Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Applicants for and recipients of Medicaid home health Services claimed that the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Department of Health, violated their statutory right, enforceable under 42 U.S.C.1983, to an opportunity for Medicaid fair hearings. They claimed that this right, as construed by federal regulation, entitles them to “final administrative action” within 90 days of their fair hearing requests. The district court declared that “final administrative action” includes the holding of Medicaid fair hearings, the issuance of fair hearing decisions, and the implementation of any relief ordered in those decisions and permanently enjoined the state agencies to ensure that “final administrative action” implemented within 90 days of fair hearing requests. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the plaintiffs have a right to a Medicaid hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of their fair hearing requests, and that such right is enforceable under section 1983. The permanent injunction was, however, overbroad because “final administrative action” refers not to the implementation of relief ordered in fair hearing decisions, but to the holding of fair hearings and to the issuance of fair hearing decisions. View "Shakhnes v. Eggleston" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issued citations to Loretto-Oswego Residential Health Care Facility for violating employee safety standards. At the time, Loretto Management oversaw a number of non-profit corporations that operated nursing homes in upstate New York, including Loretto-Oswego; nearly all used the “Loretto” name. Loretto-Oswego reached an agreement with OSHA officials settling all matters related to the citations except whether several violations were “repeated” under 29 U.S.C. 666(a), which depends on whether Loretto- Oswego and a pair of other entities operated as a single employer for purposes of the OSH Act. If the violations were repeated, Loretto-Oswego must pay a penalty of $56,250, and if they were not, then Loretto-Oswego must pay only $11,250. An administrative law judge found that the three entities did operate as a single employer. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reversed. The Second Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting the Secretary of Labor’s variation of the “single employer test, which considers”: interrelated operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership. The Commission also considered the factor “common worksite.” View "Solis v. Loretto-Oswego Residential Health Care Facility" on Justia Law

In 1999, Bucalo, then 42 years old, applied for a position as a school librarian and was not hired; the position went to a 35-year-old man. Bucalo filed a charge of age and sex discrimination with the EEOC, which granted a right-to-sue letter, but she did not file. In 2003, the position re-opened and Bucalo, then 46, reapplied. Lanier, a new superintendent, selected interviewees; Bucalo was not among them. A committee hired a 32-year-old woman. Bucalo sued, alleging violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and retaliation for her 1999 EEOC complaint, violating the ADEA and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Lanier, then suffering from a debilitating disease, executed an affidavit asserting that he had not selected Bucalo because she had worked in numerous short-term positions, evidencing “instability,” and denying that he had considered Bucalo’s age or 1999 EEOC charge. Lanier died before trial. The district court ruled in favor of the District. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that because of the death of the sole District employee with direct knowledge of the reasons she was not hired, Bucalo was entitled to judgment under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. View "Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The District hired Donnelly as a teacher under a three-year probationary contract. During his first year he received the highest rating and had perfect attendance. The District transferred him. His performance included episodes that required admonition. He told a student she was “acting retarded” and wrote the word “retard” on the board and told another to “go back to Mexico.” In the final year of his probation, Donnelly required gallbladder surgery, which occurred on November 27. He took leave through December 5. Under the collective bargaining agreement, Donnelly worked at least 1,247 hours (7.25 per day for 172 days) during the 12-month period prior to his leave: three hours short of Family Medical Leave Act eligibility, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A)(ii). When he returned, he received unsatisfactory evaluations and was denied tenure. The district court held that he was not eligible for FMLA leave and that he had not shown that he was qualified for tenure. The Second Circuit reversed. Donnelly presented a genuine issue of material fact on whether he qualifies for FMLA leave; the standard applied by the court does not apply outside of the college tenure context; and Donnelly presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find unlawful retaliation. View "Donnelly v. Greenburgh Central Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The 419 Plan was established as a multiple-employer welfare benefit plan, 26 U.S.C. 419A(f)(6). Businesses that enroll contribute to an account, which acquires and pays premiums on life insurance policies for covered employees. Each covered employee determines the type of insurance purchased on his behalf. Participating businesses can choose the number of years for which contributions will be required to fully pay for benefits. The Plan is listed as beneficiary on each policy and passes the death benefit to the covered employee. Participating businesses can withdraw at any time. Testimony indicated that "the beauty" of the Plan "is that you can put away extra money in good times” though the premium is not due, “get a tax deduction today and we don't put the premium in for years to come." Owners of four businesses, enrolled in the Plan, contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars and claimed tax deductions, although only the four owners and a stepson were covered. The IRS determined that the payments were not "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, which resulted in additional pass-through income on which the owners had not paid taxes. The tax court held that the owners owed deficiency payments and accuracy-related penalties. The Second Circuit affirmed.View "Curcio v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment. View "Liranzo v. United States " on Justia Law

