Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her. View "Fabrikant v. French" on Justia Law

Adams entered the U.S. from Jamaica in 1990 on a visitor’s visa and overstayed. Arrested in New York in 1992, for attempting to sell cocaine to an undercover officer, Adams represented that he was “Michael Thomas” and pleaded guilty. “Thomas” failed to appear for sentencing. The state court received a form from Jamaica certifying that “Michael Thomas” had committed suicide. Adams returned to Jamaica where, in 1994, he married a U.S. citizen. Adams applied for an immigrant visa, representing that he had never been in the U.S. and had never been arrested or convicted. The consul granted an immigrant visa in 1997. He was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. In 2008, returning from a trip to Jamaica, he was stopped by Customs officials, who suspected that Adams was “Michael Thomas” in the outstanding arrest warrant. The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately ordered removal. Adams argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1256(a), barred removal because Adams was the beneficiary of an adjustment of status when he obtained an immigrant visa and that there is a five-year limitation on rescinding the status of a lawful permanent resident. The Second Circuit rejected the arguments.View "Adams v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mota and Castillo married in Mexico, where their daughter, Elena, was born. In 2007, when Elena was six months old, Castillo entered the U.S. illegally and began sending financial support to his wife and daughter. In 2010 Mota and Castillo decided to reunite. They hired a smuggler to take Elena across the border. After Elena had entered the U.S., Mota tried to cross the border, but was repeatedly blocked by American border guards. Meanwhile, the smugglers had transported Elena to New York, where she began living with her father. After one attempt to enter, Mota was arrested and prosecuted for use of false identification. Castillo began living with another woman, no longer sent financial support, and declared that he would keep Elena. Mexican authorities applied to the U.S. government for the child’s return. Castillo then instituted custody proceedings in New York. Having obtained no relief through official diplomatic channels, Mota filed a petition seeking an order requiring Castillo to return Elena to her in Mexico under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601. The district court granted the order. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Mota v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Grayton was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal Law 125.25(1), based on a 2001 shooting death, and was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment. He exhausted his state appeals and timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his exclusion from a Geraci hearing violated his constitutional right to presence at all material stages of the trial. Geraci hearings are held in New York state courts to determine whether a defendant has procured a witness’s unavailability by misconduct and has thus forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights in regards to that witness. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Grayton had a federal constitutional right to be present at the hearing, then determined that he had waived that right. The Second Circuit affirmed, first holding that there is a right to be present at a Geraci hearing. Grayton had at least minimal knowledge of the proceeding; if he objected to his exclusion, it was incumbent upon him to have made that known. It is not unreasonable to call failure to do so waiver. View "Grayton v. Ercole" on Justia Law

