Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit held that the discretionary concurrent sentence doctrine continues to apply when a defendant collaterally attacks one of his convictions, and exercised its discretion to decline review in this case. Petitioner is currently serving numerous concurrent sentences, including two life terms in prison. Petitioner challenges one of his convictions under Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). The court concluded that, no matter the outcome of his claim, petitioner will remain in prison for the rest of his life on other counts of conviction, and a favorable decision would not shorten the amount of time he will spend incarcerated. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment without prejudice to petitioner renewing the claim if the validity of his life sentences changes in the future. View "Kassir v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that any failure by the IJ to make an explicit credibility finding requires no remand because the BIA explicitly assumed petitioner's credibility in upholding the IJ's decision, consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) & 1231(b)(3)(C). The court also concluded that the IJ, sua sponte, effectively considered the social groups identified by petitioner in this court, and the record evidence considered in light of controlling precedent does not support, much less compel, the conclusion that these social groups bear the particularity or social distinction required for withholding of removal. Finally, the court concluded that the record evidence also does not compel the conclusion that petitioner faces likely torture either directly by or indirectly with the acquiescence of Salvadoran police, as required for CAT relief. View "Quintanilla v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, which (A) declared the Board to be in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for denying a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to disabled students between the ages of 21 and 22 while providing a free public education to nondisabled students in the same age range, and (B) permanently enjoined the Board and its successors, employees, and agents, etc., from terminating, on the basis of age, FAPEs for plaintiff class members who have not received a regular high school diploma before they reach the age of 22.The court concluded that the original plaintiff, D.J., had standing to bring the action where D.J. received ten months less of special education than he would have if not for the Board's enforcement of the challenged state regulation, thereby demonstrating injury for purposes of Article III standing. Furthermore, D.J.'s standing was entirely traceable to the Board's enforcement of the regulations at issue and the injury could be redressed by judicial action. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in interpreting the IDEA term "public education" to encompass free adult education programs offered by the State of Connecticut. The court considered all of the Board's arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. View "A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an applicant for Social Security Income benefits, appeals the district court's judgment denying her motion for an extension of time to file an appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). Plaintiff contends that because of her mental impairments, she established both "good cause" and "excusable neglect" under Rule 4(a)(5) for her failure to file a timely appeal.The Second Circuit concluded that "excusable neglect," rather than "good cause," is the appropriate standard for evaluating plaintiff's claim because her failure timely to appeal was at least in part due to her own inadvertence. The court explained that, in evaluating claims of "excusable neglect" under Rule 4(a)(5), courts consider the four factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993): the risk of prejudice to the non-movant; the length of the movant's delay and its impact on the proceedings; the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the movant's reasonable control; and whether the movant acted in good faith.In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying these factors to plaintiff's claim and concluding that she failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. The court explained that because plaintiff's untimely appeal was caused by her failure to maintain contact with her attorney—a factor within her reasonable control—she failed to establish excusable neglect under the Pioneer test. While plaintiff attributes her delay to her mental illness, which she argues is beyond her control, the court determined that the record does not compel the conclusion that her impairments as opposed to her neglect caused her failure timely to appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Alexander v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal based on petitioner's failure to offer sufficient evidence that his criminal conviction—filed after the initial period for filing a direct appeal expired—goes to the merits of his conviction. The court concluded that the BIA's decision was premised on an unreasonable construction of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).The court held that the IIRIRA's definition of "conviction" is ambiguous and that the BIA reasonably determined that the finality requirement persists. However, the court need not determine whether the BIA may put limits on the finality requirement because, even assuming it may, the court held that the limitations the BIA imposed in Matter of J.M. Acosta, 27 I. & N. Dec. 420 (BIA 2018), are unreasonable. Therefore, the BIA's burden-shifting scheme and its accompanying evidentiary requirement amounts to an unreasonable and arbitrary interpretation of the IIRIRA. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Brathwaite v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit joined the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that under the expanded definition of "disability" under the ADA Amendments Act, which now covers impairments "lasting or expected to last less than six months," 28 C.F.R. 35.108(d)(ix), a short-term injury can qualify as an actionable disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.After plaintiff sustained injuries as an inmate at the Westchester County Jail by stepping on crumbled concrete in the recreational yard, he filed suit pro se against the County defendants and the medical defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The court concluded that the district court erred in categorically excluding short-term injuries from qualifying as a "disability" under the ADA. The court explained that plaintiff's claim could not be dismissed as a matter of law simply because the injury causing these limitations was temporary. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal to the extent it dismissed plaintiff's ADA claim against the County, remanded for further proceedings as to that claim, and affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims. View "Hamilton v. Westchester County" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (Count One); conspiring to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (Count Two); and possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of either the racketeering conspiracy or the narcotics conspiracy charged in the prior two counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count Three). The jury specially found that the pattern of racketeering activity charged in Count One encompassed both narcotics and murder conspiracy conduct. The jury also found that a firearm relevant to Count Three was discharged in furtherance of the Count One racketeering conspiracy but was not discharged in furtherance of the separate Count Two narcotics conspiracy. The district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment for Count Three, to be served consecutive to his concurrent 120-month sentences for Counts One and Two.The Second Circuit concluded that its recent decisions in the wake of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), preclude section 924(c) from being applied to a murder conspiracy. Therefore, given the possibility that defendant's section 924(c) conviction was based on murder conspiracy conduct rather than on a qualifying drug-trafficking offense, the court held that his conviction on Count Three is invalid. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's section 924(c) conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on the racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy charges. View "United States v. Heyward" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony but remanded for resentencing. For the reasons stated in a summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion, the court held that (1) the challenged rulings of the district court at trial were not an abuse of discretion, and (2) although it was clearly erroneous not to require the government to prove that defendant knew of his status as a felon, that error does not warrant reversal.In this opinion, the court held that, contrary to the conclusion of the district court, NYPL 120.05(1) is a "crime of violence" under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(1) in light of the court's recent decision in United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc). In Scott, the court made clear that a predicate offense is to be categorically recognized as a "crime of violence" under section 4B1.2(a)(1) where conviction requires that the defendant "intentionally caus[e] at least serious physical injury—crimes necessarily involving a use of force—. . . whether committed by acts of omission or by acts of commission." View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action challenging New York City's Third Party Transfer (TPT) Program, through which the City initiates in rem foreclosure proceedings against tax-delinquent properties and, following a foreclosure judgment, transfers ownership of the properties to third party partners who develop and manage the properties. Plaintiffs alleged federal constitutional and state law claims stemming from the transfer of their properties through the TPT. The district court dismissed the complaint.The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; the TIA is not directly applicable to plaintiffs' claims and the district court exceeded its discretion in concluding that comity bars their claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs' equal protection and due process claims, or their second takings claim – that their property was taken for a public purpose without just compensation – to the extent that for each of those claims, they seek only the value of their lost property in excess of the amount owed in taxes. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. View "Dorce v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that maritime complaints seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act must contain sufficient factual matter to satisfy the plausibility standard applicable to pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The court concluded, however, that petitioner's Second Proposed Amended Complaint met that standard, and thus the district court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion for leave to amend.In this case, petitioner sought exoneration from or limitation of liability pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30511 et seq. in connection with a fatal boating accident. The district court dismissed the maritime complaint for failure to allege sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for exoneration or limitation, and denied his motion for leave to amend. The court affirmed the judgment to the extent that it dismissed the initial complaint and denied petitioner's first motion for leave to amend, but reversed the judgment to the extent it denied the second motion for leave to amend on grounds of futility and bad faith. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bensch v. Estate of Umar" on Justia Law