Under 26 U.S.C. 6621(d), interest is calculated at a higher rate for corporate tax underpayments than for corporate tax overpayments. A corporate taxpayer could, therefore, owe underpayment interest even if the amount underpaid in one tax year (or set of tax years) was entirely offset by the amount by which it overpaid in another tax year (or set of tax years). Congress amended section 6621 in 1998 to include a provision for “global interest netting;” the interest rate differential is adjusted to yield a net interest rate of zero for periods of reciprocal indebtedness, during which the taxpayer’s overpayments in one set of tax years overlap and offset equivalent underpayments in another set,. Congress also adopted a statutory, uncodified, “special rule,” which makes section 6621(d) applicable under certain circumstances to periods of overlapping indebtedness that occurred prior to the 1998 effective date of the statute. The Second Circuit held that the language of the special rule is ambiguous, but that the structure of section 6621(d) as a whole, as well as its historical context and purpose, makes clear that taxpayers may benefit from retrospective global interest netting even when the limitations period for one of the legs of the overlap has expired. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Terex manufactures equipment. Apuzzo was its Chief Financial Officer. URI is an equipment rental company. Nolan was URI’s Chief Financial Officer. URI and Nolan, carried out fraudulent “sale-leaseback” transactions, to allow URI to recognize revenue prematurely and inflate profits. URI sold used equipment to GECC, a financing corporation, and leased it back. To obtain GECC’s participation, URI convinced Terex to agree to resell the equipment after the lease periods. Terex guaranteed that GECC would receive at least 96 percent of the purchase price for the equipment. URI secretly agreed to indemnify Terex for losses from the guarantee and to purchase new equipment from Terex. Apuzzo knew that if the extent of the transactions was transparent, URI would not be able to claim increased revenue under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Apuzzo disguised URI’s risks and obligations, and approved inflated invoices to conceal indemnifications. Following transactions under the scheme, the SEC charged that Apuzzo aided and abetted securities laws violations through his role in a fraudulent accounting scheme. The district court dismissed; the complaint plausibly alleged that Apuzzo had actual knowledge of the primary violation, but did not allege “substantial assistance.” The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Apuzzo associated himself with the venture, participated in it as in something that he wished to bring about, sought by his action to make it succeed. . View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Apuzzo" on Justia Law

Germany and Thailand signed a treaty, providing that disputes concerning investments between Germany or Thailand and an investor of the other party may be resolved by arbitration at the request of either party. The treaty applies to “approved investments” made before the treaty by investors of either country in the territory of the other. Bau initiated arbitration, claiming that Thailand had interfered with investments made, 1989-1997, in a Thai tollway project. An arbitration tribunal convened under agreed terms, which empowered the tribunal to consider objections to jurisdiction and provided that U.N. Commission on International Trade Law Arbitration Rules would apply. Thailand objected to jurisdiction on the ground that Bau’s were not “approved investments” because Bau never obtained a “Certificate of Admission” from Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bau responded that the project was comprised of “approved investments” because Bau was invited to make the investments by the Thai Council of Ministers, which approved the project at various stages, and because the Thai Board of Investment issued certificates of investment for the project. The tribunal held that it had jurisdiction and made an award in favor of Bau. The district court confirmed. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have independently adjudicated jurisdiction instead of performing deferential review.View "Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand" on Justia Law

Davis and Gunn were convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies of suspected drug dealers, 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Count One); attempting to commit such a robbery in the Bronx (Wickham robbery) (Count Three); two counts of using and discharging a firearm during the Wickham robbery, including causing the death of Grey, 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), (j) (Counts Six and Seven); and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1), 846 (Count Eight). Davis was also convicted of attempting to commit a Hobbs Act robbery in Long Island (Elmont robbery), 18 U.S.C. 1951 (Count Two), and two counts of using and discharging a firearm during the Elmont robbery, including causing the death of Laing (Counts Four and Five). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Davis’s challenge to venue in the Southern District of New York for Counts Two, Four, and Five, the Hobbs Act and firearms counts relating to the Elmont robbery. View "United States v. Davis " on Justia Law