Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, wanted in his native Greece on charges related to the kidnapping and murder of a minor, was certified extraditable after a hearing in the district court, notwithstanding certain arguments he made regarding Greece's compliance, vel non, with its own criminal procedure. This appeal required the court to clarify the proper role of a district court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging an extradition order. The court held that the district court erred by placing the burden of proof in the habeas proceeding on the United States rather than on petitioner and by engaging in an improper inquiry into Greece's compliance with its own laws. The court reaffirmed that a court considering an extradition request - or a petition for habeas corpus seeking collateral review of an extradition order - could review the demanding government's compliance with its own laws only insofar as it was necessary to ensure that the provisions of the federal extradition statute and relevant extradition treaty have been met. The court further held that petitioner had not carried his burden of proving that the requirements of the treaty were met. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the writ, and remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to enter a certificate of extraditability and order of commitment.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing her disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., as untimely. The court concluded that the 90-day limitations period provided by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) began to run when a right-to-sue letter issued by the EEOC was first received either by the claimant or by the claimant's counsel. Therefore, because plaintiff initiated this action 93 days after her presumptive receipt of the right-to-sue letter, the district court properly held that her claim was time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a conviction of 16 counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false federal income tax returns and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 41 months incarceration, three years' supervised release, and restitution and a special assessment. The court affirmed the conviction except with respect to certain aspects of the sentence, as to which the judgment was vacated and remanded for: (1) resentencing within the range authorized by statute, and (2) amendment of the restitution order to: (a) determine whether the State and the City of New York were victims entitled to restitution, (b) exclude payments already made by the five taxpayer-clients to the IRS, and (c) exclude losses associated with a 2001 tax return that did not serve as a basis for any of the 16 counts of conviction.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.

Plaintiff sought contribution under the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, for both past and future costs of cleaning up industrial pollution. The district court awarded contribution for past cleanup costs but declined to issue a declaratory judgment as to future contribution. The court reversed the denial of a declaratory judgment and held that the judgment would serve a useful purpose in settling the legal issues involved, the judgment was not being used for procedural gamesmanship or a race to res judicata, it would not increase friction between sovereign legal systems, and there was no better or effective remedy. The court noted that it would not matter that a declaratory judgment of liability alone would not finalize the controversy and offer relief from all uncertainty. Numerous other issues raised on appeal were decided in a summary order issued simultaneously with this opinion.

Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from convictions of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the SEC. The charges arose from an allegedly fraudulent reinsurance transaction between AIG and Gen Re that was intended to cure AIG's ailing stock price. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions were vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data.

Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree, arising out of the death of his estranged wife. Petitioner appealed from a judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner contended that by upholding his conviction for depraved indifference murder, the state courts unreasonably applied the rule of Jackson v. Virginia that a jury find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying the law as it existed after defendant's conviction became final in July 2004, the court found that although the evidence of "significantly heightened recklessness," was slim at best, giving the state courts and the jury the utmost deference, the court could not find that the evidence was so completely lacking that no rational jury could have found defendant guilty of depraved indifference murder. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing for want of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff's complaint seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Exoneration and Limitation of Liability Act (Limitation Act), 46 U.S.C. 30501 et seq. Plaintiff initiated this limitation proceeding following an accident that took place when defendant intended to go fishing as a passenger aboard plaintiff's fishing vessel, slipped and fell on a ramp leading from the marina to a floating dock that passengers were required to traverse in order to access the vessel. The court held that defendant's accident did not occur on or over navigable waters and so this action fell outside the traditional scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. The court also held that the Limitation Act did not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for petitions that arose from incidents not occurring on or over navigable waters. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This was an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court denying a motion to dismiss a suit seeking confirmation of an international arbitration award. Appellant contended that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens (FNC) in favor of an action in the courts of Peru. The court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the petition, concluding that the underlying claim arose from a contract executed in Peru, by a corporation then claiming to be a Peruvian domiciliary against an entity that appeared to be an instrumentality of the Peruvian government, with respect to work to be done in Peru, and the public factor of permitting Peru to apply its cap statute to the disbursement of governmental funds to satisfy the award tipped the FNC balance decisively against the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq., and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his conspiring with others in a scheme to illegally purchase SOCAR, a state-owned oil company, by bribing the Azerbaijani president and other officials. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding overt acts, conscious avoidance, insufficiency of the mens rea charge, and proposed bad faith instructions; the district court did not err in allowing his conviction on the false statements count to stand because it was supported by sufficient evidence; and the district court did not err in not permitting testimony by the vice president for investments at Columbia University, not permitting cross-examination of Thomas Farrell, and permitting a portion of a certain memorandum referencing a conversation as a prior consistent statement. The court examined the remainder of defendant's arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the conviction was affirmed.