Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff suffered post-operative injuries following implantation of artificial lenses during cataract surgery, she and her husband filed suit against Bausch & Lomb, the manufacturer of the lenses, as well as related entities. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss the negligence and failure-to-warn claims and denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim based on wrongful marketing.The Second Circuit reserved decision and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Connecticut: 1) Whether a cause of action exists under the negligence or failure-to-warn provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572h, 52-572q, or elsewhere in Connecticut law, based on a manufacturer's alleged failure to report adverse events to a regulator like the FDA following approval of the device, or to comply with a regulator's post-approval requirements. 2) Whether the Connecticut Product Liability Act's exclusivity provision, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572n, bars a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110a, et seq., based on allegations that a manufacturer deceptively and aggressively marketed and promoted a product despite knowing that it presented a substantial risk of injury. View "Glover v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of the government's motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on plaintiff's claims that the cadet separation procedures of the United States Military Academy at West Point fail to provide due process and that plaintiff's separation proceedings violated West Point's own regulations in a manner that substantially prejudiced him.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that West Point's cadet separation procedures satisfy due process and that the intra military immunity doctrine, which bars judicial interference in discretionary military personnel decisions, renders plaintiff's regulatory claims nonjusticiable. The court explained that plaintiff was not substantially prejudiced by any purported regulatory deviation and the court may not circumvent the doctrine to engage in a fact-specific inquiry as to whether military personnel properly applied the military's own evidentiary standard. View "Doolen v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants' Khalupsky and Korchevsky convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and computer intrusions, securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their use of information from stolen, pre-publication press releases to execute advantageous securities trades. Defendants used intermediaries to pay hackers for the stolen press releases.The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish Korchevsky's conspiracy with Khalupsky, as well as sufficient evidence to support the securities fraud convictions; venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York for the securities fraud counts where it was foreseeable that defendants' actions constituting securities fraud would take place there; there was no constructive amendment or prejudicial variance of the superseding indictment; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to a jury request during deliberations. The court also concluded that there is no merit to defendants' challenge to the district court's decision to charge the jury that conscious avoidance can satisfy the knowledge requirement. Nor is there merit to their claim challenging the particular instruction given. View "United States v. Korchevsky" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of marijuana conspiracy but acquitted of cocaine and cocaine base conspiracy and a related firearms charge. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the charge of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). After a second jury trial, defendant was convicted of the RICO conspiracy count and sentenced by the district court principally to 360 months' imprisonment for both the marijuana conspiracy and RICO conspiracy counts of conviction.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court's decision to admit evidence of defendant's involvement in cocaine or cocaine base trafficking during his retrial on the RICO conspiracy charge did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court also concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to disqualify his codefendant's counsel and instead severe defendant's trial. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and concluded that they lacked merit. View "United States v. Hicks" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for multiple drug- and gun-related counts, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions. The court rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary errors. However, the court vacated Defendant Willis's sentence because the district court clearly erred in its factfinding regarding jointly undertaken criminal activity and failed to rule whether his sentence would run concurrently to an undischarged state sentence. The court remanded for resentencing and clarification. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the discharge order was ambiguous as to whether plaintiff's private educational loans were discharged. The lender maintains that 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) prevented the loans from being discharged in plaintiff's bankruptcy.The Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of the lender's motion to dismiss after concluding that section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii)—which excepts from discharge "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend"—does not cover private student loans. View "Homaidan v. Sallie Mae, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for multiple bribery charges and obstruction of justice. Defendant was a self-styled Brooklyn "liaison" to the NYPD, selling preferred outcomes to encounters with law enforcement.The court rejected defendant's contentions that: (1) evidence collected from his electronic devices should have been suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the district court prejudiced him by correcting a misstatement of law made by co-defendant Grant’s attorney; (3) evidence of uncharged conduct should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial; (4) the government disclosed certain documents in an untimely fashion, prejudicing his defense; (5) the temporary admission of a phone call (GX-300A) against his co-defendant generated spillover prejudice against him; (6) the admission of his non-testifying co-defendant’s statements against that co-defendant violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights; (7) the district court abused its discretion in excluding two proposed expert witnesses for the defense; (8) the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing to investigate his attorney's potential conflict of interest; (9) the jury was wrongly instructed on the relevant law; and (10) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The court concluded that all of defendant's arguments are without merit. View "United States v. Reichberg" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's July 8, 2020 Order granting an application for discovery assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 and the August 25, 2020 Order denying reconsideration of the same. The Fund, a Russian corporation, sought assistance from the district court to order discovery from AlixPartners for use in an arbitration proceeding brought by the Fund against Lithuania before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty between Lithuania and Russia.The court concluded that an arbitration between a foreign state and an investor, which takes place before an arbitral panel established pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty to which the foreign State is a party, constitutes a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" under 28 U.S.C. 1782; the Fund, as a party to the arbitration for which it seeks discovery assistance, is an "interested person" who may seek discovery assistance for such an arbitration under section 1782; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Intel factors weigh in favor of granting the Fund's discovery application under section 1782. View "The Application of the Fund v. AlixPartners" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant was sentenced to 360 months in prison based on his conviction on charges including conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, more than 50 grams of cocaine base.The court concluded that district courts are not required to consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court found unpersuasive the reasoning of sister circuits that have adopted a differing view. The court explained that relief under the First Step Act is discretionary and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce defendant's terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The court rejected defendant's assertion that the emphasis on his career-offender status, combined with the boilerplate language on Form AO 247 (referencing factors irrelevant to First Step Act motions), reflects that the district court misapprehended its authority to grant a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Rather, the court concluded that the district court did not misconstrue eligibility as depending on career-offender status; the form is titled "Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant To First Step Act And 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2);" and, although the form contains boilerplate that is irrelevant to defendant, the written decision makes clear that the district court used the proper framework. View "United States v. Moyhernandez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in defendant's appeal from the district court's final order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Because a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel on a compassionate release motion or an appeal from the denial of such a motion, the court held that an attorney seeking to be relieved before it in that context need not file a motion and brief that comply with the requirements of Anders. Instead, counsel's motion to be relieved must adhere to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27.1 by stating with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief requested, and the legal argument supporting that request, as well as attaching an affidavit indicating that counsel has advised the defendant of the process for obtaining court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Counsel in this case complied with the requirements of Rule 27. The court also denied the government's motion for summary affirmance of the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law