Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Highsmith pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and weapons possession in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to make a specific finding of fact as to whether the firearm, which he admits to having possessed in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, “[was] discharged” in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012), which held that the more lenient sentences Congress created under the Fair Sentencing Act, 124 Stat. 2372, applied to those defendants who were to be sentenced after the FSA became law for crimes committed before that event. Clarifying that it was overruling its 2011 decision, United States v. Acoff, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with Dorsey, but rejected Highsmith’s argument that the district court plainly erred by adopting the presentence investigation report without making further fact findings. View "United States v. Highsmith" on Justia Law

Wernick was convicted on five counts, including receiving and distributing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A); reproducing child pornography for distribution by computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(3)(A); possessing materials containing images of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B); and persuading, inducing and enticing minors to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Wernick appealed his 360-month sentence, but not his conviction, arguing that the district court erred by considering certain sexual conduct directed at young children, not charged in the indictment or proven at trial, as “relevant conduct” that increased his offense level with respect to Count Five. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court erred in considering the sexual acts with young children as effectively part of one offense of conviction (the enticement of teenagers), relevant to calculating the seriousness of that offense under the Guidelines, rather than as separate criminal acts to be considered at a different stage of the sentencing process. View "United States v. Wernick" on Justia Law

In 2009 the university announced that in the 2009–10 academic year, it would eliminate its varsity sports teams for women’s volleyball, men’s golf, and men’s outdoor track and field, while creating a new varsity sports team for women’s competitive cheerleading. Plaintiffs, five women’s volleyball players and their coach, charged violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a). The district court enjoined the school from withdrawing support from its volleyball team, finding that it systematically and artificially increased women’s teams’ rosters and decreased men’s teams’ rosters to achieve the appearance of Title IX compliance. The court then certified a class of present and future female students and ultimately granted permanent injunctive relief. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the court’s counting of participation opportunities in varsity sports afforded female students. The district court correctly concluded that the disparity revealed by that calculation demonstrated a failure to provide substantially proportionate athletic participation opportunities as required by Title IX. View "Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ." on Justia Law

Irwin appealed the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his convictions for assault in the first degree and witness intimidation in the third degree. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had caused serious physical injury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the above witness intimidation count. View "Santone v. Fischer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, New York inmates with complicated histories of incarceration, claimed that their release dates were incorrectly calculated. Their due process claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) were dismissed on grounds that prison system officers and employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed. The state defendants could not necessarily “fairly be said to ‘know’” that due process required that the inmate be afforded certain credits and cited precedent, by its terms, does not instruct prison administrators as to the calculation of release dates when multiple sentences are at issue.One sentencing judge’s instructions may conflict with that of another. View "Sudler v. City of NY" on Justia Law

Aladdin’s purportedly gross mismanagement allegedly caused plaintiffs to lose their entire $60 million investment in a collateralized debt obligation. A CDO pays investors based on performance of an underlying asset. The CDO at issue was “synthetic” in that its asset was not a traditional asset like a stock or bond, but was a derivative instrument, whose value was determined in reference to still other assets. The derivative instrument was a “credit default swap” between Aladdin CDO and Goldman Sachs based on the debt of approximately 100 corporate entities and sovereign states. The district court held that, because of a contract provision limiting intended third-party beneficiaries to those “specifically provided herein,” plaintiffs could not bring a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim and could not “recast” their claim in tort. The Second Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the parties intended the contract to benefit investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from Aladdin to the investors; that the relationship between Aladdin and plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort; and that Aladdin acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs’ losses. View "Bayerische Landesbank, NY v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

Harrington is serving a statutorily mandated 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed. Harrington’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA was barred because it was not presented to the district court. First degree unlawful restraint under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-95, is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, that together with two prior first-degree robbery convictions compelled imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum 15-year prison term. View "Harrington v. United States" on Justia Law

In an antitrust class action alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants, manufacturers and sellers of “publication paper,” a type of paper used in preparing printed material of various types. Plaintiffs, direct purchasers of defendants’ paper products, claimed that defendants’ price hikes mirrored each other in amount and occurred in close succession and were instituted pursuant to an agreement, rather than independently. Plaintiffs also claimed that, in the same time frame, two defendants coordinated the closure of paper mills in order to reduce the supply of publication paper. The Second Circuit vacated in part. A jury could reasonably find that defendants entered into an agreement to raise the price of publication paper, and that, as implemented, this agreement damaged plaintiffs. View "In re: Publ'n Paper Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Vartelas, a native of Greece and permanent resident of the U.S. since 1989, pleaded guilty to a felony in 1994. At the time, lawful permanent residents were not regarded as making an “entry” when returning from “innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s] . . . outside this country’s borders.” An alien in Vartelas’s situation could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing resident alien status. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, under which lawful permanent residents returning from a trip abroad are regarded as seeking admission if they have committed an offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), including the felony to which Vartelas had pleaded guilty. In 2003, Vartelas briefly traveled to Greece to visit family. Upon returning, he was treated as an inadmissible alien. An IJ denied ordered Vartelas removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed and denied a motion to reopen based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Second Circuit held that Vartelas was not prejudiced by failure to raise nonretroactivity, since the IIRIRA could apply retroactively. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed, “[g]uided by the deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation.” The Second Circuit remanded to the BIA to consider the performance of Vartelas’s attorneys. View "Vartelas v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other New York State prisoners convicted of violent felonies, alleging that they were denied parole as a result of an “unwritten policy” to deny parole to violent felons, and that this unofficial policy violates the Due Process, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. To state a claim for violation of due process rights, plaintiffs would have to allege that they were denied parole based on an “inappropriate consideration of a protected classification or an irrational distinction.” They did not do so. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices, and prisoners either in the aggregate or specified by offense are not a suspect class. The rational basis for a distinction in parole determinations is preventing early release of potentially violent inmates who may pose a greater danger to others. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion. View "Graziano v. Pataki" on Justia Law