Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a securities broker, pleaded guilty to charges related to his conduct involving a bribe greater than $70,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in calculating restitution insofar as it ordered both restitution and forfeiture in the amount of defendant's gains from the fraudulent scheme underlying his conviction. The court held that it was error for the district court to substitute defendant's gains for the victims' losses in calculating restitution, but declined to exercise the court's discretion to notice the error, as defendant failed to object in the district court, and had failed on appeal to show that the error affected his substantial rights or undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Zangari" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, motorcyclists, appealed from a jury verdict finding New York State Troopers not liable for injuries that plaintiffs sustained, including one plaintiff who sustained mortal injuries during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed that the troopers violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure through the use of excessive force. The court held that the district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury regarding the use of "deadly force" in addition to a correct instruction on excessive force. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Terranova v. State of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant, a computer programmer employed by Goldman Sachs & Co., appealed his conviction for stealing and transferring proprietary computer source code of Goldman's high frequency trading system in violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. 2314, and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1832. Defendant argued, inter alia, that his conduct did not constitute an offense under either statute because: (1) the source code was not a "stolen" "good" within the meaning of the NSPA, and (2) the source code was not "related" to a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce" within the meaning of the EEA. The court agreed and concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute an offense under either the NSPA or the EEA, and that the indictment was therefore legally insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Aleynikov" on Justia Law

This case required the court to address the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction over suits against non-debtor third parties, as well as the scope of a stay issued pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 524(g)(4). Pfizer and Quigley appealed from a judgment in the district court reversing the Clarifying Order of the bankruptcy court and holding that the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos (Angelos) could bring suit against Pfizer for claims based on "apparent manufacturer" liability under Pennsylvania law. The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue the Clarifying Order; and that the Clarifying Order did not bar Angelos from bringing the suits in question against Pfizer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In re: Quigley Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of Robbery in the Third Degree. The State subsequently appealed from an order of the district court denying the State's motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner more than a year earlier. The court found that the State's motion was nothing more than an attempted end-run around the one year time limitation on a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, which allowed the district court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Therefore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. View "Stevens v. Miller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment from the district court dismissing his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. Plaintiff was a convicted sex-offender who had been civilly committed post-release from prison and he alleged that when he was confined in the Manhattan Psychiatric Center, staff seized and withheld his personal DVDs and CDs and his incoming non-legal mail in violation of his due process rights. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the complaint failed to state any claim for which relief could be granted. The court also undertook to clarify some applicable principles and affirmed the judgment of the district court because, in any event, it was objectively reasonable for the Center staff to believe that their acts did not violate plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, they were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Ahlers v. Rabinowitz" on Justia Law

The district court ordered the Governor of the State of New York and various state commissioners and agencies to make certain modifications to the State's mental health system to ensure compliance with 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d) - the so-called "integration mandate" of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court held that DAI, a nonprofit organization contracted to provide services to New York's Protection and Advocacy System under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. 10801 et seq., lacked standing under Article III to bring the claim. The court also held that the intervention of the United States after the liability phase of the litigation had concluded was insufficient to cure the jurisdictional defect created by DAI's lack of standing. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remedial order and dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living, Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Arnold & Itkin, a Texas-based law firm, appealed from a judgment of the district court sanctioning it for its conduct in opposing the arbitration of a dispute between its clients. Arnold & Itkin challenged the determination that the conduct was sanctioned and the amount and form of the sanctions imposed. The court largely affirmed the judgment of the district court, except that the court remanded in part to permit the district court to consider whether it should impose certain limits on its requirements that Arnold & Itkin's attorneys attached the sanction order to all future applications for admission pro hac vice in the Southern District of New York. View "Prospect Capital Corp. v. Enmon" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from defendant's judgment of conviction for one count of distributing, and possessing with the intent to distribute, a controlled substance. At his trial, the prosecution introduced, over the defense's objection, testimony from two police detectives that they were familiar with defendant and had spoken to him on numerous occasions prior to his arrest in the instant case. The court held that the admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and 403 of trial testimony by the officers was an abuse of discretion where the testimony served no purpose other than to invite jury speculation about defendant's propensity to attract police contact and monitoring. The court further held that such error was not harmless and therefore vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants on all claims of direct and secondary copyright infringement based on a finding that defendants were entitled to safe harbor protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512. The court held that, although the district court correctly held that the section 512(c) safe harbor required knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity, the court vacated the order granting summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find that YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its website. The court further held that the district court erred by interpreting the "right and ability to control" infringing activity to require "item-specific" knowledge. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's holding that three of the challenged YouTube software functions fell within the safe harbor for infringement that occurred "by reason of" storage at the direction of the user, and remanded for further fact-finding with respect to a fourth software function. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Viacom International, Inc., et al. v. Youtube, Inc., et al.; The Football Assoc. Premier League Ltd., et al. v. Tur, et al." on Justia Law