Scholz Design created technical drawings for three homes and submitted them to the Copyright Office in 1988 and 1989 with front elevation drawings showing the front of the houses surrounded by lawn, bushes, and trees. Scholz obtained copyrights. In 1992 Scholz entered an agreement permitting Sart to build homes using the plans, for a fee of $1 per square foot of each house built. The agreement required that Sard not "copy or duplicate any of the [Scholz] materials nor . . . [use them] in any manner to advertise or build a [Scholz Design] or derivative except under the terms and conditions of the agreement." Scholz claimed that after termination of the agreement, Sard and real estate companies posted copies of the drawings on advertising websites and sued for violation of copyrights, 15 U.S.C. 1051, breach of contract, and violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 1201. The district court dismissed, finding that the copied images did not fulfill the intrinsic function of an architectural plan. The Second Circuit reversed. Architectural technical drawings might be subject to copyright protection even if they are not sufficiently detailed to allow for construction. View "Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Graham was the leader of a group of violent robbers associated with a public housing project in Brooklyn. Following a conflict after a robbery, Graham forced Thompson to get into Graham’s vehicle by firing a single shot into the ground with a 9-millimeter pistol, then provided Thompson with a Mac-10 to commit a robbery to repay his debt. Thompson ultimately did not commit the robbery. Graham was indicted for: conspiracy to extort Thompson, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and 3551; discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), 2 and 3551.; and using an explosive to commit a felony, 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), 2 and 3551. Graham’s 50-year sentence included two consecutive, mandatory 10-year terms of imprisonment for the violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1), based on Graham’s discharge of a gun while threatening Thompson. The Second Circuit reversed with respect to one count. The term “explosive” in 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1) does not include the cartridge in the 9- millimeter semiautomatic pistol used by Graham. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Auction Rate Securities are variable-rate equity or debt instruments that pay interest or dividends at rates set by periodic auctions. ARS were used as an alternative financing vehicle and were promoted as a safe, liquid alternative to money market funds. Merrill Lynch placed support bids at the auctions. In 2006, the SEC ordered investment banks, including Merrill Lynch, to cease intervention in the ARS market in the absence of adequate disclosures and found violations of 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(2). In 2007 Merrill Lynch discontinued placing support bids and auctions for ARS failed. Anschutz holds $18.95 million of “illiquid and severely impaired securities.” Anschutz claimed that because of the support bids, it earned less interest on its ARS that it otherwise would have earned; that it relied on the appearance of ARS liquidity manufactured by Merrill Lynch, and on previous success with similar ARS, in deciding to make purchases; and that credit agencies committed fraud in rating ARS at issue. The district court dismissed, holding that disclosures on the Merrill Lynch website, in conjunction with the SEC Order, were sufficient to apprise Anschutz of ARS support bidding practices and that Anschutz failed to allege any actionable misstatements by the rating agencies. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

A New York state court judge found Gibson, charged with criminal mischief, not competent to stand trial and filed a temporary order of observation, transferring Gibson to custody of the mental health commissioner for a period not to exceed 90 days, for treatment to restore capacity to stand trial. New York law distinguishes between temporary orders and final orders, which are intended to prepare the subject for release into the community. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.40(1). While detained, he filed a federal complaint alleging civil rights violations and requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. While federal law generally permits a court to waive fees for those who cannot afford them, the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act generally prohibits a “prisoner” who has filed three or more frivolous actions in federal court from filing another lawsuit without paying required fees, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Act defines “prisoner” as “any person . . . detained in any facility who is accused of . . . violations of criminal law.” The district court concluded that Gibson was was a “prisoner” under the PLRA, and that, based on previous frivolous filings, he was barred from filing another complaint without first paying fees. The Second Circuit affirmed. View "Gibson v. City Municipality of New York" on Justia Law

Antico was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. 23 1962(c), and illegal gambling, 18 U.S.C. 1955, and sentenced to 108 months in prison. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the racketeering conviction the sentence. The district court acted within its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, based on Antico’s history of jury tampering and other factors. The court took reasonable measures to avoid prejudice, including a neutral explanation to the jurors. View "United States v. Pica " on Justia Law

In 2004, securities fraud class actions were filed against AIG and other corporate and individual defendants, including Gen Re. The district court consolidated the actions and appointed as lead plaintiffs three Ohio public pension funds, for a putative class of investors who purchased AIG’s publicly traded securities between October 28, 1999, and April 1, 2005. The complaint alleged that AIG and Gen Re violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), (Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)), by entering into a sham $500 million reinsurance transaction designed to mislead the market and artificially increase AIG’s share price. After the parties reached a settlement agreement, the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify a settlement class, finding that the class could not satisfy the predominance requirement of FRCP 23(b)(3) because the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not apply to the class’s securities fraud claims. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that, under Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591(1997), a securities fraud class’s failure to satisfy the fraud-on-the-market presumption primarily threatens class certification by creating “intractable management problems” at trial. Because settlement eliminates the need for trial, a settlement class ordinarily need not demonstrate that the fraud-on-the-market presumption applies to its claims to satisfy the predominance requirement. View "In Re: Am. Int'l Grp. Sec. Litigation" on Justia Law