Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Andrew Davis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Davis trafficked large quantities of marijuana in Bridgeport, Connecticut, using a method involving shipping marijuana from California via FedEx. Upon his arrest, he was found with over 136 pounds of marijuana, numerous handguns, and approximately $412,000 in cash. A co-conspirator cooperated with the government, leading to Davis's conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut sentenced Davis to 295 months’ imprisonment. Davis appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. He also raised ten additional arguments in pro se supplemental briefs, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for his other convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Davis’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court found that the government provided ample circumstantial evidence linking the cash used in financial transactions to Davis's drug trafficking operations. The court also determined that Davis's pro se arguments either lacked merit, were forfeited, or were premature. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”) provide automobile insurance in New York and are required to reimburse individuals injured in automobile accidents for necessary health expenses under New York’s No-Fault Act. State Farm alleges that several health care providers and related entities engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain No-Fault benefits by providing unnecessary treatments and services, and then pursued baseless arbitrations and state-court proceedings to seek reimbursement for unpaid bills.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted State Farm’s motion for a preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the defendants from proceeding with pending arbitrations and from initiating new arbitrations and state-court proceedings, but denied an injunction of the pending state-court proceedings. The district court found that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm due to the fragmented nature of the proceedings, which obscured the alleged fraud, and the risk of inconsistent judgments and preclusive effects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction in part. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, a balance of hardships tipping in its favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court also concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act did not bar the injunction of the arbitrations because the arbitrations would prevent State Farm from effectively vindicating its RICO claims.Additionally, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision not to enjoin the pending state-court proceedings, finding that the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly-authorized” exception applied. The court determined that the state-court proceedings were part of a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims that furthered the alleged RICO violation, and that enjoining these proceedings was necessary to give RICO its intended scope. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State Farm Mutual v. Tri-Borough" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the City of West Haven, Connecticut, of COVID-19 relief funds. The defendant, along with co-conspirators, submitted fraudulent invoices for equipment and services that were never provided. The City paid over $400,000 based on these false invoices. The defendant was the only one among his co-defendants to go to trial, while the others pled guilty.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut convicted the defendant of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court sentenced him to 96 months in prison, which was above the recommended guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had provided a detailed explanation for the above-guidelines sentence, emphasizing the severity of the crime, the defendant’s financial gains, and the need for deterrence. The court also noted that the defendant did not receive a trial penalty, as the district court had explicitly stated that the sentence was not influenced by the defendant’s decision to go to trial. The court further found that the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.The Second Circuit concluded that none of the defendant’s challenges had merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Trasacco" on Justia Law

In this case, three defendants, officers and executives of the Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative (CMEEC), were convicted of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The defendants misappropriated funds from CMEEC in 2015 to pay for personal vacations disguised as corporate retreats. These trips included visits to the Kentucky Derby and the Greenbrier Resort, with expenses charged to CMEEC's accounts.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut oversaw the trial, where the jury found the defendants guilty of one count of theft involving a program receiving federal funds. The jury determined that CMEEC received more than $10,000 in federal benefits in 2015, satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A). The defendants were acquitted on other counts, including conspiracy and theft for the years 2014 and 2016. The district court sentenced the defendants to imprisonment and ordered restitution for the misappropriated funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting the defendants' claims of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. The appellate court held that CMEEC received federal benefits exceeding $10,000 in 2015, as the funds were provided under a federal grant program. The court also found no merit in the defendants' argument that the government misled the grand jury or that the district court erred in setting the restitution amount. Additionally, the court denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus, concluding that the district court did not err in finding that the legal fees advanced to the defendants lacked a sufficient causal relationship to their offense of conviction.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction and restitution order, and denied CMEEC's petition for mandamus. View "United States v. Sullivan, Bilda, Rankin" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in a fraudulent slip-and-fall scheme in which they recruited poor and homeless individuals to stage accidents and seek unnecessary medical treatment. The scheme involved doctors and lawyers who would then sue property owners or their insurance companies for damages, with the proceeds being divided among the conspirators. The recruits received minimal compensation compared to the organizers.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the defendants of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. The jury found them guilty, and the court sentenced them based on the guidelines calculations, including enhancements for the number of victims and the amount of loss. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing various errors in the trial and sentencing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no persuasive arguments to overturn them. However, it remanded for factfinding regarding the number of fraudulent accidents orchestrated by the conspiracy during the defendants' involvement to accurately compute the loss enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. The court vacated and remanded Duncan’s forfeiture order, concluding it was based on government allegations without factual support. The restitution order for Rainford and Locust was affirmed but modified by $120,000. Rainford’s sentence was affirmed but remanded for reconsideration in the interest of justice.The main holdings were: affirming the convictions, remanding for factfinding on the loss enhancement, vacating and remanding Duncan’s forfeiture order, modifying the restitution order, and remanding Rainford’s sentence for reconsideration. View "United States v. Rainford" on Justia Law

