Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment dismissing a three-count complaint arising from the renegotiation of certain investment-advisory agreements. The court certified a question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to the circumstances under which that state's business judgment rule could be asserted in response to a shareholder derivative suit under the Massachusetts Business Corporations Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156D, 5.44. Upon the receipt of the answer, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of two of plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to various provisions of the Investment Company Act, 15, U.S.C. 80a-15(a), and Massachusetts state law. Regarding the third claim, a derivative state law claim for breach of fiduciary duty to which the certified question related and as to which the district court granted a motion to dismiss, the court vacated the judgement and remanded with instructions to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and to rule on that motion, after further discovery if further discovery was warranted.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated current and former Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. ("B&D") employees, sued B&D asserting three sets of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the New York Labor Law ("NYLL"), N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12 section 142-2.2. At issue was whether B&D owed plaintiff compensation for all the time he spent commuting between home and the job site ("commute time claims") and overtime hours that plaintiff allegedly worked but did not record ("off-the-clock claims"). The court held that the district court properly granted B&D summary judgment on the commute time claims where, even if plaintiff's activities were integral and indispensable to his principal activities, they did not render the entirety of his commute time compensable under the FLSA. The court also held that plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact on his off-the-clock claims where plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he had shown the amount of his uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.

K&L Gates LLP ("K&L Gates") filed a motion to lift two protective orders prohibiting disclosure of communications made during mediation. Savage & Associates, P.C. ("Savage") filed a cross-motion to enjoin K&L Gates from raising questions about the validity of certain provisions of a settlement agreement as a defense to malpractice in a related action. At issue was whether the district court properly denied both K&L Gates' motion and Savage's cross-motion. The court held that the district court did not err in the denial of K&L Gates' motion where K&L Gates failed to demonstrate a compelling need for the discovery, failed to show that the information was not otherwise available, and failed to establish that the need for the evidence was outweighed by the public interest in maintaining confidentiality. The court also held that the district court did not err in holding that K&L Gates was not barred from asserting a defense challenging the validity of any provision of the settlement agreement in connection with the related malpractice action currently pending against the law firm.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.

The United States sued the New York City Board of Education and related parties ("City Defendants") claiming a violation of Title VII's prohibition of disparate impact selection measures. The parties entered into a settlement in 1999 despite objections from incumbent employees who were denied leave to intervene in the suit. The incumbent employees' lawsuits raised the issue of whether the City Defendants' voluntary implementation of the settlement agreement violated section 703(a) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In addition to the central holding, the court addressed several other issues. The court held that because the district court in its Title VII analysis reached results inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, its judgment must be vacated and remanded with two exceptions. First, the court affirmed the district court's grant of class certification and second, paragraph 4 of the district court's declaratory judgment had not been appealed and therefore must stand.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the Housing Authority of the City of New Haven, alleging that defendants discriminated against them in administering New Haven's Housing Choice Voucher ("Section 8") program in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(d); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as regulations promulgated thereunder, 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, 100.204. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that 24 C.F.R. 8, 28, and 100.204 could not be privately enforced through 42 U.S.C. 1983; in the analysis of plaintiffs' intentional discrimination claim under the FHAA; in factual findings regarding the provision of Section 8 services to the class; in rulings on certain discovery issues; and in decertification. The court adopted the district court's findings and conclusions and held that the district court carefully considered and thoroughly discussed these issues. The court also considered plaintiffs' remaining arguments and held that they were without merit.

Defendant appealed a judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus where defendant was convicted of Murder in the First Degree for hiring one individual to kill another individual. At issue was whether the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped statement defendant made while in police custody. The court held that the statement was erroneously admitted in violation of defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel where defendant had invoked his right to counsel before making the statements on videotape. The court also held that the error was not harmless where it had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

The City of New York ("City") brought suit against defendants, retail firearms dealers located in South Carolina and Georgia, alleging public nuisance on the theory that they intentionally or negligently sold firearms in a manner susceptible to illegal trafficking to the City. After engaging in litigation with the City for several years, each defendant defaulted and upon entry of default judgment, the district court issued permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants from further violations of the law and required them to undergo supervision by court-appointed special master. At issue was whether a default judgment should have been entered; whether the default judgment was, in any event, void for lack of personal jurisdiction over each defendant; and, in the alternative, that the injunctions violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) or are unconstitutional. The court held that defendants' withdrawal from the district court proceedings justified the entry of default, followed by default judgment; that defendants forfeited their defense of lack of personal jurisdiction; and that the default judgment was not void. The court also held that the injunctions issued by the district court violated Rule 65(d) and therefore vacated the injunctions and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioners, registered nurses ("RNs") employed in the region, filed a complaint alleging that various hospital owners and operators in the Albany-Schenectady-Troy metropolitan area had conspired to depress the compensation of RNs in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1. A petition for leave to appeal was filed well outside the limitations period but filed within the fourteen days of the district court's denial of the motion to amend the class certification. At issue was whether such a denial constituted "an order granting or denying class-action certification" for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedures 23(f). The court dismissed the petition and held that petitioners failed to timely petition with respect to an order reviewable pursuant to Rule 23(f) where an interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f) could not properly be taken from an order denying amendment to a previous order granting class certification, at least when the motion to amend was filed fourteen days after the original order granting class certification.