Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McCray pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and one of two counts of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 10 grams or more of butyryl fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).The Second Circuit affirmed. A substance can be an “analogue” of fentanyl for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) even if it is not a “controlled substance analogue” under 21 U.S.C. 802(32). Section 841(b)(1)(B)(vi) provides fair notice that dealing in 10 grams or more of a substance that is an “analogue” of fentanyl under the ordinary meaning of the word, even if that substance is not a “controlled substance analogue,” is subject to the subsection’s enhanced penalty. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that an earlier sale was relevant to McCray’s offense conduct or in finding that the victim’s death resulted from the sale. The court did not abuse its discretion when departing upwards from the Guidelines range by 30 months based on the weight of the evidence that McCray sold the fentanyl that killed the victim. The district court appropriately applied the preponderance of the evidence standard when making factual findings at sentencing. View "United States v. McCray" on Justia Law

Bellin brought a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that managed long-term care plans (MLTCs) that contract with New York State violate Medicaid beneficiaries’ due process rights by denying them the right to appeal an MLTC’s initial determination of the personal care services hours the MLTC will provide the beneficiary if they choose to enroll with the MLTC. Bellin also alleged that beneficiaries are entitled to this appeal right, and to notice of the right, under federal statutory and constitutional law. Bellin brought her claims against ElderServe, an MLTC that she alleges denied her these rights, and Zucker, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, for his alleged failure to enforce these asserted rights.The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Bellin’s federal law claims on the grounds that the relevant federal statutes do not provide Medicaid beneficiaries a right to appeal initial personal care services hours determinations. The court vacated the dismissal of Bellin’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; Bellin plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected property interest in the determination of her personal care services hours. View "Bellin v. Zucker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and their family members were injured or killed in attacks carried out by Hamas, which the United States has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. They sued BLOM Bank for aiding and abetting Hamas’s attacks by providing financial services to customers affiliated with Hamas, in violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), section 2333(d)(2). The district court dismissed. concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege BLOM aided and abetted Hamas’s attacks in violation of JASTA.The Second Circuit affirmed. While the district court applied the wrong standard for JASTA aiding-and-abetting liability, the complaint fails to state a claim under the correct standard. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the party whom BLOM aided (indirectly), Hamas, committed attacks causing the Plaintiffs’ injuries but their allegations did not support an inference that BLOM was aware of the customers’ ties with Hamas before the relevant attacks. The complaint’s references to media articles and publications on the connection to Hamas were insufficient. View "Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL" on Justia Law

Rosario pled guilty to three offenses stemming from his sexual exploitation of a minor. As part of Rosario’s sentence, the district court ordered Rosario to pay a $5,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, 18 U.S.C. 3014(a), which requires courts tp impose the assessment on all “non-indigent” persons convicted of specified offenses.The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rosario’s argument that the district court erred by considering his future earning capacity in finding him to be “non-indigent.” The court had considered Rosario’s health, outstanding debts and current assets, employment while incarcerated, “extensive prior work history,” and “transferable skills” in “basic plumbing, painting, flooring, and tile work” while noting “that [Rosario’s] felony convictions and sex-offender status will likely have an adverse effect on his employability.” The ordinary meaning of “indigent” encompasses not only a lack of present resources but also includes a forward-looking assessment of the defendant’s “means” or ability to pay. This understanding is reinforced by the statutory scheme, which provides defendants 20 years after their release to make payment. It is also consistent with precedent and the view of all six other circuits that have addressed the issue. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

Joseph Wilson, the sole owner and beneficiary of a foreign trust, filed his returns for tax year 2007 late, the IRS assessed a 35% penalty that applies to beneficiaries of foreign trusts, and Wilson paid the penalty. After his death, plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of Wilson's estate for a refund, arguing that the IRS should have imposed only a 5% penalty that applies to owners of foreign trusts. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that when an individual is both the sole owner and beneficiary of a foreign trust and fails to timely report distributions she received from the trust, the government has the authority under the Internal Revenue Code to impose a 35% penalty. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court denied motions for leave to file a supplemental appendix that includes documents outside the record on appeal and for leave to file a sur-reply brief as moot. View "Wilson v. United States" on Justia Law

Anonymous plaintiffs filed a putative class action against The Trump Corporation, Donald J. Trump, and various members of his family, asserting claims for racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), conspiracy to conduct the affairs of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), dissemination of untrue and misleading public statements in violation of California law, unfair competition in violation of California law, unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of Maryland and Pennsylvania law, common-law fraud, and common-law negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs contend that defendants fraudulently induced them to enter into business relationships with non-party appellant, ACN, by making a series of deceptive and misleading statements. The district court denied both defendants and ACN's motions to compel arbitration.The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that (1) defendants may not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their dispute on equitable estoppel grounds; and (2) the district court may not compel arbitration as to ACN's discovery dispute because the court lacked an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties' dispute. The court considered defendants and ACN's remaining arguments on appeal and concluded that they are without merit. View "Doe v. The Trump Corporation" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, based on adverse credibility grounds. In this case, petitioner sought relief from political persecution in his home country.The court concluded that the IJ and the BIA erred in treating three of the four instances of perceived inconsistencies as casting doubt on petitioner's credibility. The court explained that they did not involve inconsistency, at least not of the sort that can reasonably support doubt about the speaker's credibility. Although the fourth instance, unlike the first three, did indeed involve inconsistency, the court concluded that the inconsistency related to a trivial detail. Therefore, this trivial inconsistency by itself, without more, could not reasonably justify finding that petitioner is not credible. View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

Connecticut Governor Ned Lamont and the state's Commissioner of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection James Rovella appeal from the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction ordering that the Governor repeal, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, a provision to suspend collection of fingerprints in connection with applications for authorization to obtain firearms. The injunction also ordered that the Governor repeal that provision of the executive order and that the DESPP Commissioner resume fingerprinting services at that agency.The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and concluded that: (1) with respect to the individual plaintiffs, the preliminary injunction motion became moot in the district court; and (2) CCDL lacked organizational standing. Because the motion was moot and CCDL lacked standing, the district court had no jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction. View "Connecticut Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont" on Justia Law

The Nation and some of its officials filed suit against the Village of Union Springs and certain of its officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) preempts the Village's ordinance regulating gambling as applied to the Nation's operation of a bingo parlor on a parcel of land located within both the Village and the Nation's federal reservation, and for corresponding injunctive relief.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Nation, agreeing with the district court that neither issue nor claim preclusion bars this suit and that IGRA preempts contrary Village law because the parcel of land at issue sits on "Indian lands" within the meaning of that Act. View "Cayuga Nation v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for providing and conspiring to provide material support to Hizballah, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339B (Counts One and Two); receiving and conspiring to receive military-type training from Hizballah, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339D (Counts Three and Four); contributing and conspiring to contribute services to Hizballah, in violation of 50 U.S.C. 1705(a) (Counts Six and Seven); and unlawful procurement of citizenship or naturalization to facilitate an act of terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1425(a) (Count Eight).The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress confessions he made during a series of interviews with the FBI; in denying his motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2017 interviews because his right to counsel had not yet attached; and in declining to provide defendant's requested jury instructions. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction where the government presented evidence that corroborated defendant's statements to the FBI agents, including data on his laptop, his internet search history, and his travel history. Finally, the court held that defendant's 480 month sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. View "United States v. Kourani" on Justia Law