Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 20-year term of supervised release imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to child pornography charges. The court found no procedural error in the district court's failure to separately explain the basis for the term of supervised release after discussing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in imposing a term of imprisonment. The court explained that nothing in section 3553(c) or its caselaw requires a district court to undertake a separate recitation of the basis for each part of the sentence imposed. Where, as here, the district court explains the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment, the court concluded that it need not repeat the process in imposing a term of supervised release. The court also concluded that defendant's term of supervised release was substantively reasonable in light of the obvious ongoing risk defendant poses to children. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to threatening a federal official and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant's charges stemmed from calls he made to the office of Congresswoman Ilhan Omar in which he made threatening statements. Defendant was sentenced to a year and a day in prison and three years of supervised release, as well as a special condition which required defendant to participate in a program known as the Partners in Restorative Initiatives.The Second Circuit vacated the special condition, concluding that it is too vague and impermissibly delegates authority to the probation officer. The court explained that the condition is vague because it would leave a reasonable person guessing as to what the requirements of the Program might be and it fails to put defendant on notice as to what conduct could trigger a charge of violating the condition. Furthermore, the Program has not been approved by the United States Probation Office. The court further explained that the Program is sufficiently ill-defined so that, in supervising defendant, the Probation Office would need to fill in too many blanks. View "United States v. Carlineo" on Justia Law

Debtors appealed the bankruptcy court's order rejecting their constitutional challenge to quarterly fees imposed during the pendency of their bankruptcy proceeding. Congress passed in 2017 an amendment to the statute setting forth quarterly fees in bankruptcy cases, 28 U.S.C. 1930. The 2017 Amendment increased quarterly fees in judicial districts in which the United States Trustee Program oversees bankruptcy administration (UST Districts). In 2020, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Administration Improvement Act of 2020, which requires that UST Districts and BA Districts, judicial districts in which judicially appointed bankruptcy administrators perform the same function, charge equal fees.The Second Circuit held that the 2017 Amendment is a bankruptcy law subject to the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. The court also held that, under the version of section 1930 in effect prior to the 2020 Act, the 2017 Amendment violated the uniformity requirement. In this case, the court concluded that debtors have standing to bring its constitutional challenge and to seek reimbursement because it filed for bankruptcy in a UST District prior to October 1, 2018; qualified for and paid a fee increase pursuant to the 2017 Amendment due to the size of its disbursements; and paid more than a similarly situated debtor (with the same filing date and disbursement size) would owe in a BA District, where the increased fee schedule had not yet been implemented by the Judicial Conference. The court explained that, prior to the 2020 Act, the 2017 Amendment was unconstitutionally nonuniform on its face because it mandated a fee increase in UST Districts but only permitted a fee increase in BA Districts. Accordingly, the court reversed the bankruptcy court's judgment and directed the bankruptcy court to provide debtors with a refund of the amount of quarterly fees paid in excess of the amount debtors would have paid in a BA District during the same time period. View "In re: Clinton Nurseries" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of one count of attempted child enticement in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that it could not convict him unless the evidence showed that he attempted to transform or overcome the will of his intended victim. Rather, the court held that section 2422(b) imposes no requirement that an individual endeavor to "transform or overcome" the will of his intended victim. Although the court did not undertake to require any specific formulation for jury instructions in section 2422(b) cases, the court repeated its prior observation that the statutory verbs are ones of common usage; in most cases, it will suffice to instruct jurors to apply the plain and ordinary meanings of those words, as the district court instructed the jury to do in this case. View "United States v. Waqar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's judgment granting in part and denying in part his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. The district court granted defendant's motion with respect to his conviction on Count One, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, but denied the motion with respect to his conviction on Count Two, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack cocaine.The Second Circuit concluded that, although defendant has been released from custody, his appeal is not moot. The court explained that if Count Two were a "covered offense" under the First Step Act, defendant would be eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release on that count. Furthermore, there is more than a remote and speculative possibility that the district court on remand would grant such relief, and that possibility is enough to create a live controversy.On the merits, the court concluded that a conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) is not a "covered offense" within the meaning of the First Step Act. Therefore, defendant is ineligible for a reduction in his sentence on Count Two under the First Step Act. The court rejected defendant's alternative argument, concluding that a court may not alter a sentence imposed on any count of conviction without express statutory authority to do so. Finally, the district court provided no explanation for why it left defendant's term of supervised release on Count One intact despite its decision to reduce his prison sentence on that count to time served. