Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Nation and some of its officials filed suit against the Village of Union Springs and certain of its officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) preempts the Village's ordinance regulating gambling as applied to the Nation's operation of a bingo parlor on a parcel of land located within both the Village and the Nation's federal reservation, and for corresponding injunctive relief.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Nation, agreeing with the district court that neither issue nor claim preclusion bars this suit and that IGRA preempts contrary Village law because the parcel of land at issue sits on "Indian lands" within the meaning of that Act. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for providing and conspiring to provide material support to Hizballah, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339B (Counts One and Two); receiving and conspiring to receive military-type training from Hizballah, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339D (Counts Three and Four); contributing and conspiring to contribute services to Hizballah, in violation of 50 U.S.C. 1705(a) (Counts Six and Seven); and unlawful procurement of citizenship or naturalization to facilitate an act of terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a) (Count Eight).The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress confessions he made during a series of interviews with the FBI; in denying his motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2017 interviews because his right to counsel had not yet attached; and in declining to provide defendant's requested jury instructions. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where the government presented evidence that corroborated defendant's statements to the FBI agents, including data on his laptop, his internet search history, and his travel history. Finally, the court held that defendant's 480 month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. View "United States v. Kourani" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for assaulting a federal officer stemming from a violent altercation with a United States Border Patrol Agent. Defendant argued that the district court erred by providing a written response to a jury note without affording the parties an opportunity to offer input on the response, and by orally instructing the jury to continue deliberations without sufficient cautions and guidance. The court concluded that the district court erred in both respects but that neither error rose to the level of plain error.In regard to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that the crime of assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1) and (b) is a general intent crime, and therefore counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to offer evidence showing a lack of specific intent. Nevertheless, the court concluded that further fact-finding is necessary and that the district court must conduct a hearing regarding certain decisions of defendant's counsel, including the decision not to offer expert testimony regarding her mental health condition with respect to an insanity defense. Accordingly, the court remanded the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "United States v. Melhuish" on Justia Law

After the County formally revoked plaintiff's pistol license and prohibited him from possessing any firearms following the dismissal of a Family Court matter and temporary order of protection that was dissolved, he filed suit against the County alleging the violation of his Second Amendment rights. The district court applied intermediate scrutiny and held that plaintiff failed to state a Second Amendment claim.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleges that the County did not have substantial evidence that plaintiff is a danger to the safety of others. The court explained that because these allegations, accepted as true, would mean that the County's actions were not substantially related to its interests in public safety and crime prevention, the complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim under intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's other claims. View "Henry v. Nassau County" on Justia Law

