Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner challenged the manner by which the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated Good Conduct Time (GCT) under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), maintaining that he should be eligible to receive GCT for the 94 months he spent in state and federal custody prior to the date on which he was sentenced in district court, even though those 94 months were credited to a prior state sentence. At issue was whether section 3624(b) permitted the award of GCT for presentence custody served by an inmate, that under 18 U.S.C. 3585(b), could not be credited to the inmate's federal sentence. The court held that the BOP's interpretation of section 3624(b) was persuasive under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. and deferred to the agency's interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court granting petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against his former employer, seeking monetary and equitable relief for alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., and state law. At issue was whether the separation agreement between the parties was unenforceable because its provisions did not comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. 626(f), and applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations, that the separation agreement be written in a manner calculated to be understood. The court held that the separation agreement was written in a manner calculated to be understood by the relevant employees of defendant. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment should have been denied because there were genuine issues of fact to be tried and that the separation agreement was unenforceable because plaintiff was not advised in writing to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff appealed from an order of the district court that reduced by two-thirds the attorney's fees award she requested for successfully appealing from the administrative denial of her application for disability benefits. The district court, attributing gaps in the administrative record to plaintiff's counsel, concluded that the alleged deficiency constituted "special circumstances" justifying a reduction in the attorney's fees awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). The court held that the failure of a claimant's attorney to develop the administrative record on issues collateral to the disability determination did not constitute a "special circumstance" warranting a reduction in attorney's fees. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the fee award based on its sua sponte critique of counsel's billing records and its conclusion that the time billed was excessive because no novel issues were raised. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Petitioners, citizens of Columbia,entered the United States in September 2001, as nonimmigrant visitors. On May 7, 2002, they filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied the application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The BIA again ruled against the petitioners.The Second Circuit again vacated and remanded. The petitioners sought $9,690.00 in attorney’s fees and $751.04 in costs incurred in connection with the petitions for review After holding that he Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A). applies to petitions for review from the BIA, the Second Circuit granted the award. The BIA position was without substantial justification; the BIA committed significant errors of law and fact that prejudiced the case by grounding its disposition of the claims on a material misquotation of death threat and inadequate consideration under the CAT.

Defendant appealed from convictions of possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of cocaine base, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant also appealed the district court's denial of a motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during his detention because the search and seizure of defendant's person and property were conducted in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and whether the district court erred in denying defendant's section 2255 motion because he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment. The court held that defendant's detention during the search of his residence was justified pursuant to Michigan v. Summers and that the district court, therefore, did not err in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during that detention. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel's alleged ineffective assistance was prejudicial and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the section 2255 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments of the district court.

The New York State Department of Education and related defendants appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to vacate an award of attorney's fees to plaintiff where the district court had awarded plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) after he successfully challenged on equal protection grounds New York State Education Law 6704(6), which restricted professional veterinarian licenses to United States citizens and aliens who were lawful permanent residents of the United States. The Department appealed the district court's ruling and while the appeal was pending, the United States granted plaintiff permanent legal resident status, which meant that section 6704(6) no longer precluded him from obtaining the license. Accordingly, a panel of the court dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the judgment. The Department then moved to vacate the fee award. The court agreed with the district court that because the judgment in plaintiff's favor, though later vacated, had brought a judicially-sanctioned, material alteration of the parties' legal relationship that had not been reversed on the merits, plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

Defendants appealed from preliminary injunctions enjoining defendants from enforcing 22 U.S.C. 7631(f), a provision of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Act), 22 U.S.C. 7601 et seq., against plaintiffs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in the international fight against HIV/AIDS that received funding under the Act. Section 7631(f), construed and implemented by defendants, required NGOs, as a condition of receiving Act funds, to adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution, and prohibiting recipients from engaging in any activities that were "inconsistent" with an anti-prostitution stance. The court held that section 7631(f) fell well beyond what the Supreme Court and the court have upheld as permissible conditions on the receipt of government funds where section 7631(f) did not merely require recipients of the Act's funds to refrain from certain conduct, but went substantially further and compelled recipients to espouse the government's viewpoint. Consequently, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and found no abuse of discretion by the district court.

The Republic of Argentina and interested non-party-appellant, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), appealed from orders of the district court to attach funds held in BCRA's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) on the theory that, pursuant to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), those funds were attachable interests of the Republic. At issue was whether sovereign immunity for central bank property "held for its own account" pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1), depended upon a presumption of the central bank's independence under Bancec, and the proper definition of central bank property "held for its own account" under section 1611(b)(1). The court held that because BCRA's sovereign immunity over the FRBNY funds had not been waived and the FRBNY funds were property of BCRA held for its own account under section 1611(b)(1), the FRBNY funds were immune from attachment and restraint. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a suit for attachment and restraint for the FRBNY funds. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

This insurance coverage dispute raised issues arising out of financial regulators' investigations in alleged accounting misstatements by MBIA, Inc. (MBIA) and related litigation. Based on these events, MBIA made claims under two $15 million director and officer (D&O) insurance policies it had purchased from Federal Insurance Co. (Federal) and ACE American Insurance Co. (ACE), seeking coverage for costs associated with these claims as losses under the policies. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of MBIA on two of its three coverage claims but granted summary judgment in favor of Federal and ACE on one of MBIA's coverage claims. The parties subsequently appealed the district court's judgments. The court affirmed the district court with respect to coverage for all costs except those related to the independent consultant where the independent consultant's investigation was a covered cost under the policies. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of MBIA on its claim for coverage of the independent consultant's costs.