Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from continuing disputes between Argentina and its various private creditors. Argentina and its Brady bondholders entered into a Continuation of Collateral Pledge Agreement that extended the security interest in the tendered bonds' collateral during its transfer and liquidation. Capital Ventures International (CVI) held certain non-Brady bonds on which Argentina also defaulted and chose to sue Argentina to collect on the defaulted bonds it held, seeking to attach Argentina's reversionary interest in the Brady collateral. At issue was whether the attachments blocked the proposed exchange and whether the district court properly modified the attachments to allow the exchange. The court held that CVI was entitled to maintain its attachments even though a quirk of the bonds' Collateral Pledge Agreement meant that the attachments would effectively block the proposed exchange between Argentina and the Brady bondholders. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's orders that modified the attachments to permit the exchange.

The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) appealed from an order of the district court enjoining the enforcement of an NYCTA policy requiring third parties to obtain the consent of those contesting notices of violations before NYCTA's Transit Adjudication Bureau in order to observe such hearings. At issue was whether the public had a right to access these proceedings. The court held that the First Amendment guaranteed the public a presumptive right of access to the NYCTA's adjudicatory proceedings and that the NYCTA had not overcome that presumption.

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of multiple fraud-related felonies. Defendant timely appealed his criminal conviction and moved to withdraw his direct criminal appeal with leave to reinstate it after he had finished pursuing an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In the alternative, defendant moved for a six month extension to file his appellate brief. The court held that the interests of judicial economy and fairness disfavored staying defendant's direct appeal. The court held, however, that staying the direct appeal by six months would not seriously prejudice the government or the co-defendant. Therefore, the court denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his direct appeal and granted defendant's request for the six month extension.

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's order of removal claiming that the Chinese government had persecuted him because he attended an underground Christian church in China. The government moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court denied the motion to dismiss where the court, by exercising its discretion, determined that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, which was an equitable doctrine, was inapplicable to petitioner's case. Having denied the government's motion to dismiss, the court addressed the merits of petitioner's case in a summary order.

This case stemmed from a contractual arrangement known as a "cash-settled total return equity swap agreement" between the parties. The parties appealed the judgment of the district court finding defendants in violation of section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d), and permanently enjoining them from future violations. The court considered only whether a section 13(d) violation occurred with respect to CSX shares owned outright by defendants acting as a group. Because the district court did not make findings sufficient to permit appellate review of a group violation of section 13(d) with respect to outright ownership of CSX shares, the court remanded for further consideration. An earlier order affirmed the denial of an injunction against the voting of shares acquired by defendants while they were not in compliance with section 13(d). The court explained that ruling on the ground that injunctive "sterilization" of shares was not available when shareholders had adequate time to consider the belated Williams Act disclosures before the relevant shareholder's vote. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the district court vacating summary judgment for defendants where plaintiffs alleged that defendants, operator of a calcium carbonate mineral processing facility, were liable for creating an "imminent and substantial endangerment" within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-92. Liability was predicated upon a finding that aminoethylethanolamine (AEEA) was present in defendants' waste. The court held that plaintiffs' claim that AEEA presented an imminent and substantial endangerment in violation of the RCRA was properly dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)96) where plaintiffs' failure to specify arsenic in their notice of intent to sue (NOI) supported the district court's dismissal of the endangerment claim and the open dumping claim. The court held that the dismissal of the action would not prohibit plaintiffs from again giving notice to defendants and filing its suit in compliance with RCRA's notice and delay requirements upon future discovery of potential violations of the federal environmental laws. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss as untimely plaintiff's complaint, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to commit those three offenses. At issue was whether the district court properly ruled that tolling of the untimely claims, on the basis of defendant's continuing concealment, was unwarranted. The court affirmed and held that the lawsuit, commenced on April 2004, arose from an injury suffered no later than June 2000 and therefore, was barred by the applicable statute of repose, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-577. The court also held that plaintiff could not seek the safe harbor of equitable estoppel due to its failure to recognize that it was required to pursue its action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district.

Petitioners appealed from a Memorandum and Order and Final Order of Forfeiture entered by the district court dismissing their petition for an ancillary hearing and rejecting their claim as beneficiaries of a putative constructive trust in defendant's forfeiture assets. At issue was whether the remission provision of 21 U.S.C. 853(i) precluded the imposition of a constructive trust in petitioners' favor and whether imposing a constructive trust would be consistent with a forfeiture statutory scheme provided by section 853. Because the court concluded that section 853(i) did not preclude, as a matter of law, recognizing a constructive trust and because a constructive trust was not inconsistent with the forfeiture statute, the court vacated the Final Order of Forfeiture and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether, pursuant to Vermont law, a constructive trust should be recognized in favor of petitioners.

Plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel in this appeal from an order of the district court that dismissed his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The motions were denied on the ground that plaintiff had filed three or more frivolous lawsuits in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g).

This case stemmed from an Engagement Agreement entered into by petitioner, a developer and manufacturer of military technology, with respondent, an independent broker dealer, by which respondent agreed to act as petitioner's exclusive placement agent in an anticipated $20 million private offering of petitioner's securities to finance its anticipated development of a field-deployable vehicle. Petitioner subsequently appealed the district court's final order and judgment compelling arbitration of the claims of respondent before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The court held that because the parties expressly agreed to adjudicate their disputes before a court, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court.