Justia U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit brought by plaintiff after he sustained injuries as a result of being struck by a USPS truck. The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court erred in finding plaintiff's presentment inadequate.The court concluded that notice required for FTCA presentment must provide a reviewing agency with sufficiently specific information as to the basis of the claim, the nature of claimant's injuries, and the amount of damages sought such that the agency can reasonably understand what it must investigate to determine liability, to value the claim, and to assess the advisability of settlement. The court also concluded that an FTCA claimant can provide the specific information required for presentment by narrative, by evidence, or by other means. Furthermore, an FTCA claimant who provides a sufficiently specific narrative need not also submit substantiating evidence to satisfy presentment. The court explained that, while a failure to present such evidence can support an agency's administrative denial of a claim, it does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over an FTCA action subsequently filed by the claimant. In this case, plaintiff presented information sufficient to provide such notice. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to reinstate plaintiff's complaint. View "Collins v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board, asserting that the Board had violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by allegedly discriminating against her in denying appropriate disability accommodations for the bar examination. The district court denied the Board's motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the Board may not be sued under the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that the district court erred in determining that the Unified Court System was the appropriate department, agency, or instrumentality under the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the relevant recipient of federal funding is the "Courts of Original Jurisdiction." The court explained that, because the Board is not an operation of the "Courts of Original Jurisdiction," and because the Board does not otherwise receive any federal funding, it is immune from suit under Section 504. The court remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the Board's motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's remaining claim under the ADA. View "T.W. v. Board of Law Examiners" on Justia Law

Set Capital filed a class action against Credit Suisse, Individual Defendants, and Janus, principally alleging that, on February 5, 2018, defendants executed a complex fraud to collapse the market for VelocityShares Daily Inverse VIX Short Term Exchange Traded Notes (XIV Notes), earning hundreds of millions of dollars in profit at their investors' expense. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead a strong inference of scienter.The Second Circuit concluded that the complaint plausibly alleges a strong inference of scienter to support Set Capital's claim for market manipulation, and that it has identified actionable misstatements or omissions in the Offering Documents. However, the court agreed with the district court that the complaint does not support a strong inference that Credit Suisse and Janus acted with scienter when they failed to correct the Flatline Value during afterhours trading on February 5. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment dismissing the claims pertaining to the manipulative scheme, the alleged misstatements or omissions in the offering documents, and the corresponding liability of control persons. The court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims for failure to correct the Flatline Value, while vacating the district court's denial of leave to amend those claims. View "Set Capital LLC v. Credit Suisse Group AG" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff maintains that the Act's three-year statute of limitations for willful violations should apply to his claim because he alleged that his employer willfully violated the Act. Plaintiff asks the court to infer willfulness from the mere fact that he was asked for a period of time to perform job responsibilities typically performed by non-exempt employees even though he was classified as exempt.The court held that the mere allegation of willfulness is insufficient for a plaintiff to secure the benefit of the three-year exception to the Act's general two-year statute of limitations at the pleadings stage. Rather, for the three-year exception to apply at the pleadings stage, a plaintiff must plead facts that plausibly give rise to an inference of willfulness. In this case, plaintiff failed to do so because his allegations permit at most an inference that defendants negligently failed to reclassify him as a non-exempt employee which, without more, is insufficient. The court explained that plaintiff fails to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of defendants' willfulness. Instead, he pleads facts that are merely consistent with defendants' purported willfulness, and thus his claim stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility. View "Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of nursing homes that participate in both the Medicare and Medicaid programs, challenge the legality of DHS's Final Rule permitting survey teams conducting certain inspections of nursing homes not to include a registered nurse. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims, brought under the Medicare and Medicaid Acts, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on claim-channeling and jurisdiction-stripping provisions governing claims arising under the Medicare Act.The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 over plaintiffs' claim arising under the Medicaid Act, which does not incorporate the same claim-channeling and jurisdiction-stripping provisions as the Medicare Act. The court explained that the Medicare Act's review provisions do not preclude plaintiffs from challenging the Final Rule in federal court because their challenge is independently rooted in the Medicaid Act. Furthermore, plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claim is not inextricably intertwined with a Medicare Act claim for benefits or compliance determination, and the government's policy rationale does not support claim channeling and jurisdiction stripping