Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department appealed summary judgment to R.E. and M.E. on their claim for tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq, and summary judgment to R.K. on her claim for tuition reimbursement under the IDEA. Plaintiff E.Z.-L. also appealed. The court held that courts must evaluate the adequacy of an individualized educational program (IEP) prospectively as of the time of the parents' placement decision and could not consider "retrospective" testimony regarding services not listed in the IEP. However, the court rejected a rigid "four-corners rule" that would prevent a court from considering evidence explicating the written term of the IEP. In R.E., the court found that the Department offered the student a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) and reversed the decision of the district court. In R.K., the court found that the Department failed to offer the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. In E.Z.-L., the court found that the Department offered the student a FAPE and affirmed the decision of the district court. View "R.E. v. New York City Dept of Education; R.K. v. New York City Dept of Education; E.Z.-L v. New York City Dept of Education " on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, requests to defendants for "any and all documents containing guidance" provided by the OLC to any representatives of HHS or USAID "relating to the enforcement" of the pledge requirement purporting to require all organizations that receive funds for HIV/AIDS and anti-trafficking work to have "a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." Defendants subsequently appealed from the district court's order granting summary judgment for plaintiff, denying defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court ordered disclosure by defendants of three memoranda prepared by the OLC because they were not covered by the deliberative process exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), from the general requirement of disclosure contained in the FOIA. The court concluded that one such memorandum was incorporated by reference in a USAID document such that the protection of the exemption was surrendered, but that the other two were not and retained their exempt status. View "Brennan Center for Justice v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendants, Queens County Assistant District Attorneys, alleging that defendants' interrogation of her following the arrest of her boyfriend, former New York State Senator Hiram Monserrate, violated her civil rights. Defendants appealed from the denial of absolute immunity in an action brought under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that, viewed through the eye of a reasonable prosecutor, defendants' acts in the present case were well within their legitimate functions as prosecutors. Because the objective circumstances triggered absolute immunity, the court vacated the district court's order denying absolute immunity and remanded for further proceedings. View "Giraldo v. City of New York" on Justia Law

This case arose when WWP sued Shinkong seeking damages and injunctive relief arising out of the failure of a joint venture between the parties. On appeal, WWP challenged the district court's order striking its expert report and claim for money damages after it attempted to file its expert disclosures seven weeks late, and later granting Shinkong summary judgment. Because the court found that WWP lacked sufficient notice of such severe consequences for late filing; an opportunity to respond before being sanctioned; and because the court found the penalty far exceeded the transgression, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "World Wide Polymers, Inc. v. Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant, the school district superintendent, appealed from the district court's order denying his motion for summary judgment with regard to plaintiff's claim that she was fired in retaliation for her reports of financial malfeasance. The court concluded that plaintiff, a payroll clerk typist for the school district, was speaking pursuant to her official duties as a public employee and her speech was therefore not protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was entitled to summary judgment. View "Ross v. Lichtenfeld" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from three research projects at two production plants in Hahnville, Louisiana that UCC conducted during the 1994 and 1995 tax-credit years. The research was conducted on products that were in the process of being manufactured for sale and were in fact sold. Nevertheless, UCC requested a research credit not just for the additional costs of supplies associated with the research. Instead, it requested a research credit for the costs of all the supplies used in the production of the product even though those supplies would have been used regardless of any research performed. The Tax Court held that UCC was not entitled to research credits for the entire amount spent for the supplies at issue. Instead, as the Commissioner argued, it was entitled to credit for only those additional supplies that were used to perform the research. The court affirmed the judgment and denied UCC a credit for supplies used in the conduct of qualified research under 26 U.S.C. 41. View "Union Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against defendants on behalf of themselves and similarly situated plaintiffs, alleging, inter alia, that defendants engaged in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive practices through unauthorized enrollment practices known as "post transaction marketing" and "data pass." At issue was whether plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their dispute with defendants as a consequence of an arbitration provision that defendants asserted was part of a contract between the parties. The court concluded that despite some limited availability of the arbitration provision to plaintiffs, they were not bound to arbitrate this dispute. In regards to the email at issue, under the contract law of Connecticut or California - either of which could apply to this dispute - the email did not provide sufficient notice to plaintiffs of the arbitration provision, and plaintiffs therefore could not have assented to it solely as a result of their failure to cancel their enrollment in defendants' service. In regards to the hyperlink at issue, the court concluded that defendants forfeited the argument that plaintiffs were on notice of the arbitration provision through the hyperlink by failing to raise it in the district court. View "Schnabel et al. v. Trilegiant Corp. et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, petitioned for review of a decision by the BIA affirming the decision of the IJ denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The court concluded that the BIA failed to consider petitioner's opposition in its full factual and political context, and the court rejected the BIA's conclusion that opposition to corruption at one workplace - without evidence that the corruption extended to other workplaces - could not serve as the basis for asylum. Finally, the court concluded that the BIA erroneously failed to consider petitioner's claim of imputed political opinion. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Yu v. Holder" on Justia Law

The SEC filed a civil enforcement action against defendants alleging insider trading in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. The SEC alleged that Defendant Strickland learned material non-public information in the course of his employment and revealed it to Defendant Black, his friend and hedge fund employee, and that Black in turn relayed the information to his boss, Defendant Obus, who traded the information. The court held that the SEC's evidence created genuine issues of material fact as to each defendant's liability under the misappropriation theory and therefore summary judgment for defendants was erroneous. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Obus, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's order dismissing a putative securities class action brought under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 77k, l(a)(20, o, on behalf of all persons who acquired certain mortgage-backed certificates issued under the same allegedly false and misleading shelf registration statement, but sold in 17 separate offerings by 17 unique prospectus supplements. The court held that plaintiff had class standing to assert the claims of purchasers of certificates backed by mortgages originated by the same lenders that originated the mortgages backing plaintiff's certificates, because such claims implicated "the same set of concerns" as plaintiff's claims. The court further held that plaintiff need not plead an out-of-pocket loss in order to allege a cognizable diminution in the value of an illiquid security under section 11. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court and remanded with further instructions to reinstate plaintiff's sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 claims to the extent they were based on similar or identical misrepresentations in the Offering Documents associated with certificates backed by mortgages originated by the same lenders that originated the mortgages backing plaintiff's certificates. View "Neca-Ibew Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co." on Justia Law