Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's determination that he had three or more prior convictions for felonies categorized as "violent" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and that he was subject to the ACCA mandatory minimum sentence as a result. The court held that defendant's convictions for escape from custody qualified as violent felonies. Therefore, the district court did not err in imposing the ACCA's mandatory minimum sentence.

Former customers of RCM, a subsidiary of the now-bankrupt Refco, appealed from a dismissal of their securities fraud claims against former corporate officers of Refco and Refco's former auditor. RCM operated as a securities and foreign exchange broker that traded in over-the-counter derivatives and other financial products on behalf of its clients. Appellants, investment companies and members of the putative class, claimed that appellees, former officers and directors of Refco, breached the agreements with the RCM customers when they rehypothecated or otherwise used securities and other property held in customer brokerage accounts. The district court dismissed the claims for lack of standing and failure to allege deceptive conduct. The court held that appellants have no remedy under the securities laws because, even assuming they have standing, they failed to make sufficient allegations that their agreements with RCM misled them or that RCM did not intend to comply with those agreements at the time of contracting.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to disclose the contents of a jury note and engaged in an ex parte colloquy with a juror accused of attempting to barter his vote. The court held that trial court deprived defendant of his right to be present at every stage of the trial. Because the deprivation was not harmless, the court vacated and remanded for a new trial.

The Board petitioned to enforce its August 2010 decision and order, concluding that County Waste violated section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2), by allowing Local 124 to distribute a bonus to employees when an election was pending. County Waste cross-petitioned for review of the August 2010 decision, contending that the decision could not be enforced since two of the Board members who entered it also sat on the panel that issued an earlier decision in this case, which was vacated by the court pursuant to New Process Steel. The court held that because the court found nothing in New Process Steel that precluded Board members who entered a subsequently vacated decision from participating on the panel that reviewed the case on remand, the court granted the Board and Local 108's petition to enforce the August 2010 decision and denied County Waste's cross-petition for review.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief after finding that he did not derive citizenship from his father. The district court ruled that petitioner was not in his father's "legal custody" when his father naturalized. The court concluded that the district court erred because it relied on an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody award where New York had jurisdiction to determine custody. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff alleged that Chase willfully and maliciously provided false information about his finances to Equifax, a consumer credit reporting agency. Chase removed the suit to federal court and moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state common law tort claims. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the FCRA preempted plaintiff's state law claims against Chase.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)-(3), seeking to recover funds that were erroneously removed from his pension fund account and credited to that of his former wife. The district court entered judgment against the Plan, including the principal amount, accumulated earnings, and pre-judgment interest. On appeal, the Plan argued that enforcement of the judgment was prohibited by the terms of the pension agreement, ERISA's anti-alienation provision, and other provisions of federal and state law. The Plan also argued that the district court's award of accumulated earnings was inconsistent with the court's decision in Dobson v. Hartford Financial Services Group. The court considered all the Plan's arguments and found that none of them warranted reversal of the district court's judgment that the Plan must pay plaintiff what he was due, whether or not it could succeed in recovering the funds that it, through no fault of plaintiff's, erroneously paid to his former wife.

The government appealed from two interlocutory orders. The first order suppressed cocaine seized from defendant's person incident to his warrantless arrest, as well as statements made by defendant, based on a lack of probable cause to support the arrest. The order also suppressed evidence seized from defendant's residence pursuant to the execution of a search warrant on the ground that without the reference to the cocaine seized from defendant's person, the warrant application did not establish probable cause to search the residence. The second order denied the government's motion for reconsideration of the suppression decisions in the first order. The court held that the district court erred in determining that defendant's warrantless arrest was not supported by probable cause, and thus, evidence seized from defendant's person and residence, as well as the statements made by defendant during and after his arrest, should not have been suppressed. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that recently-enacted amendments to the New York City Administrative Code, commonly known as the "pay-to-play" rules, violated the First Amendment by unduly burdening protected political speech and association, the Fourteenth Amendment by denying equal protection of the laws, and the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The challenged provisions (1) reduced below the generally-applicable campaign contribution limited the amounts that people who have business dealings with the city, including lobbyists, could contribute to political campaigns; (2) denied matching funds for contributions by people who have business dealings with the city and certain people associated with lobbyists; and (3) extended the existing prohibition on corporate contributions to partnerships, LLCs, and LLPs. The court affirmed summary judgment as to all three provisions, finding that the laws were closely drawn to address the significant governmental interest in reducing corruption or the appearance thereof.