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's term of supervised release on Count One and remanded. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lands' End in a putative class action brought by Gorss Motels under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), seeking compensation for faxes it received advertising the products of Lands' End.As a preliminary matter, although the parties do not raise the issue on appeal, the court concluded that Gorss has standing to proceed under the TCPA. The court concluded that Gorss gave prior express permission to receive the faxes at issue through its franchise agreements with Wyndham, and rejected plaintiff's contention that any permission to send fax advertisements was given to Wyndham and not to Lands' End. Therefore, the court concluded that Gorss agreed to the process that occurred here, in which Wyndham sent Gorss fax advertisements on behalf of a Wyndham approved supplier, Lands' End, advertising products that could be used in franchised motels. View "Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Lands' End, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant with the Binghamton Police Department, filed suit against the City, the City's mayor, and two Department officials, alleging that he was racially harassed by members of the Department and retaliated against for voicing concerns about discrimination.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim because the complaint does not support an inference that he was punished for engaging in protected speech. Although the complaint does not "enumerate" a claim for discrimination alongside the cause of action for retaliation, the court found that plaintiff does identify a discrimination claim. In this case, the introduction of the complaint specifies that plaintiff brings a "claim for discriminatory conduct based on Hispanic origin . . . pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Furthermore, the complaint includes numerous factual allegations sufficient to notify defendants that plaintiffs seeks redress for discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings. View "Quinones v. City of Binghamton" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the Bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that state legislatures may create legally protected interests whose violation supports Article III standing, subject to certain federal limitations. The court also decided that the New York law violations alleged here constitute a concrete and particularized harm to plaintiffs in the form of both reputational injury and limitations in borrowing capacity over the nearly ten-month period during which their mortgage discharge was unlawfully not recorded and in which the Bank allowed the public record to reflect, falsely, that plaintiffs had an outstanding debt of over $50,000.The court further concluded that the Bank's failure to record plaintiffs' mortgage discharge created a material risk of concrete and particularized harm to plaintiffs by providing a basis for an unfavorable credit rating and reduced borrowing capacity. The court explained that these risks and interests, in addition to that of clouded title, which an ordinary mortgagor would have suffered (but plaintiffs did not), are similar to those protected by traditional actions at law. Therefore, plaintiffs have Article III standing and they may pursue their claims for the statutory penalties imposed by the New York Legislature, as well as other relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded. View "Maddox v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The court held that defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction because his offense of conviction, drug-related murder in violation of 21 U.S.C. 848(e)(1)(A), is not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act. In this case, defendant was involved in the torture and killing of the victim, a rival drug dealer who robbed defendant about two weeks before his death. View "United States v. Gilliam" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that officials at the Monroe County Jail denied him adequate medical care and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment during his pretrial confinement. Plaintiff was ultimately admitted to the hospital where he was found to be in critical condition and was placed in a coma for over a month where he underwent serious surgeries. After his grievance was denied by the prison, plaintiff argued that administrative procedures were unavailable to him because he was hospitalized and in critical medical condition for over a month and therefore could not have filed a grievance within that five-day timeframe.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that administrative remedies are "unavailable" when (1) an inmate's failure to file for the administrative remedy within the time allowed results from a medical condition, and (2) the administrative system does not accommodate the condition by allowing a reasonable opportunity to file for administrative relief. In this case, administrative remedies were unavailable to plaintiff because he was hospitalized and in a critical medical condition during—and well past—the five-day timeframe to file a grievance according to the jail's grievance procedures. Furthermore, the prison made clear that it would not process any grievance filed past that five-day timeframe. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's claim on the merits. View "Rucker v. Giffen" on Justia Law