Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant threatened to reveal office gossip that the General Counsel of the New York State Comptroller's Office was having an affair unless the General Counsel recanted a recommendation to the State Comptroller to reject a proposal by defendant's company. He was convicted of attempted extortion of the office under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and interstate transmission of extortionate threats in violation of 18 U.S.C. 875(d). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that his conduct did not come within the statutory definition of extortion because he did not "attempt to obtain property" from the General Counsel. View "United States v. Sekhar" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted on charges arising from an elaborate, years-long financial fraud. Defendant Gowing continued to take actions in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud even after he was arrested and released awaiting trial for that same charge. On appeal, Gowing principally argued that the district court's application of 18 U.S.C. 3147 was error because he did not commit a separate or additional offense while on release, but only continued to commit the conspiracy. Because the statute did not make such a distinction, and because Gowing's other sentencing arguments were without merit, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Gowing" on Justia Law

Defendant, a securities broker, pleaded guilty to charges related to his conduct involving a bribe greater than $70,000. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in calculating restitution insofar as it ordered both restitution and forfeiture in the amount of defendant's gains from the fraudulent scheme underlying his conviction. The court held that it was error for the district court to substitute defendant's gains for the victims' losses in calculating restitution, but declined to exercise the court's discretion to notice the error, as defendant failed to object in the district court, and had failed on appeal to show that the error affected his substantial rights or undermined the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Zangari" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to several counts of mail and wire fraud, was convicted by a jury of violations of federal campaign finance law, and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Defendant appealed the resulting judgment of conviction on various grounds, including that the loss calculated for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines improperly included promised returns on defendant's victims' investments. The court affirmed the district court in all respects, and held that (1) defendant waived any statute of limitations challenge to the indictment by pleading guilty; (2) the district court's admission of the Ponzi scheme evidence was not plain error; (3) the district court did not err by calculating the intended loss amount under the Guidelines to include the loss of putative profits that victims reinvested in defendant's Ponzi scheme; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion when weighing the factors relevant to defendant's sentence; and (5) under the circumstances of the case, the appointment of a new attorney for sentencing was not required.

Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses relating to her involvement in a fraudulent "high-yield investment program." Before defendant was indicted and before the applicable statute of limitations had run, the district court granted a government application to suspend the statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3292 while the government sought the assistance of the Hungarian government in recovering records relating to transfers of the scheme's proceeds into Hungarian bank accounts. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the indictments should have been dismissed because insufficient evidence supported the district court's order to suspend the running of the statute of limitations. The court held (1) that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the district court's order; (2) that section 3292 did not require that the foreign evidence sought be necessary for an indictment, nor that it be obtainable only through an official request to a foreign government; and (3) that district courts could rely on ex parte proceedings when deciding to issue section 3292 orders. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants appealed from judgments following a jury trial that resulted in their convictions for racketeering and related offenses. Defendants all contended, inter alia, that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relatedness and continuity factors required to establish a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). The court concluded that the district court's RICO instruction was legally erroneous and this error was prejudicial with regard to Chris Cain. With regard to the racketeering convictions of David Cain, Jr. and Jamie Soha, however, applying a plain error standard of review, the court concluded that it was not reasonably likely that a properly instructed jury would have failed to find a pattern of racketeering. Accordingly, the court reversed the RICO convictions with regard to Chris Cain only and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions in all other respects.

Defendants, four executives of Gen Re and one of AIG, appealed from convictions of conspiracy, mail fraud, securities fraud, and making false statements to the SEC. The charges arose from an allegedly fraudulent reinsurance transaction between AIG and Gen Re that was intended to cure AIG's ailing stock price. Defendants appealed on a variety of grounds, some in common and others specific to each defendant, ranging from evidentiary challenges to serious allegations of widespread prosecutorial misconduct. The court held that most of the arguments were without merit, but defendants' convictions were vacated because the district court abused its discretion by admitting the stock-price data.

Defendant, former Majority Leader of the New York State Senate, appealed his conviction for honest services mail fraud, arising from defendant's failure to disclose conflicts of interest related to his receipt of substantial payments from individuals seeking to do business with the State. While defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Skilling, and held that 18 U.S.C. 346, the honest services statute, criminalized only fraudulent schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks and did not criminalize mere failures to disclose conflicts of interest. At issue was whether defendant could be retried under the standard announced in Skilling on certain counts. Although the court held that Skilling required the court to vacate the convictions on Counts Four and Eight, because the court's review of the record convinced it that the government adduced sufficient evidence under the Skilling standard, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on those two counts. The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial on Count Three because, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude a retrial on a charge that resulted in a hung jury. Accordingly, the court vacated the counts of conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of (1) conspiracy to violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations (ITR) and operate an unlicensed money-transmitting business; (2) violating the ITR; (3) operating an unlicensed money-transmitting business; and (4) two counts of making false statements in response to government subpoenas. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in several respects when instructing the jury on the conspiracy, ITR, and money-transmitting counts; defendant was entitled to a new trial on the false statement counts because the government constructively amended the indictment; the government committed misconduct in its rebuttal summation, which he claimed necessitated a new trial on all counts; and defendant should be resentenced because the district court miscalculated the applicable offense level. The court reversed Count One to the extent it alleged a violation of the ITR as an overt act and vacated and remanded to the extent it was based on the money-transmission violation as an overt act; reversed Count Two; vacated and remanded Count Three; and affirmed Counts Four and Five.

Defendant appealed his conviction for visa fraud and conspiracy to commit visa fraud, as well as his sentence. Defendant had requested specific jury instructions with respect to the government's burden of proof regarding his knowledge of the fraud for which he was indicted. The district court denied these requests and instead gave a general instruction on acting "knowingly." Defendant challenged those denials as well as the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. The court found these challenges meritless. In calculating defendant's Guidelines sentencing range, the district court relied on four enhancements, three of which defendant challenged on appeal. Though the basis of the district court's application of the leader/organizer enhancement could have been more fully elaborated, the court found that the record supported its application here. Regarding the obstruction-of-justice and number-of-document enhancements, however, the court agreed with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their use in this case. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence. Defendant also challenged the order of restitution imposed by the district court under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A. Because the court found the record evidence insufficiently specific to demonstrate that each client to whom the court ordered restitution was a "victim" of the fraud, the court vacated the restitution order. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for resentencing, including reconsideration of the restitution award.