC v. Penn-Star Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Olin brought suit against its insurers, including American Home, regarding environmental contamination at Olin sites in the United States. On appeal, Olin challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of American Home. At issue was whether the $30.3 million attachment point for American Home's excess policies for the years 1966-69 and 1969-72 could be reached by the alleged property damage at Olin's Morgan Hill, California, manufacturing site. The court held that the plain language of Olin's policies with American Home required American Home to indemnify Olin for that damage. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed claims against Wachovia for willful noncompliance with certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(a) and for common law defamation. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that there was no private cause of action for violations of section 1681s-2(a). Because the complaint only alleged violations of 1681s-2(a)(1), (2), and (8), the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims under the Act. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend in regards to plaintiff's failure to state a claim under section 1681s-2(b) in light of plaintiff's delay and the prejudice to Wachovia. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Longman v. Wachovia Bank NA" on Justia Law