Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed from an order of the district court denying its motion, made after a preliminary injunction was vacated by the court, to recover damages against an injunction bond posted by appellee. At issue was whether the district court correctly concluded that the damages sought were not proximately caused by the injunction, and that, in deciding this issue, the district court should have applied a presumption in favor of recovery against the bond. The court held that a wrongfully enjoined party was entitled to a presumption in favor of recovery against an injunction bond and that the district court's decision was insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for reconsideration and clarification.

Defendant was sentenced to 14 months imprisonment and 18 months of supervised release for violating two conditions of his previous term of supervised release. At issue was whether the district court had the power to revoke the supervised release finding that defendant had violated a condition of supervised release when he failed to report changes in employment and residence. The court vacated and held that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke supervised release because the delays in adjudicating the revocation petitioner were reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. 3583(i). The court also held that the district court erred by finding that defendant violated the asserted condition, based on the district court's view of the "purpose" of the condition, rather than the "clear and specific" meaning that a person of ordinary intelligence would attribute to it.

A debtor, his wife, and sister ("appellants") sought to reopen debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case for the purpose of pursuing an adversary proceeding against the trustee of debtor's estate and one of the trustee's bondholders. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to reopen and properly dismissed appellants' complaint. The court held that the bankruptcy court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion where the adversary claims against the trustee were entirely without merit. The court also held that, in light of the meritless appeal, appellants and their counsel were ordered to show cause as to why they should not be sanctioned.

Plaintiffs, former students of Ithaca High School, claimed that defendants violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the publication of a sexually-explicit cartoon in the Ithaca High School student newspaper ("IHS newspaper") and by prohibiting the on-campus distribution of an independent student newspaper containing the same cartoon. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the IHS newspaper was a limited public forum. The court concluded that the IHS newspaper was a limited public form and held that defendants lawfully prohibited the publication of the sexually-explicit cartoon pursuant to the standards for regulation of speech set forth in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. The court also held that defendants lawfully prohibited the on-campus distribution of the sexually-explicit cartoon in an independent student newspaper pursuant to Fraser and that the court need not reach the question of whether defendants' prohibition of the on-campus distribution of the independent student newspaper was lawful under Tinker v. DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Scho. Dist.

Plaintiff, a labor organization that represented a bargaining unit of defendant's employees, filed a formal grievance with defendant, challenging defendant's discontinuation of dues "checkoff," or deduction of dues from employees' paychecks, and seeking collection and remittance of all back dues with interest. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the parties' dispute over checkoff of union dues was subject to arbitration pursuant to their expired collective-bargaining agreement. The court held that plaintiff's contractual right to checkoff of union dues survived expiration of the agreement and therefore, subjected the parties' disputes to arbitration.

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner where petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding defense counsel from cross-examining a witness about a document that contained multiple hearsay. The court held that the trial court's preclusion of cross-examination on the document was not so clearly an abuse of its broad discretion, to balance the probative and prejudicial aspects of potential cross-examination, that the state appellate court's failure to find such an abuse of discretion was an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, sought leave to file a successive habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 where she was convicted of reckless manslaughter and depraved indifference murder in connection with the death of her infant child. At issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when New York's appellate courts violated her application for a writ of error coram nobis where she alleged that she was denied effective assistance of counsel in her district court appeal. The court denied the petition and held that petitioner did not raise a claim cognizable under section 2254 where a section 2254 petition was not a proper vehicle for challenging deficiencies in a state post-conviction proceeding.

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.

Plaintiff, Penguin Group (USA) Inc. ("Penguin"), filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against defendant, an Oregon not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona, alleging that defendant's posting of four Penguin books on the Internet violated Penguin's copyrights in works that it had published. In answer to a question the court certified to the New York Court of Appeals, that court concluded that "[in] copyright infringement cases involving the uploading of a copyrighted printed literary work onto the Internet, ... the situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction under [the relevant section of New York's long-arm-jurisdiction statute is] ... the location of the copyright holder." Accordingly, the court held that the Court of Appeals' decision compelled it to conclude, for purposes of the personal jurisdiction analysis pursuant to New York's long-arm statute, that the situs of Penguin's alleged injury was New York. Therefore, the judgment dismissing Penguin's complaint was vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the Court of Appeals' response to the certified question.

Plaintiffs appealed from judgments dismissing their class-action complaints seeking to hold defendants (collectively, "Rating Agencies") liable as underwriters or control persons for misstatements or omissions in securities offering documents in violation of sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"), 15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(5), 77o(a). At issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" as defined by 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(11) because they helped structure securities transactions to achieve desired ratings. Also at issue was whether the Rating Agencies were "control persons" because of their alleged provision of advice and direction to primary violators regarding transaction structures under section 77o(a) of the 1933 Act. The court held that plaintiffs' section 11 claims that the Rating Agencies were "underwriters" was properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' alleged structuring or creation of securities was insufficient to demonstrate their involvement in the requisite distributional activities. The court also held that plaintiffs' "control person" claims under section 77o(a) were properly dismissed because the Rating Agencies' provision of advice and guidance regarding transaction structures was insufficient to permit an inference that they had the power to direct the management or policies of alleged primary violators of section 11. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying implicitly plaintiffs' cursory requests for leave to amend.