Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner left India because he feared being harmed by members of a rival political party.The court concluded that the agency properly determined that petitioner could safely relocate within India to avoid the possibility of future persecution or torture and that it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. The court explained that petitioner cannot challenge the agency's determination by relying on general country conditions evidence without showing how the evidence demonstrates that a person in his particular circumstances would be subject to persecution or torture. In this case, petitioner's allegation that he was mistreated by members of a political party that is aligned with a party in power nationally does not undermine the agency's conclusion that he can safely relocate within the country. View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendants in these tandem cases (collectively, "Takeda") are a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer and related entities that began producing and marketing the Type-2 diabetes drug ACTOS in 1999. Purchasers of ACTOS filed suit against Takeda for improperly describing its patents to the FDA, in effect extending the duration of its patent protection over ACTOS and delaying generic competition. The district court denied Takeda's motion to dismiss, concluding that the alleged patent descriptions were incorrect under the Hatch–Waxman Act and pertinent regulations.On this interlocutory appeal, the Second Circuit held that under the "Listing Requirement" of 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1), a combination patent does not "claim" any of its component drug substances past their individual patent expiration dates. The court also held that the purchasers were not required to allege that Takeda's interpretation of the Listing Requirement was unreasonable in order to plead a monopolization claim under the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Takeda's motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings. View "United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that he suffered dental injuries during several appointments while incarcerated by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at Federal Correctional Institution Danbury. Plaintiff initially filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which sua sponte transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. That court dismissed the action for insufficient service of process because plaintiff failed to include a certificate stating that after a reasonable inquiry a good faith belief exists that there had been negligence, as required by Connecticut General Statutes 52-190a.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the action for insufficient service of process, concluding that Connecticut General Statutes 52-190a a is a procedural rather than substantive rule and is therefore inapplicable in civil actions in federal court. The court explained that there is no reason to overturn the transfer order. To the extent that plaintiff seeks to have this case transferred back to the Southern District of New York based on his current residence and potential witnesses located in New York, the court stated that he must move for such a transfer in the district court. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Corley v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by a certified class of individuals with disabilities, together with six disability-rights organizations, alleging that the failure to adequately maintain subway-station elevators violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).As a preliminary matter, the court rejected the MTA's argument that this case is nonjusticiable, and the MTA's argument that the court must consider the accessibility of the transit system as a single unit that includes subways, buses and paratransit. The court concluded that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether frequent and inconvenient elevator outages deprive at least some passengers with disabilities of adequate access to the subway. However, the court explained that summary judgment would nonetheless be proper if it can be determined as a matter of law that reasonable accommodations are provided during those outages. Because the district court did not reach the issue of reasonable accommodations and did not sufficiently consider the NYCHRL claim, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Brooklyn Center for Independence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

