Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the district court vacating the attachment, pursuant to Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of a check issued by the district court clerk made payable to defendant. At issue was whether the validity of a Rule B attachment of a treasury check issued from the Southern District's Court Registry Investment System (CRIS), representing the proceeds of electronic funds transfers whose attachment was vacated under Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd. The court held that the jurisdictional defect that led to the vacatur under Jaldhi likewise precluded the attachment of the same funds in the CRIS. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants had retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that the speech on which plaintiff based her claim was not protected under the First Amendment and that the individual defendants had qualified immunity from suit. The district court held, alternatively, that summary judgment would have been appropriate if the speech had been protected, because the school district would have fired plaintiff even in the absence of the speech. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment; that appellees' rebuttal was subject to credibility questions and hence could not be resolved as a matter of law; and that appellees were not, at this stage of the proceedings, entitled to qualified immunity.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court following an evidentiary hearing on a remand pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, denying petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to set aside certain convictions on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that petitioner's request for an expansion of the certificate of appealability was denied because his submission failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. The court also held that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that there was no deficient performance by counsel with respect to the failure-to-advise aspect of petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim or his claim that his attorneys overrode his desire to testify. The court saw no basis on the present appeal for concluding, as to any count, that there was any reasonable probability that, had there been objections, the jury would not have found petitioner guilty. Thus, petitioner could not show that the failures to object satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and this facet of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was properly rejected. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendant, with which she had a catastrophic medical insurance policy, because defendant told her that she had not yet "incurred" sufficient charges to satisfy its deductible. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's refusal to pay benefits rested on a deliberate misinterpretation of "incurred" and breached the insurance contract. The district court held that plaintiff, a Medicare recipient, could not have incurred charges that her physicians had agreed with Medicare to forgo prior to providing treatment. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court incorrectly read "incurred" in the insurance policy as including only those amounts that the insured paid or was legally obligated to pay. The court held, however, that the district court correctly interpreted "incurred," and therefore affirmed.

Appellants appealed from an order of the district court denying hotel owners' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Chapter 225 of the Laws of New York State of 2010, which prohibited rental of hotel rooms in certain types of buildings for less than 30 days. Appellants alleged that Chapter 225 would destroy their budget friendly hotel businesses, under which they rent out a large number of the units in their buildings on a temporary basis to tourists. The court affirmed the district court's order and held that appellants failed to make a sufficient showing of irreparable injury.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for physically obstructing access to a reproductive services facility in violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. 248. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that he was entitled to a jury trial as opposed to a bench trial. Because the court concluded that defendant was charged with a petty offense, the court agreed with the district court that defendant was not entitled to a jury trial.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing her disability-discrimination complaint against JetBlue. Plaintiff alleged that she required wheelchair assistance as a result of her disability and that JetBlue discriminated against her by failing to provide timely wheelchair assistance. The court affirmed the order of the district court because no private right of action existed for a violation of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. 41705, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189, did not apply to services provided by an air carrier in an airport terminal used primarily to facilitate air transportation.

Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on account of his trial counsel's failure to object, under New York law, to venue in Ontario County, New York, for one of the alleged rapes, which appeared to have occurred in Monroe County, New York. The court held that trial counsel's failure to object to venue resulted in defendant receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief and remanded.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court denying her petition to vacate an arbitration decision that rejected her claims, which asserted principally that defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal plaintiff principally contended that the arbitrators' decision should be vacated in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Fair Pay Act), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The court reviewed the district court's conclusions of law de novo and found plaintiff's contentions to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)-(3), seeking to recover funds that were erroneously removed from his pension fund account and credited to that of his former wife. The district court entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $1,571,723.73, which included the principal amount, accumulated earnings and pre-judgment interest. On appeal, defendant argued that enforcement of the judgment was prohibited by the terms of the pension agreement, ERISA's anti-alienation provision, and other provisions of federal and state law. Defendant also argued that the district court's award of accumulated earnings was inconsistent with the court's decision in Dobson v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court found defendant's arguments were without merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.