Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against defendant and others following the decline of defendant's stock price. At issue was whether certain statements concerning goodwill and loan loss reserves in a registration statement of defendant's gave rise to liability under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The court held that the statements in question were opinions, which were not alleged to have falsely represented the speakers' beliefs at the time they were made. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Six defendants appealed from their convictions for a variety of weapons trafficking offenses. On appeal, the court addressed three of the many issues raised by defendants, finding, after due consideration, their remaining arguments lacked merit. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support all of the convictions and rejected a vagueness-as-applied argument raised by one defendant (Kharabadze). The court held, however, that the district court employed the wrong standard of proof at sentencing in imposing increases to another defendant's (Solomonyan) base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E) and (b)(3)(A). Therefore, the court vacated that defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant was convicted of eleven counts of a thirteen count indictment, including several Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), violations predicated on robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the stipulation at issue was insufficient to establish the requisite jurisdictional element. The court held that the evidence proffered by the government was sufficient to sustain the interstate elements of the Hobbs Act attempted robbery count at issue where the stipulation entered into by the parties, that "marijuana [wa]s grown outside of the state of New York and travel[ed] in interstate and foreign commerce to arrive in the New York City area[,]" conveyed the same information about the interstate nature of the marijuana trade as the court's precedents. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where, given the ample evidence, a rational juror could find that defendant's conduct went far beyond "mere preparation" and constituted a "substantial step" toward commission of a robbery. The court considered all of defendant's other arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, affirmed the judgment of the district court in its entirety.

Thirteen present and former female inmates of various New York state prisons appealed from the dismissal of their class action complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief compelling the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) to alter its practices and procedures so as to enhance the protection of the class from sexual assault, abuse, and harassment. The complaint also asserted individual claims for damages. The dismissal was based on the grounds that some of the claims of named plaintiffs were moot and that the remaining named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that it lacked pendant appellate jurisdiction over the damages claims. The court also held that the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief by plaintiffs who were now free but were in DOCs custody when they brought suit were not moot. The court applied a relation-back theory and determined that plaintiffs' class claims were capable of repetition, yet evading review. The court further held that three plaintiffs have exhausted applicable internal prison grievance proceedings while the remaining ten have not. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings.

This case arose when the FTC alleged deceptive advertising claims against defendants based on two purported weight loss products, a Chinese Diet Tea and a Bio-Slim Patch. On appeal, defendants challenged both the power of the district court to award monetary relief and the means by which the district court calculated the award. The court held that the district court had the power to award restitution pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 53(b). The court also held that the district court did not err in ordering defendants to disgorge the full proceeds from its sale of the products in question. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court convicting him of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. The district court imposed a sentencing enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for the discharge of the weapon, even though it was the intended victim, and not defendant, who fired the gun. Defendant contended that because he did not possess the gun when it was discharged, the district court erred in applying the enhancement. The court held that the district court correctly held that defendant was subject to the discharge enhancement where, as here, defendant possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-related crime and the firearm was discharged during the course of that crime. Therefore, by its plain terms, the statute applied. The court also held that when a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, the risk of an intended victim trying to seize the gun was just as real as an accidental discharge and that defendant's reliance on United States v. Daija was unavailing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff, the personal representative of the Estate of Dorothy Brown, appealed from summary judgment certified as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of Noxubee General Hospital (Noxubee) and Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle (Baptist) and from a summary judgment in favor of Eli Lilly and Company (Eli Lilly). The action that gave rise to this appeal, removed from state court in Mississippi to a federal district court in Mississippi, and thereafter transferred to the Eastern District of New York, was brought to recover for the wrongful death of Ms. Brown allegedly due to her treatment with the drug Zyprexa, which was manufactured by Eli Lilly. An earlier appeal from the certified judgment in favor of Noxubee was withdrawn by stipulation. A motion to remand, predicated on the lack of diversity on the parts of Noxubee and Baptist were denied following the issuance of all the orders granting summary judgment. The court held that the appeals from the judgments entered in favor of Noxubee and Baptist were dismissed and the judgment dismissing the action against Eli Lilly were affirmed.

This case stemmed from the sexual assault of plaintiff by a male sheriff's deputy while she was being held in pretrial confinement at the Erie County Holding Center. At issue was whether plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence of municipal liability for this violation of due process to support a jury verdict returned in her favor against Erie County and its then-policy maker, former County Sheriff Patrick Gallivan. The court held that defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on a municipal liabilities claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that defendants were not entitled to a new trial because the errors they asserted in Question Two of the special verdict form and the verdict itself were not properly preserved for appellate review. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of defendants on the 1983 claim was reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment on that claim consistent with the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff.

The City of New York sued defendants under federal and New York State antitrust laws, seeking to prevent the companies from merging. The city appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants and dismissing the city's complaint without leave to amend. The court agreed with the district court that the alleged relevant market definition, as the "low-cost municipal health benefits market[,]" was legally deficient and concluded that the district court's denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgement of the district court.

This case stemmed from appellant's participation in the Bayou Hedge Fund Group (Bayou), a classic Ponzi scheme masked as a group of domestic and offshore hedge funds. Appellant appealed from his sentencing, following a plea of guilty to misprision of felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4. At issue was whether the district court's order of restitution in the amount of $60 million was improper because it relied on events occurring outside the relevant time period and the putative victims' losses were neither directly nor proximately caused by his actions as required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. The court found no error, much less plain error, in the district court's use of appellant's fraudulent 2003 faxes at sentencing. The court also found no error in the district court's conclusion that appellant's failure to report the Bayou fraud was both the direct and the proximate cause of the victim investors' losses. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.