in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Avon Nursing & Rehabilitation v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims against CLA and its principal for lack of Article III standing. Plaintiff and two other non-appealing plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging state law claims against CLA and its principal based on an errant email sent to all of CLA's employees containing the sensitive personal identifiable information (PII) of approximately 130 current and former CLA workers. On appeal, plaintiff argues that, even though she did not allege that her PII had actually been misused as a result of CLA's errant email, she alleged an increased risk of identity theft sufficient to confer Article III standing.The court agreed that in the context of unauthorized data disclosures, plaintiffs may establish an Article III injury in fact based solely on a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud, even when those plaintiffs have not yet been the victims of such identity theft or fraud. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish an injury in fact in this case. The court explained that plaintiff fails to allege that her PII was subject to a targeted data breach or alleges any facts suggesting that her PII (or that of any others) was misused. The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants McCoy and Nix appealed their convictions for charges related to their involvement in a series of home invasions in the Rochester, New York area in September and October 2014. In this case, defendants and others unlawfully conspired and attempted to rob other persons of commodities that had been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce, such as diamonds, watches, United States currency, and narcotics, and conspired to traffic in the stolen narcotics.Defendants principally contend (a) that they were entitled to a new trial on the ground that the juror's false voir dire responses violated their rights to be tried before a fair and impartial jury; (b) that their firearm-brandishing convictions should be reversed on the ground that none of their Hobbs Act offenses are predicate crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c); (c) that in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an essential element of the section 922(g)(1) charges of being felons in possession of firearms; and (d) that they are entitled to reduction of their sentences under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.The Second Circuit found merit in defendants' contention that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a section 924(c) crime of violence in light of United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019). Therefore, the court reversed defendants' section 924(c) convictions on Count 2 for brandishing firearms predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy. The court affirmed defendants' convictions on all other counts, as well as the denial of their motions for a new trial. The court remanded for resentencing, and for consideration by the district court of what relief, if any, may be appropriate under the First Step Act. View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal from the IJ's order removing him on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony crime of violence. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault under New York Penal Law 120.05(1) is a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a). In this case, petitioner's conviction for second-degree assault meets section 16(a)'s physical force requirement because NYPL 120.05(1) requires that a defendant (1) cause a serious physical injury to another (2) with the intent to do so. The court explained that a person who causes serious physical injury with the intent to do so, in violation of NYPL 120.05(1), necessarily uses physical force. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that NYPL 120.05(1) is overbroad. View "Thompson v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order granting in part and denying in part her motions to dismiss and reconsider dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1999), seeking money damages for, inter alia, an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have meaningful access to the courts. Plaintiff alleged that Pennsylvania state officials violated his rights by using excessive force during an arrest.The court concluded that plaintiff does not state a plausible claim under the Fifth Amendment and that the district court thus erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to defendant on that claim. In this case, plaintiff had no obligation to comply with the transport order from the state court, and plaintiff's complaint does not plausibly allege that the decision to permit plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference only telephonically rather than in person was arbitrary, or in any way prejudicial to his case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order to the extent they denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff's Fifth Amendment Bivens claim and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the claim. View "Dixon v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

After Asset Acceptance received a default judgment against plaintiff in a debt collection action, Asset Acceptance began garnishing plaintiff's wages. Plaintiff then appeared in the action, eventually entering into a stipulation of settlement. When plaintiff learned that Equifax was including the 2013 default judgment on his credit report, he filed suit alleging that, in reporting the judgment as "satisfied" and in its subsequent dealings with plaintiff, Equifax willfully and negligently violated the source-disclosure, accurate reporting, and reinvestigation provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FRCPA).The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Equifax, concluding that the district court correctly determined that Equifax's credit report was accurate; plaintiff could not establish damages arising from Equifax's allegedly negligent conduct; and that Equifax need not prove it actually interpreted the FCRA in line with its claimed reasonable interpretation to rely on the reasonable-interpretation defense established by Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007). The court considered plaintiff's remaining arguments on appeal and found no basis for reversal. View "Shimon v. Equifax Information Services LLC" on Justia Law