Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed convictions of murder in aid of racketeering, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit witness tampering. At issue was whether defendants should have been granted a new trial after the posttrial discovery of the victim's body, whether there were prejudicial errors in the admission of certain testimony by the victim's widow, whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions on the witness-tampering counts; and whether the government improperly withheld information that was material to the defense. Also at issue was whether the admission of certain testimony by the victim's daughter was unduly prejudicial and whether the evidence was sufficient to support one of the defendant's conviction of the murder count. The court considered all of defendants' arguments and found them to be without merit and therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping, robbery, and related crimes and was sentenced principally to 319 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court properly limited cross-examination of a government witness at trial by barring his use of a state court's finding that the witness had given false testimony in a prior judicial proceeding. The court held that the district court's evidentiary ruling was erroneous but found that the error was harmless where the witness testified primarily about the arrest of two co-conspirators and the discovery of incriminating evidence during their arrest and mentioned in passing the police's non-custodial questioning of defendant and where other officers fully corroborated the testimony.

An insurance policyholder, TD Banknorth Insurance Agency, Inc., appealed from a declaratory judgment awarding to its insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, all funds in escrow as proceeds from settlement of the policyholder's claims against third parties. The policyholder challenged the allocation of the escrowed funds on the ground that Connecticut's common law "make whole" doctrine entitled it to recover its deductible before its insurer could collect as subrogee. The court held that this issue was undecided under Connecticut law and certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Connecticut: "Are insurance policy deductibles subject to Connecticut's make whole doctrine?"

Defendants, corrections officers at Queens Private Correctional Facility ("QPCF"), appealed from convictions of conspiracy to obstruct justice, attempted intimidation and corrupt persuasion, and making false statements when defendants submitted false reports of an investigation involving the use of excessive force to an inmate. At issue was whether an internal investigation, by a privately owned prison that housed federal prisoners, of an allegation of excessive force involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The court found no basis to reverse defendants' convictions for obstruction of justice under section 18 U.S.C. 1519 and held that QPCF's internal investigation into whether the defendants' conduct violated QPCF's internal regulations involved a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the DOJ for purposes of section 1519.

Plaintiffs, a Specialist in the United States Army and her infant son, sued defendants, former and senior government officials, alleging that defendants caused the September 11th, 2001 attacks against the United States in order to create a political atmosphere in which they could pursue domestic and international policy objectives and to conceal the misallocation of $2.3 trillion in congressional appropriations to the Department of Defense. Plaintiffs were in the Pentagon on September 11th and assert violations of their constitutional rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal narcotics Agents, a common law tort of conspiracy to cause death and great bodily harm, and a violation of the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. 2333(a). At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and concluding that plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal and held that the few conceivably "well-pleaded" facts in the complaint were frivolous and were pure speculation and conjecture. The court also ordered plaintiffs' counsel to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.

Petitioners, citizens of Guatemala, petitioned for review of removal orders that became final after the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissed their appeals from decisions of an Immigration Judge ("IJ") that found each man removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the INA. At issue was whether the BIA erred in concluding that petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status where their release on "conditional parole" under section 236(a)(2)(B) of the INA did not satisfy the "paroled in the United States" requirement of section 245(a). The court held that the requirement that an alien be "paroled into the United States" in order to seek adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) was not satisfied by the alien's release on "conditional parole" under section 1226(a)(2)(B). The court also held that petitioners were correctly ordered removed under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) where they were present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and therefore, petitioners were statutorily ineligible for adjustment status under section 1255(a) despite having been released on conditional parole under section 1226(a)(2)(B).

Kristan Peters, an attorney admitted to the bars of both New York and Connecticut and formerly a partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, appealed from an order of the Committee on Grievances for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("Grievance Committee") suspending her from practicing law before that court for a period of seven years. The Grievance Committee found that she had engaged in misconduct which involved instructing a junior attorney to deface transcripts ("Brackett allegation") and violating a confidentiality order ("Confidentiality Order allegation"). At issue was whether the Grievance Committee's failure to hold an independent hearing, and its reliance on a prior sanctions hearing in the underlying litigation, violated her due process rights and the district court's local rules. Also at issue was whether the two charges of misconduct now at issue did not, as a matter of law, support the Grievance Committee's imposition of discipline. The court held that Peters was not provided adequate prior notice of the Brackett allegation or adequate opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The court also held that evidence concerning the Confidentiality Order allegation was not adequately developed during that prior proceeding so as to permit the Grievance Committee to forego an independent evidentiary hearing in the present matter. Therefore, the court vacated the Grievance Committee's suspension order and remanded the matter for the further proceedings.

Petitioner appealed a motion to dismiss his federal habeas petition where he retained an attorney in or around August 2007, instructed the attorney to file the petition before the deadline on November 20, 2007, and the attorney admitted affirmatively and knowingly that he mislead petitioner by promising him that he would file the petition before the deadline. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the federal habeas petition on the basis that the petition, submitted one day late, was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). The court vacated the judgment and held that the district court erred in determining that equitable tolling did not apply where, under the totality of the circumstances presented, extraordinary circumstances prevented the filing of the petition on time.

Appellant, Retail Holdings, N.V. (together with its predecessors, "New Singer"), appealed from a judgment in favor of appellee, Lockheed Martin Corporation (together with its predecessors, "Old Singer"), regarding a dispute revolving around the interpretation of a 1986 Reorganization and Distribution Agreement ("Spin-off Agreement") between appellee's predecessor, The Singer Company, and appellant's predecessor, SSMC, Inc. At issue was whether the Spin-off Agreement transferred a particular pension plan, the Executive Office Foreign Service Retirement Plan ("Plan"), from Old Singer to New Singer. The court reversed the judgment and held that the district court erred in considering extrinsic evidence of the parties' post-contract conduct where the contract admitted only one reasonable interpretation when the Plan was transferred to New Singer by clear and unambiguous terms.

Defendant appealed a conviction of interstate stalking and interstate violation of a protective order when he tracked his ex-wife's vehicle through a G.P.S. device he placed on her vehicle. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and whether the district court issued an appropriate limiting instruction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's abuse of his ex-wife, the district court did abuse its discretion when it allowed the ex-wife to testify that defendant's brother beat her in 1990 and that defendant later pressured her to lie in court about the brother's assault of a police officer in 1994; and the district court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that police stopped defendant while he was driving a reportedly stolen rental car in January 2008 and found three black powder rifles, ammunition, a bulletproof vest, a ski mask, and a last will and testament in the vehicle. The court also held that the limiting instructions did not suffice to protect defendant from unfair prejudice and that the district court's errors affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the court held that the district court's errors were not harmless and vacated the conviction.