Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed her conviction of immigration offenses after the district court denied her motion to suppress testimony from the officer who questioned her without Miranda warnings on her arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At issue was whether the district court correctly ruled that the officer's questioning failed to rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and thus, whether that court properly admitted into evidence defendant's statements to the officer. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have considered what occurred to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, it followed that defendant was not in "custody" and that, for this reason alone, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the officer's testimony.

Following a jury trial in district court, plaintiff won partial victory on his claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appealed. Plaintiff argued that, on his unsuccessful retaliation claim, the jury should have adopted the standard set forth for Title VII retaliation in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White. Plaintiff also appealed the award of only $204 in attorneys' fees on his one successful claim, that defendant interfered in his exercise of FMLA rights. Defendant cross-appealed the denial of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion. The court vacated and remanded for a new trial on the retaliation claim because the district court erred in rejecting the Burlington Northern jury charge and this error prejudiced plaintiff. The court also vacated the award of attorneys' fees and remanded for recalculation in conformity with the lodestar method.

This was a consolidated appeal from, inter alia, an order of the district court lifting an asset freeze for the purpose of authorizing the interlocutory sale of a vacation home owned by relief-defendant Lynn A. Smith. The magistrate judge held in relevant part that the sale was necessary to preserve the value of the asset pending resolution of the merits of the action. The court held that there was no error in this finding and held that it was not an abuse of discretion to lift the asset freeze in order to authorize the sale. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This instant appeal arose from the suppression of certain custodial statements made by defendant shortly after his arrest. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the government sought reconsideration and reversal of an order of suppression entered by the district court and previously affirmed by this court. The court reconsidered the district court's order of suppression in this case and vacated that order because the court agreed with the government that Berghuis constituted "an intervening change in controlling law," and because the court further agreed that Berghuis compelled a different outcome on these facts.

Petitioner, a former stockbroker, sought review of an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which found that he willfully violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, by orchestrating a scheme that allowed certain customers to engage in late trading of mutual funds, and that he aided and abetted and caused the failure of his firm to keep accurate books and records, in violation of the Exchange Act's recordkeeping requirements. At issue was whether the SEC's order, which barred petitioner from working in the securities industry, issued a cease and desist order against him, ordered him to disgorge his unjust enrichment amount plus interest, and imposed a civil penalty, should be vacated. The court denied the petition and affirmed the SEC's order because petitioner's conduct clearly violated the Exchange Act's antifraud and recordkeeping provisions and because the penalties imposed by the SEC were not unreasonable.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their class-action complaint, which asserted a single claim against MetLife under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that through the use of "retained asset accounts" (RAAs), MetLife breached fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA by retaining and investing for its own profit life insurance proceeds due them under employee benefit plans that MetLife administered. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, since MetLife discharged its fiduciary obligations under ERISA when it established the RAAs in accordance with the plans at issue, and did not misuse "plan assets" by holding and investing the funds backing the accounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed from an order of the district court insofar as that order denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112 et seq. At issue was whether a New York court's judgment dismissing on timeliness grounds a plaintiff's Article 78 petition seeking review of an adverse administrative determination of her employment discrimination claims precluded the plaintiff from bringing federal discrimination claims in federal court. The court held that this issue warranted certification to the New York Court of Appeals.

Plaintiffs, sergeants in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), brought this lawsuit alleging denial of overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., for the period covering April 19, 2001 to the present. Plaintiffs appealed from a July 20, 2009 judgment of the district court in favor of defendant and sought review of, inter alia, the district court's November 6, 2007 Opinion and Order denying their motion for summary judgment and sua sponte granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that the Department of Labor's interpretation of its regulations was not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with the pertinent FLSA regulations and thus was entitled to controlling deference. Applying that interpretation to the facts of the case, the court held that the primary duty of sergeants was not "management" and therefore, plaintiffs did not qualify for the "bona fide executive" exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs and for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs in these four cases appealed from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and dismissing their product liability claims for injuries allegedly caused by defendant's prescription drug, Fosamax. Plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision concluding that their product liability claims, brought under Virginia law, were not tolled by the pendency of a putative federal class action that raised identical claims and dismissing plaintiffs' claims as time-barred. The court held that the availability of "cross jurisdictional tolling" in this context raised questions of Virginia law that were appropriately certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Defendant appealed convictions for conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine, causing death by use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, murder in the course of drug conspiracy, and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. Defendant contended that he was entitled to acquittal on some counts by reason of double jeopardy and the sufficiency of the evidence, to resentencing on other counts, and to a new trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant where a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant had inferentially instructed another individual to kill the victim; that Judge Jones' decision to exclude certain portions of the tapes of jailhouse telephone conversations was not an abuse of discretion and, if the Judge had committed an error, it was harmless; that any residual prejudice from a witness's statement was negligible because the information regarding defendant's arrest was already before the jury; that the record was insufficient to allow adjudication of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and that the Double Jeopardy clause did not bar the government from getting "one complete opportunity" to achieve a conviction on the greater offense by retrial of that count where the jury in the first trial convicted defendant on the lesser offense and failed to reach a verdict on the greater offense. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.