Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of bank fraud, making false statements in support of a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. Defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to grant her motion for an acquittal based on her failure to complete the passport application paperwork and swear an oath affirming to its veracity.The court agreed with the district court's determination that submitting a fraudulent passport application, even when unsigned and without swearing the required oath, satisfies the elements of 18 U.S.C. 1542. The court explained that defendant's argument that an oath and signature on the passport application form are required to establish criminal liability is not supported by the statute and regulations defining a passport application. Furthermore, the statute and regulations define a passport application as the submitted application form and supporting documents. Because submission occurs when a person provides a federal official with an application form and any supporting materials for review, and defendant acknowledged submission of a falsified application form to a passport officer, the district court did not err by failing to grant defendant's motion for acquittal. View "United States v. Gu" on Justia Law

Defendant is a French banker who is charged with transmitting false, misleading, and knowingly inaccurate commodities reports, and with conspiracy to do the same, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and denial of her motions to dismiss the indictment.The Second Circuit concluded that it has jurisdiction to review the disentitlement ruling, but none to review the merits of extraterritoriality or due process. The court concluded that defendant is not a fugitive and, even if she were a fugitive, the district court abused its discretion in disentitling her. In this case, given her innocent residence as a foreign citizen abroad, given the nature of the charged offense and her remoteness from the alleged harm that it caused, given her line of work, and given her nonfrivolous challenge to the extraterritoriality of the criminal statute, the exercise of discretion to disentitle her was an abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed the order disentitling defendant and remanded for further proceedings to consider or reconsider the merits of her motions to dismiss. The court dismissed this appeal insofar as it seeks review of the (alternative) rulings on extraterritoriality and due process. View "United States v. Bescond" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff in a quiet title action regarding a property subject to a mortgage held by the bank. The district court, relying on a statement in Milone v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 164 A.D.3d 145 (2d Dep't 2018), held that U.S. Bank's purported de-acceleration was motivated only by a desire to avoid the expiration of the limitations period and was therefore insufficient to de-accelerate. While this appeal was pending, the New York Court of Appeals, in Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d 1 (2021), abrogated the proposition of Milone on which the district court relied. Therefore, this intervening decision undermined the reasoning of the district court. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "53rd Street, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that defendant's multi-object conspiracy conviction, with a crack cocaine object that included a drug-quantity element triggering the statutory penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), qualifies as a "covered offense" eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. Therefore, defendant's 254-month sentence on his multi-object conspiracy conviction is eligible for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.The court clarified that the administrative exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional limitation on a court's power to consider an inmate's motion for compassionate release. Rather, section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited by the government. In this case, the government withdrew any defense based on defendant's prior failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court remanded for the district court to consider his motion on the merits. View "United States v. Saladino" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of a gang known as MBG, was convicted after a jury trial of a racketeering conspiracy, committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering (VICAR) – namely, a shooting of rival gang members, and using a firearm in furtherance of the racketeering conspiracy and the VICAR offense. The district court granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the VICAR and firearm counts on sufficiency of the evidence grounds and denied it as to the racketeering conspiracy count. Both the government and defendant appealed.The Second Circuit treated defendant's notice of appeal as an appeal from the judgment of conviction on the racketeering conspiracy count. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict in its entirety and that the district court erred to the extent that it granted defendant's motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed so much of the district court's order as denied defendant's motion as to the racketeering conspiracy count, reversed so much of it as granted that motion, and vacated the judgment below with instructions to the district court to reinstate the jury verdict finding defendant guilty on the VICAR and firearm counts and to resentence defendant. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated and reversed the bankruptcy court's order imposing punitive sanctions in three chapter 13 cases. In this case, PHH sent monthly mortgage statements listing fees totaling $716 that had not been properly disclosed in the three cases. PHH was sanctioned $75,000 for violation of Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 3002.1 and $225,000 for violation of bankruptcy court orders.The court agreed with PHH that Rule 3002.1 does not authorize punitive monetary sanctions, and that PHH did not violate the court orders as a matter of law. The court explained that a broad authorization of punitive sanctions is a poor fit with Rule 3002.1's tailored enforcement mechanism and limited purpose. Therefore, punitive sanctions do not fall within the "appropriate relief" authorized by Rule 3002.1. View "In re: Gravel" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants GDB, Stavis, and Kartagener, remanding for further proceedings. This appeal arose from breach of contract and quasi-contract claims brought by plaintiff stemming from defendants' legal representation of plaintiff.The court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim because, under New York law, plaintiff can maintain a breach-of-contract claim without any showing that the $100,000 belonged to him. Although plaintiff's quasi-contract claims against Defendant Stavis and GDB do require a showing that he owned the money, the court further concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to those defendants on those claims because there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that the money indeed belonged to defendant. Finally, the court held that summary judgment for Stavis in his individual capacity was also inappropriate. View "Moreno-Godoy v. Kartagener" on Justia Law

Utica Insurance issued primary and umbrella coverage in 1973 and 1974 and subsequently paid asbestos losses incurred by the manufacturer (Goulds). Utica had ceded parts of its risk to the reinsurers, Munich and Century, in exchange for a share of the premiums, via facultative certificates, i.e., a reinsurance contract particular to that policy. Munich and Century each paid Utica $5 million for their undisputed one-fifth shares of the umbrella policy; but they refused to pay defense costs in addition to limits when Utica billed them an extra $2,760,534 each. Utica sued; in two suits before different judges of the same court, with inconsistent results.On the issue of whether the reinsurers (Munich and Century) were obligated to reimburse Utica for defense costs in addition to policy limits, the Second Circuit held that the 1973 certificates reinsure defense costs within limits, not in addition. A 2007 settlement agreement with Goulds did not independently require Century or Munich to pay defense costs in addition to limits. View "Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Munich Reinsurance America, Inc." on Justia Law

Perez was born in rural Mexico in 1989 and entered the U.S. without authorization at age 13. He has two children, who were born in the U.S., whom he visits and helps support financially. In July 2016, Perez was attending a barbeque when a violent fight broke out. Several young men wielding bats and machetes were attacking a member of a rival gang. Perez borrowed a firearm from an acquaintance and fired several shots into the air. Hearing the gunshots, the young men scattered, and Perez returned to the barbeque and returned the gun to his acquaintance. Days later, the NYPD obtained a video recording of the incident, identified Perez, and identified the firearm.Perez was charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition while being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). Perez unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that section 922(g)(5) on its face violated the Second Amendment by erecting a categorical bar on the possession of firearms by illegal or unlawful aliens. The Second Circuit affirmed. Assuming without deciding that, even as an undocumented alien, Perez is entitled to Second Amendment protection, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5), as applied to Perez, withstands intermediate scrutiny. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law