Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McGarry claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Vermont Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, facing charges related to a domestic dispute, prison officials compelled him to work in the prison laundry under threat of physical restraint and legal process. His pro se complaint alleged violation of his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed, reasoning that McGarry did not allege that his work in the laundry was “like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the Thirteenth] Amendment.” The Second Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly stated a claim; defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personal housekeeping chores such as cleaning the areas in or around their cells without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, but it is “clearly established” that requiring hard labor of pretrial detainees (persons not “duly convicted”) violates the Thirteenth Amendment. A pretrial detainee’s compelled work in a laundry for up to 14 hours a day for three days a week doing other inmates’ laundry cannot reasonably be construed as personally related housekeeping chores and officers of reasonable competence could not disagree. View "McGarry v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Taylor, an attorney who allegedly suffers from clinical depression, lived in a private community managed by HPHA. Graser was president of HPHA’s board. For years, Taylor’s glass-enclosed patio, visible from the main thoroughfare, was described as a “pigsty.” Taylor generally declined offers to help with cleanup. While she was away, Cramp, noticed that Taylor’s garage door was open. Taylor gave him permission to retrieve her opener and close the door. Cramp, Graser, and another closed her garage door and cleaned up Taylor’s patio, consolidating items in Taylor’s garage. Taylor filed a police report complaining of trespass and burglary and filed a complaint against HPHA with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR). DHR issued a Determination that there was no evidence of disability or that the accumulation of or clearing of clutter is related to a disability. HUD affirmed. Taylor filed suit against the HPHA and Graser, claiming failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. 3601, trespass, and conversion. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit dismissed her appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules. Calling Taylor’s FHA claim “frivolous,” the court held that HPHA and Graser were entitled to attorneys’ fees. View "Taylor v. Harbour Pointe Homeowners Assoc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented commercial property to AGC under a lease to expire February 28, 2007. In 2006, AGC stopped paying rent and plaintiff obtained a warrant of eviction in state court. On February 2, 2007, before plaintiff could execute the warrant, AGC filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy; the automatic stay halted eviction efforts. Plaintiff successfully moved to lift the stay and executed the warrant on April 24, 2007. Plaintiff sought, under Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, post-petition rent, attorneys’ fees, and interest for the period between the Chapter 7 filing date and the date the warrant of eviction was executed. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, concluding that the pre-petition issuance of the warrant of eviction terminated the relationship such that there was no “unexpired” lease, the presence of which is necessary to obtain administrative expenses under Section 365(d)(3). The district court affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated. A lease is “unexpired” for purposes of the Code where the tenant has the power to revive the lease under applicable state law. In New York it is the execution, and not the issuance, of the warrant of eviction that extinguishes the tenant’s interest in a lease, so, until the warrant is executed, the lease is “unexpired.” View "In re: Assoc. of Graphic Commc'n, Inc." on Justia Law

Two protesters at the 2004 Republican National Convention at Madison Square Garden were arrested after they failed to comply with police instructions to move from an area where demonstrating was prohibited to one designated for protesting. They sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the policy violated the First Amendment and that their arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Second Circuit affirmed. The restriction on speech was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and plaintiffs’ arrest was supported by probable cause. View "Marcavage v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Traders employed by brokerage firms were indicted for conspiring with employees of Watley, a day trading firm, to commit securities fraud by providing their employers’ confidential information to Watley. After a mistrial on conspiracy to commit securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1348, 1349, the government retried the conspiracy count with honest services fraud and property fraud as the charged objects of conspiracy. The jury convicted under each theory. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Skilling, limiting honest services fraud to schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks. After sentencing, the SEC initiated administrative proceedings and disclosed transcripts of investigative depositions taken as early as 2004. With access to those transcripts, defendants moved for a new trial, contending that the transcripts included material required to be disclosed under Brady because it contradicted or undermined testimony of key government witnesses on a central question: whether allegedly misappropriated information was confidential under Carpenter v. U. S. The district court concluded that the jury would not have reached a different result had the transcripts been disclosed. The Second Circuit vacated. Failure to disclose portions of the transcripts violated Brady and undermined confidence in the verdict. The court also did not adequately instruct the jury on the scope of honest services fraud. View "United States v. Mahaffy" on Justia Law

Acticon is the lead plaintiff in a consolidated putative class action suit against China North East Petroleum Holdings Limited (NEP) brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) & 78t(a), and under SEC Rule 10b-5. Acticon alleges that NEP misled investors about its reported earnings, oil reserves, and internal controls. It further alleges that NEP revealed this information through a series of corrective disclosures and that in the trading days after each disclosure was made, NEP’s stock price dropped. NEP argues that these allegations are not sufficient to allege economic loss because its share price rebounded on certain days after the final disclosure to the point that Acticon could have sold its holdings and avoided a loss. The district court held that because Acticon had foregone multiple opportunities to sell its shares at a profit, it had not suffered an economic loss and dismissed. The Second Circuit vacated. Price recovery does not defeat an inference of economic loss. View "Rosado AG v. China North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd." on Justia Law

In 1997, Malik Jones, an African-American male, was shot and killed by a member of the East Haven Police Department. Plaintiff Jones, mother of Malik Jones, filed suit against the town and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the town’s custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference to the rights of black people caused the killing of her son in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At trial, the jury found in favor of the police officers, but found the town liable and awarded damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to demonstrate a custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference which caused Jones’s death. View "Emma Jones v. East Haven" on Justia Law

Wrobel was a longtime employee of Erie County's highway division. In 1999, a newly elected Republican county executive appointed defendants as Wrobel’s supervisors. Over the next 18 months Wrobel’s run-ins with them resulted in harassment of him and his transfer to a faraway workplace. His direct supervisor, Naylon, repeatedly referred to employees that predated his tenure as being part of the “old regime,” and to the office under his supervision as the “new regime.” Following his transfer, Wrobel made anonymous complaints to public officials and a confidential report to the FBI, for which he claims he was further persecuted. Wrobel’s complaint alleged retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. He alleged that he suffered discrimination because he was apolitical, and not politically aligned with the “new regime.” The district court dismissed hi 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Wrobel’s mistreatment was caused by any political activity or inactivity. View "Wrobel v. County of Erie" on Justia Law

Velez moved from Ecuador at age 16 to live with her half-sister, Sanchez, Sanchez’s sister Munoz, and their mother, Yolanda Munoz, and perform housework and babysitting. The relationship deteriorated and Velez believed that she was being isolated and that promises were not kept. She sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-19, and New York state law. The district court dismissed certain claims, including breach of contract claim, allowed the parties to complete discovery and submit additional materials, then found sua sponte that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over ATS claims and converted them to a claim for a civil remedy under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1595, but granted summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract and ATS claims and vacated and remanded with respect to FLSA and state law claims. View "Velez v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

African-American firefighters brought a Title VII discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) claim, based on 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant. The district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Buffalo had demonstrated that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity, despite the disparate impact of the 1998 examination on African Americans, and that plaintiffs were barred from challenging the job relatedness and business necessity of similarly derived examinations. The Second Circuit affirmed: an employer can show that examinations having a disparate impact on a protected class are job related and supported by business necessity when the analysis that produced the test relied on data not specific to that employer. While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry its burden in Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law. In this case, an independent state agency determined, based on empirical, expert, and anecdotal evidence drawn from fire departments across New York and the nation, that the job of fire lieutenant, wherever performed, involves common tasks requiring essentially the same skills, knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics; and developed a general test based on those findings. View "M.O.C.H.A. Soc'y, Inc. v. City of Buffalo" on Justia Law