In tandem appeals, Plaintiffs Smalls and Daniel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendants deprived them of their rights to a fair trial by fabricating evidence against them. Daniel also asserted other claims under section 1983 and claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to some of his section 1983 claims. The district courts ultimately granted defendants' motions, concluding that Smalls and Daniel could not establish favorable terminations within the meaning of McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019).The Second Circuit concluded that the district courts erred in dismissing Smalls and Daniels' section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims and entering judgment for defendants. The court explained that McDonough's accrual rule does not import malicious prosecution's favorable-termination requirement onto section 1983 fair-trial claims; where the plaintiff asserts a section 1983 fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence, all that is required is that the underlying criminal proceeding be terminated in such a manner that the lawsuit does not impugn an ongoing prosecution or outstanding conviction; and this requirement may be satisfied where a criminal conviction has been invalidated or a criminal prosecution has been terminated in the criminal defendant's favor because, in such circumstances, there is no risk that a section 1983 plaintiff's claim will impugn an existing conviction or the basis for an ongoing prosecution. In this case, Smalls and Daniel's criminal proceedings terminated in their favor. Finally, the court also concluded that Daniel's section 1981 claims were properly dismissed, and Daniel's equitable tolling motion was properly denied. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to the fair-trial claims, affirmed the dismissal of Daniel's other claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Smalls v. Collins" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy litigation trustee appeals the district court's orders dismissing claims arising out of the leveraged buyout of the Tribune Company in 2007 and its bankruptcy filing in 2008. The trustee contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims against the Tribune Company's shareholders and financial advisors for fraudulent transfer, breach of fiduciary duty, and related causes of action. The trustee also contends that the district court erred in denying leave to amend his complaint.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the intentional fraudulent conveyance claims against the shareholders based on the buy-back of their shares; affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary claims against the allegedly controlling shareholders; affirmed the district court's dismissal of the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and professional malpractice claims against the Financial Advisors; affirmed the district court's dismissal of the actual fraudulent conveyance claims as to Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch, but vacated as to VRC; affirmed the district court's dismissal of the constructive fraudulent conveyance claims as to Morgan Stanley and VRC, but vacated as to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch; affirmed the district court's denial of the trustee's motion for leave to amend to amplify his intentional fraudulent conveyance claim against the shareholders and to add a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim against the shareholders; and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition challenging the denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture following a determination by an IJ that he was not credible. The IJ concluded that petitioner was attempting to bolster his application through false testimony and determined that petitioner was not credible.The court explained that, while a factual omission is ordinarily less probative of credibility than an inconsistency, the omission here concerned material information that petitioner would be expected to have divulged earlier in the process. In this case, petitioner's inclusion on a blacklist was the difference between him being the victim of a discrete instance of harassment at the hands of local police on the one hand and the target of a coordinated campaign by national officials to persecute petitioner because of his religion on the other. Therefore, how petitioner knew that he was on that list, then, was critical to his application. Because petitioner failed to raise these facts earlier, and given petitioner's father also omitted this information from his letter, the court concluded that there was substantial evidence supporting the agency's adverse credibility determination. View "Jian Liang v. Garland" on Justia Law

Racer, which was created and funded to clean up polluted locations connected to the former General Motors Corporation during that company's bankruptcy, appealed the district court's dismissal of their federal claims for violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and related state law claims. Racer alleges cost and recovery and contribution claims under CERCLA sections 107 and 113 against dozens of defendants, which RACER alleges contributed to pollution at one of the New York sites it has been tasked with cleaning up.The Second Circuit concluded that the district court was correct to require RACER Trust to substitute its trustee as plaintiff, because the trust lacks capacity to sue. On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in dismissing RACER's complaint at this early stage. In this case, RACER's section 107 claim is ripe because it is based on costs RACER has already incurred for which it may not receive repayment through the EPA investigation, and because further delay in adjudicating the claim would cause RACER hardship. Furthermore, the district court erred in dismissing RACER's section 113 claim where, to the extent that the district court concluded that it too was prudentially unripe, the court disagreed for the same reasons that apply to the section 107 claim. To the extent the district court's dismissal rested on other grounds, the court concluded that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasoning and the court remanded for further analysis.The court declined to address the other issues raised by the parties, which should be addressed by the district court in the first instance. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal of RACER's CERCLA claims, and vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal of RACER's state law claims so that the district court may reconsider its ruling. View "Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust v. National Grid USA" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (also referred to as the Islamic Sate of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL)—in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a). Defendant violated conditions of her presentence release by resuming contact with known supporters of ISIS and other extremist groups, attempting to conceal these communications from law enforcement authorities, and then lying to the FBI about her conduct. Defendant also pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice.The Second Circuit vacated defendant's 48 month sentence, concluding that defendant's far-below-Guidelines range is substantively unreasonable. In this case, defendant faced a total Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 to 600 months' imprisonment, and her far-below-Guidelines sentence was outside the bounds of what was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. The court explained that the district court assigned defendant's need for rehabilitation from years of trauma and abuse overwhelming weight while failing to give adequate consideration to the competing goals of sentencing—including the need for the sentence to protect the public, deter criminal conduct of the defendant specifically and others generally, promote respect for the law, and reflect the seriousness of the offense committed. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion and the court remanded for resentencing consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

An organization that is not directly regulated or affected by a challenged law or regulation cannot establish injury-in-fact for purposes of organizational standing absent a showing that it suffered an involuntary and material burden on its established core activities.CTPU filed suit alleging that Connecticut's standards regarding the racial composition of its interdistrict magnet schools violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that CTPU has not established an injury-in-fact for purposes of demonstrating organizational standing. In this case, CTPU is an organization that is not directly regulated or affected by the challenged standards and CTPU has failed to show that it suffered an involuntary, material burden on its core activities. View "Connecticut Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker" on Justia Law