Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court for dismissing as untimely his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court assumed that defendant satisfied the requirements for equitable tolling of a three-month period when he was hospitalized but, nevertheless, concluded that the petition was untimely because he failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim in the two-month period between his hospital discharge and filing. The court held that no such demonstration of diligence was required where the petition was filed within one year of the total untolled time after the challenged conviction became final. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Sheet Metal Workers Local 33 et al. appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their putative securities class action complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether the securities issuer made false statements and omissions of material facts in the registration documents accompanying its initial public offering, in violation of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq. The court held that the alleged misstatements were not material because the value of the transactions composed an immaterial portion of the issuer's total assets. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's motion to dismiss on the ground of immateriality.

Plaintiff brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging excessive force and other Eighth Amendment and due process violations in connection with a prison yard altercation. At issue was whether a plaintiff in a lawsuit governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was entitled to a jury trial on disputed factual issues relating to his exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court held that the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a jury trial on factual disputes regarding administrative exhaustion under the PLRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant plead guilty to narcotics violations in connection with a scheme to import cocaine and was sentenced principally to a term of 235 months imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court held that the government's refusal to move for a third-point reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) in this case was based on an unlawful reason because the government could not refuse to move on the grounds that it had been required to prepare for a Fatico hearing. In light of the court's holding, it did not reach the issue of substantive reasonableness, but did reject defendant's arguments regarding the disparity between his sentence and those imposed on his co-defendants; his lack of prior criminal record; and his medical condition. Accordingly, the sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Defendant appealed from two judgments entered in the district court: (1) convicting him of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) (Judgment II) and (2) revoking the supervised release to which he had been sentenced on a prior conviction for violation of section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and imposing a prison term, to be followed by a life term of supervised release, for violations of his prior supervised release conditions (supervised release judgment). On defendant's appeal challenging Judgment II, defendant contended principally that the district court should have dismissed the indictment on the ground that it was procured by his probation officer acting in excess of his statutory and constitutional authority and that, absent dismissal of the indictment, certain self-incriminating statements defendant made to his probation officer, as well as evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant obtained on the basis of those statements, should have been suppressed on the ground that his statements were protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant also argued that the severity of the penalties of the supervised release judgment should be reduced if Judgment II was vacated. The court found no merit in defendant's challenges to Judgment II and therefore, affirmed both judgments.

Plaintiff, a former probationary police officer, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging principally that defendants, Chief of the Middletown Police Department (MPD) and other members of the MPD, violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by causing the termination of his employment in retaliation for his refusals to make false statements in connection with an investigation into a civilian complaint alleging use of excessive force by a MPD officer. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Garcetti v. Ceballos and Weintraub v. Board of Education did not preclude First Amendment protection for his refusals to make false statements. The court considered all of defendants' arguments in support of affirmance and found them to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was vacated to the extent that it dismissed plaintiff's claims for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the matter was remanded.

Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of customers with poor credit who purchased used automobiles from defendants, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The complaint asserted that defendants violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq., and various state laws by burying hidden finance charges in the prices that plaintiffs were charged for these automobiles where defendant advertised the newer, more valuable used cars in its inventory at market prices, but sold the older, less valuable used cars to subprime credit customers for prices substantially higher than the market prices listed in the same guide. The court held that because the complaint did not contain any allegation for which it could plausibly be inferred that defendants failed to disclose a finance charge to plaintiffs, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued defendants for various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and parallel provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq., after defendants terminated plaintiff. A jury found that plaintiff's termination was in retaliation for complaints he made about his supervisor and it awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Both parties appealed numerous issues related to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. The court held that it need not determine whether the district court was authorized to grant such relief since the court read the parties' joint submission as effectively stipulating to a new jury trial, the result of which was an award in the reduced amount of $190,000, rendering the district court's judgment final. The court affirmed the decision of the district court that plaintiff's original punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive. The court further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct its clerical mistake without first obtaining leave from this court to do so, but now the court granted that leave nunc pro tunc. The court finally held that because the remaining issues raised in both parties' appeals were without merit, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety.

Defendant, a former Senator in the New York State Legislature, appealed from a judgment entered in district court following his conviction of two counts of mail fraud; one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and federal-program fraud; and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, federal-program fraud, and wire fraud. On appeal, defendant contended principally that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, erred in calculating the imprisonment range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, and erred in ordering restitution without proof that the persons characterized by the government as victims were directly harmed by his offense conduct. The court considered all of the parties' contentions in support of their respective positions and, except as indicted, have found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court vacated the August 23, 2010 order and remanded for further proceedings with respect to the amount of restitution to be ordered and the judgment of conviction, as well as all other aspects of defendant's sentence, were affirmed.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17, claiming compensatory damages for disparate treatment and hostile work environment. Plaintiff also brought parallel state law claims and sought backpay and reinstatement under Title VII and attorneys' fees. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's rulings on the post-trial motions regarding backpay, her state law claims, and the hourly rate applied to the award of attorneys' fees. The court held that because a backpay award required a separate inquest, a district court could not deny an award of backpay because it believed that an award of compensatory damages was sufficient. Accordingly, on remand, the district court was directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. The court also held that because the district court abused its discretion in its "specific finding" that plaintiff was not entitled to backpay, the district court should consider in the first instance on remand whether plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay. The court further held that plaintiff abandoned her state law claims because she did not pursue the matter diligently. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to remove its "abandonment" reference. The court finally held that the district court's award of attorneys' fees, while perhaps lagging behind the market, was not an abuse of discretion.