In No. 20-1762, the Second Circuit denied the government's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal from the district court's denial of his motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to correct errors in his judgment of conviction (First Order). The court concluded that because the district court entered the Second Order while defendant's appeal challenging the First Order was pending, the district court lacked authority to enter the Second Order.In Nos. 20-3286 and 20-3276, which have been consolidated with No. 20-1762, defendant appeals from the Second Order (No. 20-3286) and appeals from an order denying his motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act (No. 20-3276). Because the Second Order indicates the district court's desire to correct the judgment of conviction, in Nos. 20-1762 and 20-3286 the court vacated the First Order and the Second Order, respectively; and remanded to the district court, restoring its authority to enter whatever amended judgment it finds appropriate to correct the operative judgment's clerical errors.The court directed the Clerk of Court to unconsolidate No. 20-3276, which challenges the denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release, and to recalendar that appeal for a merits panel or a motions panel, as appropriate, for resolution in the ordinary course, and to consider consolidating No. 20-3276 with a new First Step Act appeal filed by defendant, No. 21-1277. View "United States v. Jacques" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his firm appeal from the district court's opinion and order sanctioning them for their conduct during their representation of a client in his copyright case against Bandshell Artist Management. The district court found that plaintiff repeatedly violated court orders, lied under oath to the district court, and brought and maintained this case in bad faith. The district court cited its authority under 28 U.S.C. 1927, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, and its inherent power, and imposed monetary sanctions in attorney's fees, additional monetary sanctions, and nonmonetary sanctions that, inter alia, imposed nationwide requirements on cases filed by plaintiff and his firm.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court's sanctions on plaintiff and his law firm, while strict, were not an abuse of discretion. In this case, the district court's factual findings – including the findings of bad faith – were adequately supported by the evidence in the record and by the district court's judgments of witness credibility. The court explained that, given plaintiff's serious and repeated misconduct, he and his firm merited sanctions reserved for attorneys and litigants who demonstrate via their actions that unusual measures are required to deter future misbehavior, protect other litigants, and maintain the integrity of the judicial system. View "Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Management" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated by his former employer for violating company policies prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace, he filed suit alleging that the stated basis for his termination was pretext and that the real reason he was fired was age discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).Although on a Rule 12(c) motion the district court should not have weighed the plausibility of competing allegations in the movant's pleading or considered evidence extrinsic to the non-movant's pleading, the court affirmed the district court's judgment because plaintiff's complaint failed to plead that either his age or protected speech was a but-for cause of his termination. Likewise, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails for similar reasons. View "Lively v. WAFRA Investment Advisory Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs DDK Hotels, DDK Hospitality, and DDK Management filed suit against Defendants Williams-Sonoma and West Elm, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. West Elm then brought an action in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking to dissolve the joint venture, which the Delaware court dismissed. Plaintiffs then filed a supplemental complaint in the district court to assert an additional claim for breach of the prevailing party provisions of Section 21(h) of the joint venture agreement. Defendants then moved to compel arbitration for that claim, which the district court denied.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration, concluding that the joint venture agreement does not "clearly and unmistakably" delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator and that the district court therefore correctly ruled on the scope of the arbitration agreement. Finally, the court rejected DDK Hospitality's request for prevailing party fees and noted that DDK Hospitality may pursue its request for fees on remand. View "DDK Hotels, LLC v. Williams-Sonoma, Inc." on Justia Law

In this SEC enforcement action, defendant appealed the district court's judgment entered after a jury found that he recommended an unsuitable trading strategy and made unauthorized trades in customer accounts.The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that 28 U.S.C. 2462, which imposes a five-year statute of limitations on SEC enforcement actions for civil penalties, is not jurisdictional and may be tolled by the parties. The court also concluded that the SEC's suitability claim and the civil penalties imposed in this case were proper and that the other challenges on appeal are without merit. The court modified the judgment to correct one error in the amount of disgorgement. View "SEC v. Fowler" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated its previous opinion and filed an amended opinion in its place.Plaintiff and Church United filed suit against Vimeo, alleging that the company discriminated against them by deleting Church United’s account from its online video hosting platform. Plaintiffs claimed that Vimeo discriminated against them based on sexual orientation and religion under federal and state law. The district court concluded that Vimeo deleted Church United's account because of its violation of one of Vimeo's published content policies barring the promotion of sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) on its platform.The court agreed with the district court that Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act protects Vimeo from this suit and that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for relief. In this case, plaintiffs argue that Vimeo demonstrated bad faith by discriminating against them based on their religion and sexual orientation, which they term "former" homosexuality; deleting Church United's entire account, as opposed to only the videos at issue; and permitting other videos with titles referring to homosexuality to remain on the website. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs' conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a plausible inference of bad faith sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court explained that Vimeo removed plaintiffs' account for expressing pro-SOCE views which it in good faith considers objectionable, and plaintiffs, while implicitly acknowledging that their content violated Vimeo's Terms of Service, nevertheless ignored Vimeo's notice of violation, resulting in Vimeo deleting their account.Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim under either the New York Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act or the California Unruh Act. Because plaintiffs make no allegation suggesting that Vimeo removed their content for any reason other than this violation of the Terms of Service, plaintiffs' allegations lack the substance required to support an inference of discriminatory intent. View "Domen v. Vimeo, Inc." on Justia Law