George Moses was convicted of mail and wire fraud, money laundering, lying to the FBI, and other charges for defrauding two nonprofit community organizations he led. He used funds from these organizations for personal expenses, including a timeshare, cruise tickets, and other personal items. Moses was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Wolford, C.J.) handled the initial trial. Moses was convicted on 28 counts, but he appealed 14 of these counts. He argued that the district court improperly excluded a document he claimed was his employment contract, gave erroneous jury instructions, and that the evidence was insufficient for his convictions. He also claimed procedural errors at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the employment contract because Moses failed to authenticate it. The jury instructions were deemed proper, including those on fraud by omission and the lack of a need for a specific instruction on ratification by an authorized agent. The appellate court also found sufficient evidence to support Moses's convictions on the challenged counts, including detailed schemes of fraud and misuse of funds.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting all of Moses's arguments on appeal. The court upheld the 78-month sentence, finding no procedural errors in the district court's sentencing process. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

The case pertains to Ariel Jimenez, who owned and operated a tax preparation business in Bronx, New York. Between 2009 and 2015, Jimenez led a large-scale tax fraud and identity theft scheme, purchasing stolen identities of children to falsely claim them as dependents on clients' tax returns. Through this scheme, Jimenez obtained millions of dollars, which he laundered by structuring bank deposits, investing in real estate properties, and transferring the properties to his parents and limited liability companies. Following a jury trial, Jimenez was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to tax-return claims, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering.On appeal, Jimenez raised two issues. First, he claimed that the district court’s jury instruction regarding withdrawal from a conspiracy was erroneous. Second, he alleged that the evidence supporting his conspiracy convictions was insufficient. The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that the district court’s jury instruction on withdrawal from a conspiracy was a correct statement of the law and that the evidence supporting Jimenez's conspiracy convictions was sufficient. The court found that Jimenez had failed to effectively withdraw from the conspiracy as he continued to benefit from it. View "United States v. Jimenez" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment awarding damages to Plaintiff to recover funds Defendant received as the result of various alleged fraudulent transfers. The district court entered a default against Defendant as a sanction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) for her repeated failure to comply with discovery orders and ultimately entered a default judgment against Defendant for fraudulent transfers, awarding Plaintiff damages calculated based on three checks Defendant drew from bank accounts she held jointly with her debtor husband.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant’s noncompliance during discovery warranted a default. The court explained that Defendant failed to respond to interrogatories and produce the documents Plaintiff requested, in violation of the district court’s many orders. This record supports the district court’s determination that Defendant acted willfully, that lesser sanctions would have been inadequate given Defendant’s continued noncompliance after multiple explicit warnings about the consequences of further noncompliance, that Defendant was given ample notice that her continued noncompliance would result in sanctions, including the entry of default judgment, and that her noncompliance spanned more than six months. The court also concluded that Defendant’s withdrawals from accounts she held jointly with her husband constitute fraudulent transfers under Connecticut law. View "Mirlis v. Greer" on Justia Law

Defendant, a California licensed attorney, challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for transmitting extortionate communications in interstate commerce to sportswear leader Nike, attempted Hobbs Act extortion of Nike, and honest-services wire fraud of the client whom Defendant was purportedly representing in negotiations with Nike. Defendant further challenged the trial court’s jury instruction as to honest-services fraud and the legality of a $259,800.50 restitution award to Nike.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for the two charged extortion counts because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s threat to injure Nike’s reputation and financial position was wrongful in that the multi-million-dollar demand supported by the threat bore no nexus to any claim of right. Further, the court held that the trial evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for honest-services fraud because a reasonable jury could find that Defendant solicited a bribe from Nike in the form of a quid pro quo whereby Nike would pay Defendant many millions of dollars in return for which Defendant would violate his fiduciary duty as an attorney. The court further explained that the district court did not exceed its authority under the MVRA by awarding restitution more than 90 days after initial sentencing, and Defendant has shown no prejudice from the delayed award. Finally, the court wrote that the MVRA applies in this case where Nike sustained a pecuniary loss directly attributable to those crimes as a result of incurring fees for its attorneys to attend the meeting demanded by Defendant at which he first communicated his extortionate threat. View "United States v. Avenatti" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant appealed from a district court order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. The court explained that it is simply wrong to suggest that the antecedent-personal-injury bar is necessary to ensure “genuine limitations” in Section 1964(c), or to give restrictive significance to Congress’s implicit intent to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property”’ when it enacted RICO. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law